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This thesis presents an account of the individual within a radical feminist structural analysis of 
rape. According to radical feminism, rape is explained by the patriarchal structure that is based 
on a social construction of gender that sexually objectifies women. However, this structural 
explanation leaves the individual under-theorised. Simone de Beauvoir’s existentialism, 
combined with symbolic interactionism, can provide a theory of the subject, through which sexual 
objectification is understood as a process in the mind of the rapist. 
 
Drawing on literature from philosophy and criminology, alongside four vignettes of rape from the 
victims’ perspective, I theorise the subjectivity of the rapist in the moment of the act. The account 
of sexual objectification as a process in the mind of the rapist counters the recent shift to 
embracing sexual objectification as consistent with women’s liberation, and the anti-humanist 
trend in feminist theory. It also refutes criminological explanations of the rapist as vulnerable, 
and philosophical accounts of sex as inherently objectifying. This exposition of the rapist thereby 
challenges a range of current orthodoxies in feminist theory, philosophy and criminology. 
 
Through presenting an account of the subject as intersubjective and embodied, sexual 
objectification is defined as a denial of subjectivity that depends on the recognition of subjectivity. 
The structure of patriarchy presents men with the possibility of a dominant self-conception based 
on the sexual objectification of women. Sexual objectification as a way of seeing emerges from a 
desire for dominance. This process involves negating moral emotions, and constructing 
rationalisations that justify sexually objectifying actions. This account theorises both the subject 
and the structure. Rationalisations are drawn from the cultural narrative that defines her as a 
sexual object, but the process is initiated by his desire for dominance, and the simultaneous 
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The most basic motivation for this project is to understand the act of rape. More specifically, I 
aim to theorise the mind of the rapist through feminist theory, criminology and philosophy. 
Radical feminism provides a structural explanation of rape. This thesis will theorise the individual 
within this structural explanation. This aims to reinvigorate a radical feminist perspective, in order 
to evince the importance of critiquing the sexual objectification of women. Theorising sexual 
objectification as a process in the mind of the rapist implicates the structure of patriarchy, as well 
as the choice of the individual. When subjects are understood as embodied and intersubjective, 
the violation of rape must be understood as requiring a distortion of the rapist’s consciousness. 
This distortion is made possible through the structural framing, but it is ultimately a process 
enacted by the rapist. This thesis proposes that sexual objectification is a denial of subjectivity 
premised on the recognition of subjectivity. The process of sexual objectification is initiated by a 
desire for dominance, which produces a conception of ‘self’ and ‘other’ that disinhibits the 
emotional response that makes violation of another harmful to one’s sense of self. The final stage 
of the process of sexual objectification is the narrative construction that presents one’s actions as 
justified. This account of the subject of rape draws on Simone de Beauvoir’s  existentialism (1949; 
1953)1 and symbolic interactionism. 
 
In the first chapter I will outline the problem of rape and why it needs theorising, focusing on 
men’s rape of women and girls. The radical feminist explanation of rape was preceded by theories 
of the individual that pathologised the rapist or made the victim responsible for being raped. 
Radical feminism thereby represented a paradigm shift, changing the focus to the social structure 
as opposed to the individual victim or perpetrator. Radical feminism identifies the continuity 
between the act of rape and the social construction of gender, which is centred on the sexual 
objectification of women (Millet 1971; Brownmiller 1975; Griffin 1979; Dworkin 1981; 
MacKinnon 1989). The theory of radical feminism arises from women’s experience; it is an 
empirically grounded theory. The emergence of radical feminism propounded the perspective of 
women and exposed the role of the structure and hence the normalisation of this treatment of 
women. For these reasons, radical feminism explicitly did not theorise the individual rapist. 
Radical feminist theories have been accused of essentialism and determinism (Messerschmidt 
1993; Brown 1995; Butler 1999; Cahill 2001; Gadd and Jefferson 2007), which has led to their 
widespread dismissal. But these accusations have arguably resulted from this under-theorising of 
 
1 Original publication dates are used throughout the thesis to highlight the temporal positioning of the 
development of ideas, as this is relevant to some of the arguments developed. When page numbers are used 
for quotes or reference to a particular part of a text, the original publication date appears in square brackets 
alongside the specific publication used. 
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the individual. However, radical feminism does not deny the possibility of agency, as it proposes 
an explanation that rests on social constructionism, the structural theory implies men’s conscious 
role in the process, and the concomitant collective action and resistance evidences women’s 
agency. This suggests that theorising the individual is compatible with a radical feminist analysis. 
This chapter also considers the idea that radical feminism is discredited by intersectionality; I 
argue that recognising the intersections of oppression does not undermine the claim of women 
being sexually objectified. In looking at rape in terms of the moment of the act, a focus on the 
gendered dynamic can be justified. This thesis aims to revive the radical feminist critique of 
sexual objectification to reject the more recent arguments that sexually objectifying practices 
constitute women’s liberation and agency (Gill 2008; Jeffreys 2009; Walter 2010).  
 
The second chapter introduces how Beauvoir’s (1949) existential theory of women’s oppression 
provides a humanist account, in theorising a common humanity and a subject of consciousness. 
The common humanity of subjects is undermined by the imposition of sexual objectification 
through the social construction of gender, and men can be seen to evade responsibility for 
themselves through this. In highlighting the significant overlaps between Beauvoir’s account of 
women’s oppression and radical feminist theory, it can be suggested that radical feminism also 
presents a humanist position. Again, this underlines the idea that theorising the individual is 
compatible with a radical feminist account. Anti-humanism rejects the commonality between 
subjects and thereby rejects the coherence of theorising a subject of consciousness (Althusser 
1968; Foucault 1969). The rise of anti-humanism can be seen as an attempt to reject the existential 
subject (Soper 1986; Kruks 1990). Queer theory epitomises the shift in feminist theory towards 
anti-humanism (Butler 1999). The disagreements between radical feminism and queer theory can 
then be understood to represent the theoretical divergence between humanism and anti-humanism. 
The existential subject as a situated subject can be defended against the critiques of anti-
humanism, and with this we can establish the advantage of radical feminism for theorising 
women’s oppression. Theorising rape becomes lost when subjects and acts are reduced to 
‘discursive possibilities’, and in particular when the debate focuses on deconstructing the category 
of ‘woman’. This indicates the need to theorise materiality alongside social construction. Anti-
humanism leads to a de-politicisation of feminist theory and the stance of anti-normativity 
undermines the moral criticism of men’s violence against women. Feminism requires humanism. 
Theorising subjectivity as a common humanity – in a minimal sense of choice and agency – allows 
us to consider the harm of sexual objectification to the humanity of women, and it enables us to 
hold men responsible for sexually objectifying acts. The need to theorise men who rape suggests 
the use of Beauvoir’s (1949) existential subject to supplement the radical feminist theory, in order 
to provide a theory of the individual within the structural analysis.  
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The third chapter introduces psychosocial criminology as an attempt in criminological theory to 
combine theorising the individual with theorising the social context (Gadd and Jefferson 2007). 
The psychosocial theory of rape is represented as a rebuttal of the ‘over-social’ approach of radical 
feminism. Psychosocial theory combines the psychoanalytic subject (Klein 1975) with post-
structural discursive positions (Foucault 1969; Hollway 1984). The main theoretical supposition 
made to dispute the radical feminist focus on dominance is to insert vulnerability into the 
explanation of men’s sexual violence. Through providing a critique of the psychosocial theory of 
rape, I reinstate the value of both existentialism and radical feminism for theorising rape. In 
considering the existential rejection of the unconscious (Sartre 1943; Beauvoir 1949), it can be 
seen that the psychoanalytic subject is ultimately a determined subject in which behaviour is 
traced to early nurturing experiences. This loses the moment and the subject, providing a theory 
that does not hold men responsible for rape and instead displaces blame for men’s sexual violence 
onto failed mothers. In contrast, an existential subject maintains a focus on the moment of the act 
and the choice of the subject. Given that the alleged vulnerability of rapists is in relation to 
women’s sexuality, this can in fact be seen as part of the sexual objectification of women. This 
reinstates the radical feminist position of dominance in combination with an existential subject 
that has choice in consciousness. This chapter further argues for the advantage of the structural 
analysis of patriarchy in opposition to the post-structural account of discursive positions, in 
relation to the contrasting theories of power. The post-structural theory of the dispersal of power 
(Foucault 1976) is in fact used to locate women’s power in their sexuality. This has the effect of 
discrediting women’s testimony of rape. Through exposing the patriarchal interpretation 
encompassed in the psychosocial account I demonstrate the advantage of a radical feminist 
position.  
 
Chapter Four provides a philosophical method for theorising the subject of rape in the moment of 
the act. The method is to present four vignettes of rape from the perspective of the victim, 
including my own experience of being raped. This method develops partially in response to the 
problems with the psychosocial methodology in the use of media representations of a case, the 
presentation of rape as contested, and disbelief towards the victim (Gadd and Jefferson 2007). 
Radical feminism and the existential method of phenomenology provide support for this 
methodological choice. The abstraction in providing a brief account of the moment of rape 
facilitates a structural analysis in capturing the repetition of the act by various men. This chapter 
defines sexual objectification as a denial of subjectivity. This positions sexual objectification as 
necessarily harmful through presenting subjects as fundamentally intersubjective and embodied. 
This account of the subject, developed from Beauvoir (1949; 1953), proposes that benign sexual 
interaction is based on the recognition of subjectivity. Sexual objectification can then be the 
explanatory concept of sexual violation. The definition of sexual objectification as a denial of 
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subjectivity is further specified as including a recognition of subjectivity. The full import of an 
intersubjective and embodied account of the subject is that recognition of subjectivity cannot be 
avoided. Furthermore, recognition of subjectivity is central to the experience of domination 
achieved by the denial of subjectivity. This establishes that sexual objectification is a foundational 
distortion of consciousness that is normalised through the social construction of gender. The 
chapter then introduces symbolic interactionism as compatible with radical feminism and 
Beauvoir’s account of the subject. This brings out the idea that the intersubjective and embodied 
subject is founded on the internalisation of the perspective of the other (Goffman 1959; Scully 
1990). The definition of sexual objectification as a denial of subjectivity then explains the process 
in the mind of the rapist, through positing the negation of moral emotions. In drawing together 
the symbolic interactionist concept of ‘the looking-glass self’ (Cooley 1902) with the existential 
concept of ‘the look’ (Sartre 1943), we can understand the gaze of sexual objectification as a way 
of seeing that negates moral emotions to disrupt the self-reflection that makes it shameful to 
violate another.   
 
The final chapter continues to theorise the subject of symbolic interactionism in combination with 
the subject of existentialism to propose the narrative construction of identity (Mead 1934; Mills 
1940; Scott and Lyman 1968). In considering sexual objectification to necessarily represent a 
position of power, the process of sexual objectification emerges from his desire for dominance. 
Rationalisations are presented as complementary to the negation of moral emotions in accounting 
for sexual objectification in the mind of the rapist. The rapist is able to make his act appear 
justified through adopting the cultural definition of women as sexual objects. The cultural 
demonisation of the rapist provides a further rationalisation in representing the rapist as distinct 
from the ‘normal man’. Rationalisations involve an awareness that the act is wrong whilst 
neutralising the implication of this in terms of a negative self-reflection (Sykes and Matza 1957). 
The role of the recognition of subjectivity within the denial of subjectivity, and the role of the 
recognition of wrong-doing within the neutralisation of rationalisations, indicates a substantive 
mental process. The structure of patriarchy is not passively absorbed by men who rape; it is 
consciously endorsed. The subject must be understood within the structure, as he utilises the 
cultural definitions in his definition of self and other to make his act justified. But the subject is 
not reduced to the structure as he uses the structural framing to enact a position of dominance. 
Rape is a product of the structure of patriarchy and the choice of individual men who desire 
dominance. This theory maintains the radical feminist focus on explaining rape through 




Men who rape desire dominance; they construct themselves as dominant through constructing 
women as sexual objects. This provides a way of seeing that negates moral emotions and produces 
rationalisations that make his act justified. The negation of moral emotions and the construction 
of rationalisations for rape are ultimately an evasion of his consciousness, as he refuses to take 
responsibility for his violation of another. Sexual objectification represents the structure of 
patriarchy in the social construction of gender, but sexual objectification can also be understood 
as a process in the mind of the individual. This account humanises the rapist without presenting 
a sympathetic portrayal that lessens his responsibility for his choice to rape. This account 
establishes the pressing need to critically contest the representation of women as sexual objects. 
Too many girls and women have their subjectivity stifled through the act of rape. The inclusion 
of my own experience of being raped presents an attempt to regain subjectivity through writing; 
to refuse the shame and questioning imposed on victims of rape, and to turn this to critically 
consider the subject of the rapist. As he becomes the object of my study, I reinstate my own 


























Chapter One  




This chapter will begin by outlining the problem of rape and how it is gendered and prevalent. I 
will explore previous individualised accounts of rape that either pathologise the rapist or make 
the victim responsible. This contextualises the development of the structural explanation of rape 
provided by radical feminism. I will highlight the role of sexual objectification in radical feminist 
theory. I will then consider how radical feminism has been widely rejected as essentialist and 
deterministic. I will defend radical feminism against the charge of essentialism and determinism: 
taking these criticisms to indicate how the individual is currently under-theorised in a structural 
analysis, instead of suggesting the analysis denies the possibility of agency. In considering the 
intersectional critique of radical feminism I will propose that a focus on the gendered dyad is 
problematic when considering the reaction to rape and the representation of rape, but that it can 
be justified when considering the act of rape itself. Gadd and Jefferson’s (2007) critique of 
criminological theory clarifies the need to theorise the subject alongside theorising the social 
context. I will finally motivate the need to re-theorise radical feminism by considering the post-
feminist attempt to reclaim objectification as a position of agency. 
 
This chapter will establish that: rape needs theorising; the structural analysis provided by radical 
feminism is a compelling and grounded explanation of the prevalence and gendered dynamic of 
rape; radical feminism under-theorises the individual within the structural analysis. 
 
Section One: Rape 
 
This section will define rape and demonstrate that it is gendered and prevalent. I will present the 
harm of rape as a reason to need to understand the action, and justify why rape needs theorising. 
I will then consider theories of the rapist that preceded second-wave feminism.  
 
1.1 Outlining the Problem 
 
In UK law, the criminal offence of rape is contained within the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and it 
is defined as ‘the intentional penetration of the vagina, anus or mouth of another person with his 
penis, when the other person does not consent to the penetration, and it is not reasonably believed 
that the person consents’ (Sexual Offences Act 2003 1:1). This thesis will not take a legalistic 
approach, for reasons that will be discussed in this chapter. However, this definition provides a 
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starting point for locating the topic of study. My interest is not in whether or not a case legally 
constitutes rape and hence how we can establish the absence of consent; my focus is on how to 
explain sexual interaction that violates the subjectivity of the other. 
 
Rape is a gendered crime, with the overwhelming majority of perpetrators being male, 
whilst females are disproportionality victimised. The latest CPS statistics reveal that 98.2% of 
perpetrators for rape were men (CPS 2019: A25). This follows from the definition of rape 
specifying penetration with a penis. A female therefore cannot legally commit rape but if she 
assists a male in an attack, then she may be found guilty of rape (CPS). Rape is the only sexual 
offence that is circumscribed by the perpetrators’ sexual organs and therefore other sexual 
offences could in principle be as easily committed by females. Other sexual offences 
include ‘assault by penetration’ which involves penetration using any body part or instrument 
and ‘sexual assault’ defined as unwanted sexual touching (Sexual Offences Act 2003 1:2; 1:3). 
For sexual offences excluding rape, the gender skew remains with men making up 97.2% of 
defendants (CPS 2019: A29). These statistics on reported sexual offences are mirrored by 
findings from the Crime Survey for England and Wales, collating data from 2017 – 2020, 98% of 
sexual assault by rape or penetration was perpetrated by males (ONS 2021a: section 4). Statistical 
data consistently reveals that women and girls are disproportionality the victims of sexual 
offences, with 19.6% of females having been a victim of a sexual offence since the age of 16, 
compared with 2.7% of males (MoJ 2013: 18). In terms of reported cases of rape the complainant 
was female in 83.9% of cases (CPS 2019: A25). This leads the Ministry of Justice to state that 
“gender is a key factor related to the risk of sexual offence victimisation” (MoJ 2013: 13).  
 
Given that the vast majority of perpetrators of rape are male and a disproportionate amount of 
victims are female, this thesis focuses on rape perpetrated by men against women and girls. This 
is not to deny or trivialise the rape of males, but simply to locate a specific problem that I will 
theorise.2 The most recent report on Violence Against Women and Girls provided an analysis of 
the age of victims of sexual offences, finding that girls and young women are at most risk with 
“48.5% of complainants aged 24 or under and 15.5% aged 14 – 17” (CPS 2019: A26). In this 
thesis I will refer to the sexual objectification of women and sexual violence against girls/women, 
when referring to the sexual objectification of women this should be understood as a shorthand 
for the sexual objectification of girls and women. 
 
 
2 In the next chapter I will suggest that the radical feminist explanation of rape is able to explain high levels 
of sexual violence against trans people. In Chapter Five I will also briefly consider how the radical feminist 
explanation can account for men’s sexual violence against boys and men. 
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In the UK the estimated prevalence for the most serious sexual offences, including rape, are that 
per year there are between 68,000 and 103,000 female victims and between 5,000 and 19,000 
male victims (MoJ 2013: 12). This indicates that sexual violence is not a marginal issue. Due to 
the worldwide prevalence of sexual violence it has been termed a “major public health problem” 
(WHO 2021). Another indication of the prevalence of this form of violence is the continuous 
media ‘revelations’ of large scale sexual abuse. For instance, the decades of sexual abuse carried 
out by Jimmy Saville and other men in positions of power investigated through ‘Operation 
Yewtree’, and further police investigations into historical child sexual abuse perpetrated by 
politicians (House of Lords 2016). Child sexual exploitation (CSE) has been uncovered in various 
cities all over the UK (Berelowitz et al. 2012; Coffey 2014; Bedford 2015). There have also been 
revelations of widespread and systematic sexual violence perpetrated by men in the entertainment 
industry, such as Harvey Weinstein, Bill Cosby, and Rolf Harris. This recent media spotlight on 
rape led to a viral outpouring of many women voicing their experiences of rape and sexual 
harassment through the hashtag ‘Me Too’.3 These cases again portray the gendered dynamic of 
sexual violence, with the perpetrators being male whilst the majority of victims are female.  The 
widespread nature of this form of violence makes understanding the possibility of the act of rape 
imperative. 
 
Having established what rape is and that it is prevalent and gendered, I will now discuss why rape 
needs theorising. Firstly, the act of rape needs theorising because it is a harmful action and 
explanation of social harm can lead to strategies for prevention. The humiliation and violation of 
one’s subjectivity in the act of rape can leave victims with low self-esteem, a sense of 
worthlessness and hopelessness, and mental health conditions such as depression or PTSD 
(Jordan et al. 2010). The loss of bodily integrity can lead to a difficulty in embodiment, which is 
crucial to one’s ability to act in the world. Another harm that arises from rape can be difficulty in 
experiencing sexual pleasure (Becker and Skinner 1983). Rape can be an extremely isolating 
experience. Many victims experience a sense of guilt and shame and find themselves unable to 
speak to others about what has happened to them (Bhuptani and Messman-Moore 2019).  
 
Furthermore, the gendered dynamic of rape and its prevalence means that this harm is not limited 
to those who are actually themselves victims of rape. For girls and women, the possibility of being 
raped exists in one’s consciousness. This fear of being raped limits women’s ‘space for action’ 
(Lundgren 1998) because far more than men they have to factor personal safety into their daily 
 
3 This testimonial movement was started in 2006 by Tarana Burke, an African American activist, in order 
to create a community for survivors of sexual violence. After becoming a viral hashtag in 2016 it was 
subsequently taken up in countries all over the world (Ghadery 2019). Although the most media attention 
was paid to Hollywood actresses (privileged white women), it is not correct to suggest this movement was 
limited to this demographic. 
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routines (Stanko 1990). This fear of personal safety can be and has consistently been used as a 
reason for girls and women needing male protection, interfering with women’s independence and 
autonomy. This individual and collective harm of rape can be used to suggest that rape is 
indicative of and constitutive of a system of oppression. I will return to this consideration in 
establishing a radical feminist explanation of rape. For now, it is sufficient to note that theorising 
rape is important because the act can be used to theorise oppression. 
 
Sexual violence has been widely researched but remains under-theorised (Herbele and Grace 
2009). Furthermore, the hidden nature of sexual violence provides an importance to theorising the 
consciousness of those who perpetrate the act. Rape remains a largely hidden crime in terms of 
official reporting, with an estimated 11% of rapes in the UK being reported to the police (Stern 
2010: 32). This low level of reporting remains consistent with the latest Crime Survey for England 
and Wales finding that less than 16% of people who experienced rape or assault by penetration 
reported it to the police (ONS 2021a: section 1). Jones suggests that “a cautious approach needs 
to be taken to any statistical data on sexual violence due to the unknown level of unreported 
violence” (2011: 186). Of the rapes that are reported very few lead to prosecution and even fewer 
lead to a conviction; in 2019 – 2020 there were 55,259 reported rapes with “only 2,102 
prosecutions and 1,439 convictions” (EVAW 2021: 7). The way in which the recorded statistics 
and convicted populations represent a minority of sexual violence compels a theoretical analysis 
that is grounded in the reality of sexual violence, without being circumscribed to the visible 
margins of the offence. This is why I propose philosophically theorising the possibility of the 
perpetrator’s mind. 
  
1.2 Theories of the Individual  
 
The overall aim of this thesis is to theorise the mind of the perpetrator in the act of rape. It is 
therefore important to understand how the individual has previously been theorised. I will focus 
on the individualised theories that predominated as explanations of rape prior to the second-wave 
feminist movement in the late 1960s. This is not to suggest that theorising rape at the level of the 
individual is limited to this time period, but it provides important historical context of a paradigm 
shift from explaining rape on the level of the individual to the level of the social structure. I will 
briefly outline three broad approaches to theorising the individual in the act of rape: 
pathological/perverse; psychoanalytic; victim precipitation. 
 
For much of the 19th and 20th century, theorising about sexual violence was dominated by 
biological and psychological theories. The sexually violent man was considered an aberration and 
the explanation of his behaviour was squarely focused on the individual. Rape was categorised 
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amongst perceived sexual perversions, such as homosexuality and prostitution. The moralism in 
such explanation focuses on the sexual nature of the act rather than its violence. The perversion 
was seen to be pathological. Understanding sexual deviance as a medical or psychological 
problem related to the increasing influence of psychiatry (De Block and Adriaens 2013). No 
longer was illness restricted to the body, but the mind –  and therefore behaviour –  could now be 
explained through the lens of pathology. 
 
Krafft-Ebing (1886) suggested that sadomasochism was at the basis of sexual relationships, if 
such impulses were uncontrolled, this endangered individuals and society, thus requiring 
repression “by social constraints and self-control” (Oosterhuis 2012: 141). Sexual domination is 
not seen as deviant in itself, but the urge to sexually dominate must be repressed and controlled. 
The rapist has a failure of self-control and is in this way differentiated from the rest of society. 
The pathological explanation of the rapist resulted in treatment of sex offenders as patients 
(Oosterhuis 2012). Treatment through sterilisation or castration illustrates the theory of the rapist 
having uncontrollable sexual desires.  
 
Lombroso (1897), who is widely seen as the forefather of criminology, located the cause of 
offending within the body of the offender. He theorised that there were criminal types that could 
be physically differentiated; the biology of the individual was the explanatory base of the 
behaviour. In terms of rapists, he suggested that they were “atavistic throwbacks” (D’Cruze 2011: 
39). Whether inscribed into the mind, body or character of the offender, the individualised 
conceptualisation was that sexually violent men could be distinguished and differentiated from 
the norm.  Thus “the identification of sexual violence with deviance and marginality had become 
authorised by the emergent discourses of criminology, psychiatry and subsequently psychology” 
(D’Cruze 2011: 38).  
 
Alongside the deviant sexual offender, female victims have variously been interpreted as 
contributing to their own violation or in fact desiring rape due to an innate masochism. The 
individual explanations of psychoanalysis provided a sympathetic reading of the offender and a 
pathologised interpretation of the victim. Many of Freud's female patients reported sexual abuse, 
Freud at first attributed hysteria to this abuse (Freud and Breuer 1895). But he then rescinded this 
suggestion and reinterpreted the reports as fabrication (Freud 1915a). The “recollections of early 
sexual abuse are replaced by recollections of incestuous childhood desires and phantasies of their 
consummation” (Meyers 2002: 78). This becomes central to Freud’s (1915a) explanation of 
identification with mother and father figures. The Oedipus complex in which the child sexually 
lusts after the parent of the opposite sex means that “family romance as a childhood fantasy” is 
central to the construction of identity (Meyers 2002: 85). Placing the revelations of sexual 
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violence as evidence of the child’s internal process of identification “was instrumental in creating 
a climate of tyrannical scepticism about incest and child abuse” (Webster 2005: 513). This 
diffusion of the testimony of sexual violence into fantasy meant that “for much of the twentieth 
century rapes by fathers and authority figures were readily absorbed by psychoanalytic 
explanation as pure fantasy” (Gavey 2005: 18).  
 
Alleged rape fantasies served to reveal female masochism: “in this sense, actual physical rape 
was the natural outcome of the female’s pain-inflicting psyche” (Albin 1977: 424). Albin traces 
how various projective psychoanalytic techniques suggested that “sex offenders were fearful, 
inadequate, sensitive, shy, impulsive, irresponsible, expected too much sex, lacked social skills, 
had a self-concept confused in psychosexual areas of identification and were unable to evaluate 
the consequences of their own behaviour” (ibid: 426). The psychoanalytic reading is thus far more 
sympathetic than the pathological diagnosis. Fear and shyness are states of the human condition; 
the sex offender is thereby humanised as his violence is seen to emanate from his own insecurity. 
This sympathetic portrayal is achieved through blaming “victims, mothers and wives of sex 
offenders” (ibid: 429).   
 
Amir's (1968) theory of victim-precipitated forcible rape provides a further individualised theory 
that serves to blame victims. With the concept of victim precipitation Amir proposes the victim’s 
involvement in her own attack, by drawing upon von Hentig’s (1940) proposal regarding the 
interaction between the perpetrator and victim. According to Amir (1968), victim acts of 
commission include accepting a lift or a drink with the offender, whilst acts of omission consist 
of a failure to strongly reject sexual suggestions. What is interesting about Amir’s account is that 
the dismissal of a woman’s actual behaviour in favour of how the offender interprets her 
behaviour provides the kernel of a feminist theory; irrespective of her behaviour, she will be seen 
as sexually available because she is female. Amir states “wrongly or rightly, a woman’s 
behaviour, if passive, may be seen as worthy to suit action, and if active it may be taken as an 
actual promise of success for one’s sexual intentions” (1968: 494). The phrasing of ‘wrongly or 
rightly’ seems to undermine Amir’s own argument. If the offender’s interpretation is wrong, then 
it does not seem she precipitated the attack. Another quote demonstrates the completely flawed 
argumentation put forward by Amir, as he claims that “the truth about the would-be victim’s 
behaviour are unimportant here. It is highly probable that often the would-be offender will 
misinterpret the behaviour and the situation” (ibid).  Amir simultaneously dismisses the truth 
about how the victim behaved and blames the victim’s behaviour for precipitating the attack. If 
the victim is blamed for precipitating the attack even if this is based on a misinterpretation, the 




All of these individualised theories can be seen to directly serve patriarchy and thus contribute to 
the continuation of rape. The individualised theories of rape can all be seen as androcentric; not 
only were they written by men, but women’s perspective is eliminated. As Messerschmidt notes, 
criminology was “traditionally written by men and primarily about men and boys” and yet such 
theories were ‘gender-blind’ (1993: 1). If ‘human’ equals ‘man’ (because women are eliminated 
from discourse), then the fact that all rapists are men does not provide a relevant factor for 
theorising the cause of rape. Scully (1990) describes the explanations of sexual violence prior to 
second-wave feminism as having three implications: absolving the perpetrator of responsibility; 
disconnecting sexually violent men from normal men; searching for causes and solutions in the 
individual and not the culture. Freud (1915a) eliminated women’s perspective by undermining 
their testimony and then making women responsible for men’s abuse. The rape myths embodied 
in Amir's (1968) theory indicate the impossibility of rape: if the acceptance of a lift is an 
acceptance of sexual access, then almost all of women's behaviour can be interpreted as sexual 
invitation.  
 
If rape occurs due to pathology, then the individual man is absolved of responsibility. The notion 
of an insatiable sexual impulse again absolves the individual of responsibility, as if he was overrun 
by his sexual desire as a force within him rather than directed by him. This contributes to the 
stereotype of men having insatiable sexual appetites. The corollary of this is that females must be 
available to satiate this desire. In this way, it can be seen that the individualised narrative of 
pathology separates the sexually violent man from the norm, whilst also reinforcing the normality 
of an uncontrollable male sexual desire. Whilst the narrative of pathology leaves the cultural 
structures unexamined, the narrative of sexual impulse naturalises the cultural construction of 
sexuality into a biological necessity.  
 
The focus on the sexual nature of the act and the way in which urges of sexual domination were 
naturalised was crucial to justifying repression and control of sexuality. The notion that sexuality 
is a dangerous drive that needs to be controlled is translated into women needing to be controlled. 
Gavey states that “while women were portrayed as sexually passive in relation to men, they were 
also imbued with a dangerous lurking sexuality that could be invoked in all sorts of ways to 
explain and justify rape” (2005: 19). Women were perceived as sexual temptation and thus as a 
corrupting force. Both the explanations that pathologised the offender for failing to contain his 
sexual desire and the explanations that made women responsible for inviting violation, were 
central to a narrative in which women needed to be controlled by men. The absence of theorising 
the mind of the rapist within radical feminism needs to be seen in the context of the role of 
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individualised theories in contributing to patriarchy. I will now discuss the structural explanation 
of rape provided by radical feminism. 
 
Section Two: Radical Feminism  
 
This section will outline the development of radical feminist theory from women sharing 
experiences with each other, exposing the prevalence of men’s sexual violence against women. 
The prevalence of this treatment of women resulted in the conclusion that this behaviour was 
normalised, locating the problem in the structure of patriarchy. The social construction of gender 
can be seen to inscribe positions of sexual object and sexual subject. Radical feminism contained 
inspiring acts of resistance, but I will propose separating radical feminist theory from the call for 
legal intervention. I will then summarise what I take from a radical feminist explanation of rape, 
proposing that the central premise of a radical feminist theory is that the social construction of 
masculinity and femininity involves the sexual objectification of women. Rape is an affirmation 
of a masculine identity. This will dispute the claim that radical feminism explains rape as 
‘violence not sex’. I will finally explain the reason for radical feminism explicitly not theorising 
the individual.  
 
2.1 The Rise of Radical Feminism 
 
Radical feminist explanation was developed by women and centralised women’s experiences and 
the role of gender in the explanation of rape. It therefore disrupted the androcentric theorising that 
preceded it. The shift in explanation is not only from the individual to the structure, but also from 
a focus on men to considering the perspective (and existence) of women. As I will explain, a 
radical feminist explanation focuses attention on the way in which women are seen in a patriarchal 
society and this develops from providing a voice to women’s experience. The radical feminist 
explanation of rape refuted the idea of rape being a rare act explained through individual 
pathology (Brownmiller 1975; Griffin 1979). Exposing the widespread nature of rape was crucial 
to this, as the pathological explanation is reliant on the notion that this act is committed by a few 
individuals. The other crucial departure from previous explanations was the finding that rape was 
not predominately perpetrated by strangers but by husbands, friends, and family members. Rape 
was an act embedded within relationships.  
 
The development of this new theory of rape arose from women’s consciousness-raising groups in 
which women discussed their experiences in women-only spaces (MacKinnon 1989; Mackay 
2015). This methodology is central to understanding radical feminist theory. Not only was rape 
found to be widespread, but it was found that many acts of violence were committed by men 
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against women. Furthermore, it was found that this violence was often sexual in nature. This 
brought together theorising on rape, domestic violence, street harassment, prostitution, 
trafficking, pornography, child-abuse. This not only included acts that were legally prohibited, 
but also everyday experiences such as being subjected to wolf-whistling. The feminist slogan of 
‘the personal is political’ encapsulates how individual acts experienced by individual women 
could no longer be seen as isolated incidents; this treatment of women was systematic (Hanisch 
1970).  
 
The beginnings of women sharing experiences with each other was formalised into social science 
research (Dines 2012). Studies such as Koss et al. (1987) and Russell and Howell (1983) 
confirmed the prevalence of sexual violence. Kelly’s (1988) notion of a continuum developed 
from her qualitative research. The ‘continuum of sexual violence’ includes acts such as rape and 
sexual murder, but it also includes unwanted sexual approaches by men and being evaluated by 
men in public. The need to theorise this as a continuum is because in women’s experience these 
acts convey the same entitlement to the sexual use of her body, and consequently they ‘share a 
common character’ (Kelly 1988: 75). These acts create a system in which she lives under the male 
gaze. The importance of appreciating the confluence of this treatment of girls and women can be 
seen by the finding that in an environment in which girls experience extensive street harassment, 
they become dismissive of “even the most serious threats of violence” (Westmarland 2015: 104). 
 
Uncovering the extent of sexual violence against women revealed that this was a problem with 
how women were being seen. This treatment of women was normalised. If it is not tenable to see 
rape as deviant and thus sharply distinguished from ‘normal’ sex, then we must question what is 
normal. In questioning what is considered normal, ‘pathology’ is located in the structures of the 
society rather than individuals. The realisation of a collective experience transformed the notion 
of individual harm into a political injustice. This leads to theorising patriarchy – a system of male 
domination. Patriarchy is seen as a form of social organisation; it is therefore not necessary or 
impervious to change, rather it is formed and sustained by the individuals within the society. The 
structure is political not biological.  
 
Radical feminists viewed the gender binary as a social construction facilitating male domination. 
Masculinity and femininity are constructs, constituted through binary opposition. Masculinity is 
associated with being active, strong, brave; whilst femininity is associated with being passive, 
weak, vulnerable. Instead of accepting these differences as biologically driven, radical feminism 
considered the way in which we are socialised into “patriarchal polities with regard to 
temperament, role and status” (Millet 1971: 27). Not only do roles of socialisation portray this 
dynamic of subject and object, the law can also be seen to inscribe these relational positions, as 
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‘for most of patriarchal history women have been defined as chattel’ (Dworkin 1981: 101). The 
law on rape was constructed as a property crime against the father or husband, it was not 
considered a violation of the woman; this property model of rape was not “seriously challenged 
until late into the 20th century” (du Toit 2009: 34). Furthermore, the very notion of ‘consent’ 
suggests a contractual model of relations in which one party initiates and the other acquiesces. 
The idea of reciprocity and mutuality between equals is absent from the legal conception 
(Pateman 1980; Pineau 1989). Until 1991 in the UK there was a marital exemption to rape because 
marriage was seen to provide the husband with uncontested sexual access to his wife (Law 
Commission 1992). Explicit legal definitions of women as men’s sexual property support the 
radical feminist analysis that rape is consistent with the ways in which men and women are 
encouraged to construct themselves.   
 
Patriarchy as a system of oppression is based on a woman’s definition as a sexual object. Sexual 
entitlement to female bodies is expressed through the wolf-whistle, the slap of the bum, and the 
sexual ‘compliments’ in inappropriate contexts. This is the same entitlement that is communicated 
by the expectation for women to spend time on their appearance, and the legal transfer of a woman 
from the ownership of her father to the ownership of her husband. Under this constructed system, 
rape does not stand out in stark opposition to other experiences. In fact, rape is an act that confirms 
what she is told she is throughout society. The way in which rape is normalised explains the 
possibility of women describing experiences of rape, while denying the label. The possibility of 
seeing sexual violence as ‘just sex’, implicates the socio-cultural environment (Gavey 2005).  
 
The act of rape cannot be seen as deviant when it coheres with the encouraged forms of identity 
construction within society. In this way, rape was explained as a normal expression of 
masculinity. Rape does not violate social norms; it affirms the social norms of a gender binary 
that is based on dominance and submission. In this contra positioning, masculinity is defined 
through the relative subjugation of the feminine. The psychopathological explanation of rape is 
replaced by a socio-cultural explanation. The structures of patriarchy – enforced heterosexuality 
in which men are defined as subjects and women are defined as sexual objects – explains rape. 
Rape affirms a masculine sense of self because under patriarchy his identity is based on her 
objectification. Rape confirms these positions and as such it is emblematic of the wider system of 
male supremacy.  
 
Not only does this explanation of rape arise from women’s experiences, it developed alongside 
acts of resistance. Radical feminists set up refuges for women fleeing domestic violence and they 
set up rape crisis centres (Mackay 2015). The recognition that women were oppressed and that 
this involved specific sites of violence, led to women collecting together to provide support to 
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each other. They also organised forms of activism, such as protesting ‘Miss World’ competitions 
and starting Reclaim the Night marches (ibid). A radical feminist theory further advocated 
personal empowerment through rejecting the constraints imposed by femininity: they questioned 
why women should remove their body hair (Hillman 2013), they encouraged women to become 
embodied through sport and self-defence classes (Gavey 2005).4 Radical feminist theory was built 
‘ground-up’ from women’s experiences, and it was also directed back into reality in terms of how 
oppression could be resisted. 
 
Some radical feminists have called for increasing regulation and criminalisation, but to do this is 
to collude with the state.5 For instance, MacKinnon and Dworkin (1988) developed civil rights 
legislation for those harmed by pornography, the consequence of this ordinance is said to amount 
to censorship (Duggan and Hunter 1995). MacKinnon (1979) also developed the legal concept of 
sexual harassment. Instead of advocating for legal interventions, the conclusion I draw from 
radical feminist theory is the need for radical social change. Firstly, given that the law has been 
central to the definition of women as sexual objects, the state has helped to create the problem so 
cannot be relied on to provide a solution to women’s oppression. Secondly, the effort at 
punishment is futile in an environment that encourages this treatment of women. To provide an 
analogy it is like attempting to deal with a mouse infestation by trapping one mouse at a time 
instead of locating the origin of the infestation; the mice keep breeding so the problem remains, 
just as there will continue to be men who violate women unless the structures of the society are 
radically altered. This is exemplified by a quote from a girl in a report on child sexual exploitation: 
“But there are so many men out there and if we report one then the others will still not go away” 
(Coffey 2014: 11). Finally, the role of the criminal justice system in producing and maintaining 
class and race oppression means that this attempt to protect women can have ramifications for 
contributing to other structures of oppression. This argument will be further established later in 
the chapter through considering the critiques of intersectionality. Given this, I suggest any 
particular radical feminist invocation of legal intervention should be extricated from radical 
feminist theory itself. 
 
2.2 Sexual Objectification 
 
I propose that the crux of radical feminism is to analyse the social construction of gender as the 
sexual objectification of women. This explains both the prevalence and the gendered dynamic of 
 
4 The way in which the removal of body hair makes a woman’s body pre-pubescent makes this a particularly 
pernicious cultural norm given high levels of child-abuse, it is also a cultural norm that tenaciously persists. 
 
5 Radical feminist theorists are pejoratively referred to as ‘governance feminists’ or ‘carceral feminists’. 
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rape. I take it to be fairly non-contentious that rape is an act of sexual objectification. What can 
be understood from the absence of consent is the denial of subjectivity in rape. The culture 
encourages the development of masculine subjectivity based on the objectification of women. 
Rape as an act of sexual objectification then provides a performance of masculinity. The way 
women are viewed through the construction of the gender binary means that the act of rape can 
be experienced as self-affirming; affirming of one’s dominance as a man. Rape is explained by 
the structures of patriarchy. Rape is an act of power that makes a subject into an object. Male 
power is eroticised and hence it is not coincidental that this act of domination is sexual in nature. 
Equally, the power gained from the act is imperative to understand the meaning given to sexual 
relations under patriarchy.  
 
When we consider the role of sexual objectification within the heterosexual binary of identity 
construction, we can see that radical feminism does not propose that rape is violence not sex. If 
heterosexual identity constructions are founded on sexual object and subject positions, then the 
violence of rape is necessarily sexual. It is through sexual positioning that dominance is asserted. 
The social meaning of being masculine or feminine is sexual and thus the act of rape in order to 
achieve its goal of power is necessarily sexual. The value of the radical feminist explanation must 
be seen from the perspective that it develops from reality; the problem of this treatment of women 
is not created and the explanation is not given in abstraction. Rather, women discussing 
experiences with each other found that sexual objectification was rife throughout their lives. The 
recent ‘Me Too’ movement makes it clear that sexually objectifying treatment of women remains 
ubiquitous.  
 
Brownmiller’s (1975) insistence on the violence of the act of rape was essential given the 
individualised accounts that preceded second-wave feminism, in which rape was seen to result 
from uncontrollable sexual urges or women’s sexual temptation. The introduction of women’s 
voices into the explanation was to suggest that rape was not simply about sex but about power, 
and in this way the act must be seen as one of violence. If Brownmiller is rejected from a 
reductionist perspective that suggests she denied the sexual aspect of rape, we “lose sight of the 
social context in which the early feminist analysis of rape was developing. This analysis did not 
arise as an abstract philosophical treatise, but as a practical theory directed to the social conditions 
for women at the time” (Gavey 2005: 31).  
 
The way in which the individual is under-theorised in radical feminist theory can be seen as a 
product of the intentional positioning of radical feminism. The previous theories of rape were 
individualised and focused solely on men’s perspectives. Radical feminism introduced a structural 
analysis through the introduction of women’s experience into the discussion. As Albin states, the 
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“focus on rape-as-power interpretation reflects an intentional bias against psychiatric analyses of 
rape which have reinforced cultural (i.e., male) stereotypes of women” (1977: 431). Looking at 
the individual tends towards distinguishing what is abnormal or unusual about the individual; a 
radical feminist theory is premised on displaying the way in which the individual rapist does not 
stand out as an aberration. Given this, there is reason to explicitly avoid theorising the individual. 
Furthermore, the relentless focus on men’s experiences, and theories developed by men had led 
to the complete exclusion of women’s perspective. The radical feminist reinsertion of a female 
perspective meant that the focus was explicitly on women’s experiences – individualising the 
rapist goes against the attempt to provide a platform for women to articulate their oppression. In 
order to establish the need to theorise the individual within a radical feminist analysis I will now 
consider the way in which radical feminism has become a widely rejected perspective. 
 
Section Three: Rejections of Radical Feminism and Responses 
 
Criticisms of radical feminist theory centre around the accusations of essentialism and 
determinism, summed into statements such as ‘all heterosexual sex is rape’ and ‘all men are 
rapists’. These charges of essentialism and determinism are often ill-defined and include a 
multitude of criticisms within them. At the base of these criticisms, however, is that a radical 
feminist theory eliminates agency (Messerschmidt 1993; Brown 1995; Butler 1999; Cahill 2001; 
Gadd and Jefferson 2007). In response to these criticisms, post-structuralism has gained 
predominance within feminist theory. This section will explore these critiques and the consequent 
move away from a structural analysis. The methodology and praxis of radical feminism counters 
the claim that the theory undermines the possibility of agency. What can be taken from these 
criticisms is that agency – in the form of the individual – remains under-theorised. The criticisms 
do not necessitate the rejection of radical feminism, but indicate the need for further theorising 
within this framework.  
 
I will then consider the critique of intersectionality, that focusing exclusively on gender fails to 
account for the intersections of oppression. This leads me to distinguish the act of rape, the 
representation of rape and the reaction to rape. I suggest that a focus on the gendered dyad is 
justified when theorising the act of rape, but problematic when theorising the representation of 
rape or the reaction to rape. The way in which women are sexually objectified can depend on 
other aspects of their social positioning, but specific accounts of the oppression of black women 
reveal the centrality of sexual objectification to sexual violence. Finally I will consider how 
theorising the individual on a structural analysis can avoid criticisms of determinism. This 





One of the charges against radical feminism is to claim that the theory relies on biological 
essentialism. The analysis of sex-class invokes biological categories of male and female. If 
positions of oppressor and oppressed are inscribed into biology, then this makes the situation of 
oppression necessary and hence unchangeable. If biology determines action, then agency has been 
lost. Cahill suggests that if all men are potential rapists and all women are potential victims, this 
becomes “a biological reality, beyond politics” (2001: 21). Further to this, Butler (1999) denies 
the sex/gender distinction, claiming that biological categories of sex are also socially constructed, 
and she compels the deconstruction of ‘woman’. In theorising women’s experience and women’s 
oppression, the category of woman precludes multiplicity and in itself constructs an essentialist 
category. Fixed categories are seen to mystify and obstruct the fluid nature of agency and identity, 
constructed through discourse. If there is no such thing as ‘woman’, then the basis of the radical 
feminist analysis is undermined. While this section will go on to focus on a defence of radical 
feminism against the charges of essentialism and determinism, the next chapter considers this 
debate in terms of the shift towards anti-humanism. 
 
The radical feminist position that heterosexuality and the gender binary are overarching structures 
of oppression is seen to have universalising effects: all men become oppressors, whilst all women 
become victims. If the rapist is the normal man, then every man is the rapist. If all women are 
victims, women are denied agency and hence the possibility for resistance, defined only as 
victims. Cahill claims this analysis presents “a dichotomous model of power dynamics whereby, 
by definition, women are victims and men are oppressors” (2001: 44). If rape is understood 
through normative heterosexual practices in which dominance and submission are seen to be 
written into the oppositional construction of masculinity and femininity, then it is claimed that all 
sex becomes rape. The criticism is that making rape essentially similar to heterosexual sex loses 
the possibility for distinguishing between rape and sex. If the structure is fully determining, then 
agency has been removed, making the positions of oppressor and oppressed necessary and 
irredeemable. 
 
The grand-narrative and totality of a structural analysis is responded to by post-structuralism with 
the idea of power working at the micro-level in which individuals occupy multiple positions of 
power relative to one another. Claims of all men and all women are seen to be reductive, the focus 
on the micro-dynamics of power is needed to complicate the analysis in order to allow for agency 
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(Showden 2012).6 This relates to the ‘feminist fault-line’ around the sex industry. Radical 
feminists consider prostitution and pornography as forms of male violence against women. 
Feminists on the other side of the debate, however, argue that as these practices are not universally 
experienced as violations, to use them in an analysis of patriarchal structures directly silences 
women who gain a sense of agency and identity through these sexual practices (ibid). Radical 
feminists are thus pejoratively categorised as sex-negative, whilst post-structural analysis – in 
allowing multiplicity – is said to be sex-positive, which allows for women’s sexual agency. A 
structural analysis based upon this universal victimisation serves to undermine women’s 
proclamations of agency by instead defining them as unknowing victims. 
 
The turn towards post-structuralism in feminist theory suggests that these criticisms of radical 
feminism have been largely accepted.7 This is further demonstrated by the way in which radical 
feminism is regularly dismissed off-hand, without detailed discussion; rejections of radical 
feminism often dispute the whole theoretical perspective based on an individual theorist, or even 
a single line within a text. It has become common knowledge that radical feminism is essentialist 
and deterministic. Rape is a central topic within radical feminist theory: the move away from 
radical feminism is coupled with the act of rape being decentralised and sometimes omitted 
entirely from feminist theory. Mardorossian states that “rape has become academia’s under-
theorised and apparently un-theorisable issue” (2002: 743). I will trace how a post-structuralist 
position displaces the theorising of rape. In this way, I will argue that in order to understand the 
act of rape these criticisms should be further considered before rejecting a structural analysis.  
 
The call for multiple complex narratives of the micro-dynamics of power leans away from an act 
such as rape in which there are determined positions of perpetrator and victim, and power is 
possessed by one individual and exercised over another individual. The sex-positive line of 
theorising reclaims the practices of prostitution and pornography. The act in which there is no 
dispute of the absence of women’s agency becomes under-theorised in an attempt to reassert 
sexual agency. Furthermore, the deconstruction of woman and the condemning of women-only 
spaces leads to closing down spaces of disclosure, which in turn necessitate the need to theorise 
rape. Brown (1995) criticises the method of consciousness-raising for creating a narrative of 
 
6 In Chapter Three and Chapter Five I will return to the problematic consequences of this conceptualisation 
of power for theorising rape, and in the consideration of anti-humanism in the next chapter I will challenge 
that this turn to post-structuralism can allow for agency. 
 
7 Gavey (2005) provides a radical feminist post-structural account, although recognising that this 
combination necessarily modifies both perspectives. Munro (2003) proposes that seeing the similarities 
between the positions of radical feminism and post-structural Foucauldian analysis helps respond to 
criticisms of both. However, in order to portray a general move in feminism towards post-structuralism, in 
rejection of radical feminism and away from theorising the act of rape, I will portray these positions as 
oppositional. 
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victimisation. If the collective identification of having been victimised is seen to be problematic, 
then once again women should not speak about rape and thus rape becomes under-theorised. 
Finally, the post-structural focus on discourse and representation leads to under-theorising the act 
itself. The representations of rape and sexuality are undoubtedly crucial to understanding rape, 
but it seems mistaken to thereby not theorise the act itself. In proposing that the rejection of radical 
feminism as a structural analysis leads to under-theorising the act of rape, the criticisms of 
essentialism and determinism need to be assessed. I will advance a number of responses to these 
charges in an attempt to indicate that agency is present within a structural analysis, even if it 
remains under-theorised.  
 
To first respond to the most basic criticism of biological essentialism, radical feminism is 
explicitly social constructionist in its structural analysis. It is not the biological category of “man” 
that is seen to be the problem, it is the social construction of masculinity. All men, by virtue of 
being men in a patriarchal society, are given the cultural framing in which they can construct their 
identity through the sexual objectification of women. It does not mean that all men will equally 
participate in this form of self-construction. The reason that radical feminism suggests that the 
problem lies within the structure is because so many men have apparently constructed their 
identity based on the objectification of women, as evidenced by the vast numbers of women who 
have experienced sexual violence. The critique of essentialism misses how the fundamental 
concepts of object and subject are utilised in a radical feminist perspective. The claim is precisely 
that there is no essential gendered identity, but that the current constructions of gendered identity 
are bound to the system of female oppression. 
 
The role of ‘consciousness’ throughout radical feminist theory shows that, despite providing a 
structural analysis, there is no implication that this structure precludes agency. Millet (1971) calls 
for a sexual revolution through altered consciousness, Brownmiller suggests that patriarchy is a 
“conscious process of intimidation” (1975: 15), and the method of consciousness-raising invokes 
individual agency in order to arrive at the location of oppressive structures. If the structures were 
seen to be fully determining, there would be no possibility of altering consciousness, and the 
enactment of patriarchal violence would not need a conscious process, as it would simply be 
governed by the structure. It is precisely the role of agency within the structure that requires the 
call for radical social change. The invocation of a ‘conscious process’ is often cited in the ridicule 
of Brownmiller, and yet to include agency within structure, a conscious process is required. I 
accept it is not correct to state that all men participate in this process (Cahill 2001, contra. 
Brownmiller 1975), but there are many men who do, such as men who rape. In these cases, 
positing a structural analysis with a conscious process is precisely to allow agency within the 
structure.  
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The methodology of radical feminism provides an important response to the charge of 
essentialism and the denial of agency. MacKinnon (1989; 2000) discusses how radical feminist 
theory arose from consciousness-raising groups; the analysis arises from a multiplicity of 
women’s experiences. It is not a top-down analysis that denies agency, but a bottom-up analysis 
that diagnoses the severe constraints on female agency. The theory is constituted from diversity, 
as it takes a plurality of voices to provide a collective analysis. The theory is therefore ‘particular, 
not general’ (MacKinnon 2000: 689). In this multitude there is coherence, denying this coherence 
from the perspective of multiplicity denies the foundations of ‘the personal is political’. Essential 
woman is not assumed, but the overlap in women’s experience of being objectified provides an 
analysis of a system of oppression.  
 
The way in which the theory is read to be totalising and undermining of women’s agency then 
comes to seem like an academic abstraction from the pervasiveness of the experience of sexual 
objectification. The move from pervasive to total is a failure to distinguish between ‘all’ and 
‘many’: many women experience various forms of sexual violence, therefore many men are 
perpetrating acts of sexual violence. This is sufficient to implicate the structures of 
heterosexuality. To suggest that this analysis implies that all men are rapists, or all heterosexual 
sex is rape, is to suggest that implicating the structure would only be justified on the basis of 
totality. If a structural analysis arises from pervasiveness, the problem is seen as systemic. The 
fact that not all men rape or sexually objectify shows the agency that sustains the system. If the 
structures determined to the extent of totality, then this would alleviate responsibility from 
individual men who rape. The radical feminist analysis firmly retains a sense of responsibility, 
thus his choice to participate in the structures of oppression mean that there is agency within the 
analysis. 
 
Further to the agency within the methodology of radical feminist theory, the praxis of activism 
and resistance is integral to the theory. Radical feminism is a politics of resistance that sees theory 
and activism as inseparable (Radford 2013). In this way, the recognition of victimisation is not in 
order to lie down defeated, but is utilised to fight the oppression one suffers. It is therefore simply 
false that the recognition of victimisation eliminates agency. As stated in an early radical feminist 
manifesto, the recognition of sexual violence as part of sexism “has the virtue of proving injustice, 
which angers us, rather than suffering, which merely depresses us” (Leffler 1973 cited in Gavey 
2005: 189). The political value of recognising victimisation means the analysis does not negate 
the possibility of a political (acting) subject. 
 
The debate of the denial of agency causes a continued focus on theorising and contesting women’s 
consciousness and levels of agency. It thus seems that the consciousness of the oppressor is 
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superseded by internal debates about which ‘feminism’ allows for female agency. The concern 
should be with understanding the possibility of masculine agency and consciousness that is used 
to harm and violate many females. In theorising male violence against women, radical feminism 
locates the source of oppression. This focus is lost if the theory is constantly targeted for a denial 
of women’s agency. 
 
3.2 Intersectionality  
 
Before establishing that the critiques of essentialism and determinism point towards a lack of 
theorising the individual, I will first consider intersectionality as another form of critique that has 
been taken to be conclusive against radical feminism. Society is structured by multiple forms of 
oppression. To advance an analysis of the gendered dyad can then be seen to undermine the 
intersecting forms of oppression. In this way, the radical feminist position is presented as the 
voice and experience of white middle-class heterosexual women, namely those women who only 
experience oppression on the axis of gender. It is claimed that the extraction to the single binary 
of masculinity and femininity, within radical feminism, ignores the race and class positions that 
are inextricable from gendered experience. Crenshaw discusses that in anti-racism’s use of the 
black man as the frame of reference and feminism’s use of the white woman, the confluence of 
gender oppression and racism means that the black woman exists in a “location that resists telling” 
(1993: 1242). Intersectional analysis is needed to see how the systems of oppression are not 
‘exclusive or separable’ (ibid: 1244, fn.9).  
 
Hill-Collins (2000) discusses that if it is claimed that women are constructed as ‘passive and 
fragile’, then the use of black women as mules denies that they are women, and if it is claimed 
that good mothers are housewives, then the reality of black mothers working is overlooked. 
Friedan’s Feminine Mystique (1963) is often cited to indicate the specific oppression of white 
middle-class women being portrayed as universal woman. Sojourner Truth’s pronouncement of 
‘ain’t I a woman?’ draws attention to how such analysis excludes the oppression suffered by many 
by denying them the category itself (Hill-Collins 2000). Black women suffer higher amounts of 
victimisation, are less likely to report experiences of sexual violence and are much less likely to 
secure a conviction against a perpetrator (ibid). The way in which intersecting oppressions 
amplify harm in terms of level of risk and through silencing, means that intersections of 
oppression are crucial to understanding sexual violence.  
 
It is important to understand how this critique relates to the critiques of essentialism and 
determinism discussed above. Hill-Collins (2000) questions the universal ‘men over women’ 
analysis as biologically deterministic inhibiting the possibility for change, claiming that looking 
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at intersections allows for agency. In this way, radical feminism is seen to rely on false universal 
categories that undercut multiplicity. However, Hill-Collins also rejects the anticipated critique 
of essentialism against her call for black women safe spaces. Crenshaw (1993; 2010), meanwhile, 
is careful to distinguish her critique of intersectionality from the claims of anti-essentialism. 
Crenshaw states that the critique should not be read as undermining the possibility of analysis 
through class and thus the identification of social groupings. Crenshaw (1993) raises the risk of 
this line of post-modern theorising misreading the meaning of social construction, thereby 
distorting its political relevance. Crenshaw does not cite the intersections of oppression as a reason 
for denying the possibility of an analysis of women’s oppression. The claim is rather that when 
looking at the oppression of women it is crucial to consider ‘what difference her difference makes’ 
(2010: 165). This complicates the analysis, but it does not undermine the possibility of analysing 
oppression through use of categories that thereby posit essential unifying features. Crenshaw 
(2010) notes how intersectionality is frequently misread as anti-essentialist. I will return to this 
consideration when arguing that intersectionality does not require a rejection of radical feminism. 
 
Regarding the intersectional critique, the first thing to note is that some radical feminist theories 
and practices have been racist. This is one of my reasons for putting forward a general radical 
feminist theory instead of defending a particular theorist. Davis (1981) locates the racism of 
Brownmiller’s (1975) theory in her suggestion that black men are more likely to commit sexual 
assault given their subordinated position of masculinity. Theories that utilise and uncritically rely 
on accused and convicted rapists fail to acknowledge the race and class functioning of the criminal 
justice system. Furthermore, black women have not ‘historically been full participants in white 
feminist organisations’ (Hill-Collins 2000: 5). Racism within feminism must be admitted. Having 
said this, it is mistaken to think that radical feminist theory arose only from white middle-class 
women as this is to erase the presence of black and working-class women in the second-wave 
movement (MacKinnon 2000).  
 
The importance of recognising intersectionality whilst theorising sexual violence is paramount 
given the way in which racism has functioned through the sexualisation of black people. Black 
people have been “portrayed as more sexual, more earthy and more gratification-oriented” 
(Crenshaw 1993: 1271). In being represented as having more animalistic sexual urges the black 
woman is seen to correspond to the construction of the whore in order to construct the white 
woman as the Madonna (Hill-Collins 2000). Seeing black women as promiscuous and sexually 
aggressive means that black women cannot be seen as sexually victimised as they are instead seen 
as the aggressors. The theorising of ‘deviant’ black sexuality in relation to men results in the myth 
of the black rapist, seen to be central to establishing and maintaining racial hierarchies. The 
criminalisation and demonisation of black people has been spearheaded by the black rapist who 
 25 
threatens white women. This occurs alongside the justification of white men’s sexual use of black 
women. This is seen through the sexual violation of enslaved women and the use of group-rape 
in the KKK’s terrorisation of black communities (Davis 1981).  
 
Although the act of rape is involved in constructing racial hierarchies in some acts of sexual 
violence, it is predominately an act that involves men and women of the same race (Gorislavsky 
2014). Furthermore, racial privilege does not protect white women from the act of rape. My 
proposal is that the intersectional critique does not refute the radical feminist explanation of the 
act of rape. This brings out my specific focus of theorising the moment of the act. In defending a 
focus on the gendered dyad in an analysis of rape, du Toit suggests “rape obtains its meaning 
above all within the domain of sexual politics and sexual relations, and racial politics might have 
a role to play in a specific context, but it is not an essential role” (2009: 3). Du Toit’s (2009) 
theorising is of the meaning of rape, taking a philosophical perspective. My proposal is to theorise 
the act itself, also utilising philosophical theorising. I will clarify why a radical feminist focus on 
gender is problematic when the analysis is of the representation of rape or the reaction to rape. I 
will then propose that in terms of the act, radical feminism and intersectional feminism provide 
similar and compatible explanations. 
 
Crenshaw states that “representations of rape both reflect and reproduce gender and race 
hierarchies” (1993: 1266). The white woman as the victim and the black man or men as the 
predator provides the media headlines through which rape is represented. Crenshaw (1993) notes 
the similarity between the representation of the Central Park jogger case and the former lynching 
of black men, and how the gang-rape of a black woman committed on the same day as the assault 
on the Central Park jogger (who was a white woman) received no media coverage. Such 
representation of sexual violence continues, as seen through the racist discourse surrounding the 
cases of child sexual exploitation in the UK, continuously portrayed as Muslim grooming gangs 
targeting white girls (Cockbain 2013; Gohir 2013; Tufail 2015). Given the way in which 
representations of rape are continually used to serve racist ends, any analysis of how rape is 
represented will fail to be insightful if focusing only on gender.  
 
The accusation of rape has been a key tool of racial oppression. During Jim Crow in America, 
black men were systematically lynched due to allegations of rape. The fraudulent rape charge has 
been used consistently to legitimate “waves of violence and terror against the black community” 
(Davis 1981: 40). Lynching can be seen as a form of sexual violence in which the myth of the 
black rapist provides the justification (Hill-Collins 2000). The criminal justice system 
disproportionality convicts and imprisons black people. Alexander (2012) proposes that mass 
incarceration is the new form of Jim Crow: it is a method of social control used to construct a 
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racial caste system. Given this, there are “serious questions of an anti-rape movement that relies 
in the first place on the repressive powers of the criminal justice system” (Davis 1981: 39).  
 
Radical feminists have unfortunately been disposed to invoke and advocate criminal justice 
interventions in the fight against sexual violence. This betrays an outlook that focuses on gender 
to the exclusion of race and class oppression, in overlooking the disproportionate use of state 
power against particular groups. Furthermore, the system of criminal justice is not seen as an 
option for many people – if black communities are harassed rather than ‘protected’ by the police, 
then such solutions are not available to black women. As Crenshaw notes “MacKinnon’s 
interventions do not move the needle much for women of color” (2010: 163). To account for 
intersections of oppression it is thereby necessary to extricate radical feminist theory from the 
legalistic practices it has spawned. I suggest that this separation is not a difficult task, as the most 
logical conclusion from a structural analysis is the need for radical social change in how we 
construct our identities. If women are violated because they are seen as sexual objects, no amount 
of incarceration will ameliorate this practice, given that people are still taught to view women in 
this way and given that the law itself helps to construct this perception of woman.   
 
The representation of rape and the reaction to rape require intersectional analysis, such that an 
exclusive focus on the gendered dyad is based on disregarding other axes of oppression. If the 
consequence of this is to advocate using the criminal justice system, this is to contribute to 
oppression. However, I will argue that in theorising the act of rape, a focus on gender through the 
process of sexual objectification can be retained whilst also considering ‘what difference her 
difference made’. Given this, the intersectional critique does not need to refute radical feminist 
theory in explaining rape. 
 
To consider how women’s particular social location is involved in her objectification, MacKinnon 
suggests “each woman is in pornography as the embodiment of her particularities. This is not in 
tension with being there “as a woman” ”(1991: 21). Women are not seen indiscriminately, but 
their particular features are utilised to construct each woman as sexual object. The white woman 
in pornography may be the virginal girl next door, whilst the black woman may be the debased 
whore, but both are seen primarily in terms of their sexuality, and in both cases their sexuality is 
the appropriated property of the masculine subject. Hill-Collins’ claim that ‘unlike the controlling 
images of the white woman, the images of black women are uniformly negative’ (2000: 100) is 
necessary to understand the multiplied effect of being constructed as ‘object’ across various 
dimensions of one’s identity. However, the white woman’s construct as virgin is still a position 
in which her sexuality defines her; the veneer of compliment in being a coveted object should not 
detract from the elimination of her subjectivity. 
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Crenshaw (2010) clarifies how the intersectional analysis should not be seen in opposition to 
‘dominance feminism’ but can be seen as synergistic.8  Crenshaw suggests that it is the mistake 
of reading intersectionality as anti-essentialist that leads to the notion that radical feminism must 
be rejected. Crenshaw agrees with MacKinnon that the ‘essential’ category is built from women’s 
experiences; the extraction of violence against women as a common vulnerability is not disputed 
by intersections of oppression. In terms of the legalistic ‘applications’, Crenshaw calls for the 
need to separate specific illustrations from general critique. When we take sexual objectification 
as the central concept of radical feminism, the importance of intersectionality to understanding 
the rape of women is in understanding the different ways different women are sexually objectified. 
It does not undermine the unifying way in which women are sexually objectified. 
 
Sexual objectification is central in Hill-Collins’ intersectional analysis of the position of black 
women. Hill-Collins states that “domination always involves attempts to objectify” (2000: 68). 
The role of objectification in all forms of oppression is what allows the oppression to intersect 
and multiply – the basis of the elimination of subjectivity runs through all its manifestations. The 
radical feminist critique suggests that the way in which women are objectified is particularly 
sexual in nature. Hill-Collins’ discussion of the various images of the black woman as 
‘mammy/matriarchy/welfare mother/queen/black lady’ are brought together with the common 
theme of black women’s sexuality (2000: 83). What must be seen, therefore, is that the difference 
between the objectification of white and black women is “one of degree, not of kind” (Hill-Collins 
2000: 114). This recognition means that sexual objectification in relation to the construction of a 
gendered binary can be retained as the central explanatory concept for rape, without requiring the 
elimination of differences between women. The intersectional critique is predominately directed 
against the focus on gender in regard to representation of and reaction to rape. If on this basis 
feminist theory rejects a radical feminist explanation, then what has been lost is theorising the act 
of rape. This is the aim of this thesis and it is for this task that I maintain radical feminism provides 
a plausible explanatory framework.  
 
3.3 The Individual Within the Structure  
 
Critiques of essentialism and determinism can broadly be seen to reflect the lack of theorising the 
individual within a structural analysis. This section will explore how theorising the individual can 
avoid the over-determinism implicit in the reluctance to accept a structural analysis. The move 
away from radical feminism at no point re-theorises the individual, and in fact the debates within 
 
8 Radical feminism is often referred to as dominance feminism because of the suggestion that dominance 
and submission define gender identity construction. 
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feminist theory can be seen to move further from the mind of the oppressor, as they endlessly 
contest the possibility for women’s agency. The anti-humanism of post-structuralism considered 
in the next chapter will develop how this shift in feminism explicitly rejects theorising the subject.  
 
When the focus on the individual is replaced by a focus on the structures, the individual can be 
seen to disappear.  If the structures determine the individual to the extent that an analysis of the 
individual is in opposition to a structural analysis, then the individual is nothing more than an 
instantiation of the structure. In this way, the individual has no agency. I have argued that the 
radical feminist focus on the structure in opposition to the individual is justified given the prior 
individualised theories of rape. However, unless there is a process that connects the individual to 
the structure, the charge that the structural analysis is deterministic would be valid.  
 
If the individual is a mere reflection of the structure, rather than being implicated in the active 
reproduction of the structure, then the mind of the individual is insignificant and all that is required 
is an analysis of the structure itself. If, in opposition to this, we suggest that individuals must 
actively participate in the structure, then an analysis of the mind of the individual is required to 
conceptualise how the individual relates to the structure that provides the position of dominance. 
Biological determinism of men raping because they are men would require no analysis of the 
individual, as the action would be explained simply by his given identity as a man. Men raping 
because of the social construction of masculinity inscribing the sexual objectification of women 
into constructed identity, requires an analysis of the individual to explain his active participation 
in this construction of a particular identity. Seeing the rapist as the “normal man” because the act 
of rape coheres with gendered identity construction under patriarchy is distinguished from seeing 
the rapist as “everyman”, by the rapist’s choice to construct his identity in a way that enables the 
act of violation. He has constructed an identity in which the act of rape is self-affirming. The way 
in which he constructs this identity implicates the individual in the reproduction of the structure. 
 
Gadd and Jefferson state that “the individual criminal offender has long ceased to be of much 
interest to criminologists, especially to those of a radical persuasion” (2007: 8). The consequence 
of this over-social approach to explaining crime through implicating the structures of society is 
one of caricatured subjects as ‘pure social constructions’ and ‘dupes of ideology’ (ibid: 11). They 
suggest that this inadequate conceptualisation of the subject is a reason for the failure in 
understanding the causes of crime. Gadd and Jefferson trace how the individual fell out of focus 
in criminological theory. The beginnings of criminology were focused on individual psychology 
and treatment: from Lombroso’s (1897) biological criminology and the subsequent dominance of 
psychology, to the ‘governmental project’ of administrative criminology in the late twentieth 
century (Gadd and Jefferson 2007). The individual within this analysis was necessary only to the 
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extent of considering how to control crime. Critical criminology disrupted this focus on the 
control of individual offenders through questioning processes of criminalisation and how the 
criminal justice system shored up systems of class and race oppression. The focus of criminology 
turned towards the structures of society, drawing on Marxism. Radical feminism was 
contemporaneous to this structural turn of the ‘new deviancy theorists’. The ‘causes’ of crime 
were not located in the individual but in the surrounding structures. The way in which the 
structural explanation arises as a reaction against theories of the individual explains “the lack of 
theoretical interest in understanding criminal subjects” (ibid: 19).  
 
The problem of losing the individual in explaining crime purely through the structures of society, 
is that this leaves the task of theorising the individual to the discipline of psychology. Gadd and 
Jefferson note the “renewed interest shown by psychologists in criminology” (2007: 10). The risk 
of this is that once again the offender becomes pathologised. Instead, it is necessary to “humanise 
the criminal, however awful his or her deeds and rescue him or her from the uncomprehending 
condescension of pathologising discourses and the exclusionary practices these tend to promote” 
(ibid: 9). If we want to avoid defining offenders as deviant others, we must locate the individual 
within the structure, identifying mental processes of human subjects.  
 
Radical feminism provides one of the structural explanations that Gadd and Jefferson criticise for 
the loss of the criminal subject. They suggest that the shift from seeing rapists as the pathological 
few to a “social problem implicating all men…bears the hallmarks of a (too) simple inversion” 
(2007: 71). They identify the criticisms of essentialism through suggesting all women are made 
into passive victims lacking agency, and determinism suggesting the explanation suffers from 
over-prediction, given that not all men rape. A structural analysis risks the charges of essentialism 
and determinism if it refuses to engage with theorising the individual. Given this, it is imperative 
that we consider what a structural explanation means on the level of the individual. In Chapter 
Three I will defend the radical feminist explanation of rape against Gadd and Jefferson’s rebuttal. 
 
My suggestion is that through a radical feminist analysis, the individual can be located within the 
structure through understanding the process of sexual objectification. Sexual objectification is 
found in the socio-cultural environment through the representation of women as sexual objects, 
and it is found in actions such as rape. If we further understand sexual objectification to be a way 
of seeing, then sexual objectification is also a process in the mind of the individual. The structure 
of heterosexuality is not then floating above and determining the individual; the individual utilises 
the structural framing to alter his perception in the pursuit of self-aggrandisement. His 
construction of self at the expense of the other is something he is active in. It is this agency that 
makes him responsible for his sexually objectifying acts. The radical feminist analysis, in 
 30 
providing a critique of the structures of heterosexuality, has left the individual under-theorised, 
but this in no way means that the individual cannot be theorised within a structural analysis. This 
is the aim of this thesis. 
 
Section Four: The Need to Revive Radical Feminism  
 
The neoliberal focus on choice and individualism has resulted in a post-feminist discourse in 
which sexual objectification is presented as women’s agency. The post-feminism of the 1990s 
denied the reality of rape, refuting the widespread violation of women as being ‘hysteria’ (Paglia 
1992; Roiphe 1993). The current embrace of sexual objectification can be seen as a continuation 
of this ‘backlash’, in which women’s oppression is not only denied but reformulated as 
empowerment. As Walter states the “mainstreaming of the sex industry is now often presented as 
the culmination of the freedoms that feminists have sought” (2010: 8).9 Within academic 
theorising “the ‘sex work’ position, i.e. that prostitution should be understood as legitimate work, 
and an expression of women's choice and agency, has become the dominant perspective. Most 
feminist scholars now take this point of view” (Jeffreys 2009: 316). Gill coins the term 
‘subjectification’ in which women “are portrayed as active sexual subjects who choose to present 
themselves in a seemingly objectified manner because it suits their (implicitly ‘liberated’) 
interests to do so” (2008: 42). The criticism of a culture “that sees women as primarily sexy dolls 
will find themselves coming up against the constantly repeated mantra of free choice” (Walter 
2010: 28). The problem with the claim that women choose sexual objectification is that the 
cultural inscription of sexual objectification starts in childhood, in which “the language of choice 
seems particularly misplaced” (ibid: 73).  
 
The reclaiming of sexual objectification as empowered female agency serves to depoliticise the 
role of sexual objectification in women’s subordination (Gavey 2009; Coy and Garner 2010). 
Third-wave feminism defines itself partly in opposition to second-wave feminism, with the 
“espousal of a pro-pornography position (in conscious repudiation of radical feminists like 
Dworkin and MacKinnon) and about a ‘girlie feminism’ of lipstick and fashion, exemplifying the 
depoliticisation of feminism” (Aune and Holyoak 2017: 14). The political radicalism of radical 
feminism is precisely in its critique of the structure of heterosexuality and hence the 
problematisation of the objectification of women. The call for female empowerment and 
liberation within radical feminist theory requires rejecting the sexual objectification of women. 
 
9 This is exemplified by overtly positive literary representations of the sex industry such as Belle de Jour 
2005 and Quan 2008, and by academic books and articles that are focused on the choice and empowerment 




A new feminist analysis that revives the radical feminist critique of sexual objectification is 
necessary to counter feminism that plays into the hands of patriarchy through repackaging 
subjugation as liberated agency. This thesis, in focusing on rape, positions the project as 
problematising the form of sexual objectification that most find to be indisputably harmful and 
definitionally lacking in choice. Furthermore, in focusing on understanding the man’s 
consciousness in the moment of the act – he has made her into an object and hence negated her 
agency – it moves away from speculating on the level of agency that women have in general.  
 
In linking the act of sexual objectification in rape, to the culture of sexual objectification, we can 
use this concept to theorise the mind of the perpetrator. The centrality of sexual objectification 
should not be seen to deny individual agency, if we understand sexual objectification to be a 
process that is enacted consciously by the man in the act of sexual violence. In proposing to 
theorise the mind of the rapist, I do not suggest that there is an identifiable type of person who 
rapes. Rather, understanding the mind in the instance of the act means these men are unified 
through committing the act. To then suggest there is a process occurring in the mind prior to and 
during the act does not propose the same mind overall. In philosophically theorising sexual 
objectification in relation to the perpetrator, this thesis aims to reinvigorate the radical feminist 




This chapter has established that rape needs theorising because it is gendered and prevalent; it is 
both an individual and a social harm. Previous individualised explanations of rape pathologised 
the rapist, naturalised men’s sexual aggression, and made the victim responsible. In locating the 
way in which these theories serve and reflect patriarchy, the radical feminist rejection of an 
account of the individual is legitimate. Radical feminism proposes that the positions of sexual 
object and subject found in the act of rape constitute the social construction of gender: rape is 
explained by the structure of patriarchy. Sexual objectification is the central concept of a radical 
feminist explanation. The rejection of radical feminism as essentialist and deterministic can be 
seen as a result of under-theorising the individual in the analysis. These criticisms should not be 
taken as conclusive against the position, as radical feminism highlights social construction not 
biological determinism, whilst the theory implies an account of agency and the praxis evidences 
an account of agency. These criticisms of post-structuralism have led to a lack of theorising rape, 
and the focus on the level of agency attributed to women, or the need to deconstruct the category 
of woman, means that theorising the man’s consciousness becomes lost. Distinguishing between 
the representation of rape, the reaction to rape, and the act of rape, justifies a radical feminist 
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focus on the gendered dyad in relation to the act of rape. The move towards embracing sexual 
objectification as a form of liberation underlines the importance of reinstating the radical feminist 
critique of sexual objectification. 
 
This thesis aims to theorise the rapist within a radical feminist analysis, by considering sexual 
objectification as a process in the mind of the perpetrator. Radical feminist theory has left the 
individual under-theorised, but this does not mean that it is impossible to theorise the individual 
from a radical feminist perspective, providing the impetus for this thesis. In the next chapter I will 
introduce Beauvoir’s (1949) existentialism as a way of theorising the individual from a radical 
feminist perspective. Through this, I will return in more depth to the shift to post-structural 
feminism discussed in this chapter, drawing out how this is a shift towards anti-humanism – an 
explicit rejection of theorising the subject. This will establish the need to theorise a common 







































This chapter establishes that in order to theorise the act of rape, it is necessary to theorise the 
subject of consciousness. This involves taking a humanist perspective. I propose that 
existentialism provides a compelling account of the subject within the structure. The structural 
analysis of rape provided by radical feminism can be supplemented with Beauvoir’s (1949) 
existentialism, in order to theorise the consciousness of the perpetrator. In the first section of this 
chapter I will establish that Beauvoir’s existential analysis of women’s oppression provides a 
humanist account. Through then rooting radical feminism in Beauvoir’s existentialism, I propose 
that radical feminism provides a humanist position. The humanism of Beauvoir and radical 
feminism claims that the common humanity of our position as a subject is lost when the female 
sex is objectified through the social construction of gender.  
 
The second section of this chapter considers the rise of anti-humanism as a rejection of the 
existential subject. The shift from second-wave feminism (characterised by radical feminism) to 
third-wave feminism (characterised by queer theory), can be seen as a shift towards anti-
humanism in feminist theory. Butler’s (1999) exposition of queer theory relies heavily on 
Foucault’s (1969; 1975a; 1976) anti-humanism. The shift in the debate can be seen through the 
distinction between sex and gender. The final section of this chapter considers the need for an 
account of materiality and social construction in order to theorise subjects and acts. This is to 
argue in favour of existentialism and radical feminism, and against queer theory and post-
structuralism. It will be argued that existentialism and radical feminism do not provide essentialist 
positions. In post-structural theory, the loss of the moment of the act leads to a depoliticised 
theory. The acts and subjects become mystified within the realm of representation. The previous 
chapter established that rape needs theorising. This chapter considers why the shift towards anti-
humanism in feminist theory is in tension with theorising rape.  
 
Section One: The Humanism of Beauvoir and Radical Feminism 
 
Beauvoir’s (1949) existentialist analysis of women’s oppression in The Second Sex provided a 
groundwork for feminist theory, presenting feminism as an expression of humanism. 
Existentialism has been a neglected area of theorising in criminology, but there is a growing 
consideration of its value (Hardie-Bick and Lippens 2011). This thesis will contribute to 
reconsidering the importance of an existential subject in criminology. I will first present 
 34 
Beauvoir’s existential account of women’s oppression as humanist. I will then consider how 
Beauvoir’s account is consistent with the radical feminist analysis of hetero-patriarchy. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, radical feminist analysis has focused on theorising the 
structures of patriarchy and has thereby left the consciousness of the perpetrator under-theorised. 
To propose that it is a humanist account is to again reiterate that theorising the individual is not 
incompatible with a radical feminist analysis. Furthermore, I suggest Beauvoir provides the 
philosophical framework to theorise the consciousness of oppression.  
 
1.1 Humanism and Beauvoir’s Account of Oppression 
 
Soper defines humanism as ‘an appeal to the notion of common essential features of human 
beings’ (1986: 11). To posit common essential features of humanity is to theorise a subject of 
consciousness. In theorising oppression, the structure is seen to destroy this common humanity. 
Marx’s (1844) early analysis of capitalism was that it resulted in alienation. Existential analyses 
of oppression suggest the notion of an inauthentic existence. What is held in common is the 
experience of consciousness; to be alienated or inauthentic implies there is a self that is being 
inhibited. The humanist assumption underpinning these accounts is of “the potential freedom and 
constitutive role of human beings in the creation of social processes” (Soper 1986: 37 – 38). The 
individuated subject is both the point of action and the point of theorising. As Soper states, the 
perspective of humanism is that ‘history is produced through human thought and action’ (ibid: 
11). Soper suggests that the central theoretical categories of humanism are “consciousness, 
agency, choice, responsibility, moral value” (ibid).  
 
This chapter will consider how both radical feminism and existentialism theorise a common 
humanity that requires recognition of subjectivity. Sexual objectification found in the act of rape 
is the destruction of this common humanity. When theorising rape, it seems that ‘consciousness, 
agency, choice, responsibility and moral value’ are all necessary theoretical components to 
condemn the action without pathologising the perpetrator. I suggest that an emphasis on choice 
and intentional action will be crucial in humanising the perpetrator without undermining 
responsibility.  
 
In The Second Sex (1949) Beauvoir provides an existential analysis of women’s oppression. 
Beauvoir posits that the biological differentiation between the sexes provides distinct 
phenomenological experiences. The way in which the burden of reproduction is placed on female 
bodies provided a disadvantage onto which a structure of oppression was placed (Beauvoir [1949] 
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1997 : 94 – 105)10. This structure of oppression is the imposition of gender, as femininity is 
defined through objectification: “feminine charm demands that transcendence, degraded into 
immanence, appear no longer as anything more than a subtle quivering of flesh; it is necessary to 
be spontaneously offered prey” (ibid: 694). Through femininity, women are confined to 
immanence –  to being the object counterpart that provides the male with superiority. In 
considering the shift towards anti-humanism in feminist theory, Johnson considers how Beauvoir 
“viewed feminism unambiguously as an expression of humanism…. women must be considered 
first and foremost as human beings” (1994: 1). It is an appeal to common humanity that underlies 
Beauvoir’s analysis of women’s oppression, as the “fact that we are human beings is infinitely 
more important than all the peculiarities that distinguish human beings from one another, it is 
never the given that confers superiorities” (Beauvoir [1949] 1997: 737). The ‘given’ is that 
humans are sexually dimorphic species; this does not entail the hierarchy of gender that is socially 
constructed from this.  
 
Beauvoir explains that under the current situation, man being a human being is consistent with 
his being male; the identification of “phallus and transcendence” provides masculine subjectivity 
([1949] 1997: 691). In contrast “it is required of woman that in order to realise her femininity she 
must make herself object and prey, which is to say that she must renounce her claims as sovereign 
subject” (ibid). The objectification imposed on women cuts against their human position of 
subjectivity. Beauvoir states that “a humanist morality would require that all life experience have 
a human meaning” (ibid: 459). The necessity of understanding the social construction through 
significance imbued on the ‘given’, is to understand the intentional processes that uphold this 
meaning. Beauvoir claims that liberty can be gained from the erotic relation, but this is “possible 
only when the other is recognised as an individual, in love or in desire” (ibid). Recognising the 
 
10 This thesis uses Parshley’s 1953 translation of Beauvoir (published by Vintage in 1997). It has been noted 
since the 1980s that there are numerous problems with this translation: the text is abridged without 
acknowledgment of this within the text, and philosophical terms have been mistranslated obscuring 
Beauvoir’s existential phenomenology and her philosophical rigour (Simons 1983; Moi 2002). In fact, 
many criticisms of Beauvoir can be traced to the problems with this translation, such as the accusation that 
she is “masculinist, essentialist, heterosexist, and racist” (Daigle 2013: 337) and the interpretation of her as 
a Cartesian (Moi 2002). This thesis disputes these interpretations, some of which will be directly disputed 
in this chapter. After much delay and continued refusal from the publishers a new translation of The Second 
Sex was published in 2009 by Borde and Malovaney-Chevallier. The main reason for my use of the older 
translation is that in noting the shift towards anti-humanism, this preceded the publication of the new 
translation. Although it has been claimed that the new translation has revived interest in Beauvoir (Daigle 
2013), this revival has not been sufficient to displace the predominance of anti-humanism in feminist 
theory. Furthermore, unfortunately the new translation has also been highly criticised by Beauvoir scholars. 
Moi claims that “The obsessive literalism and the countless errors make it no more reliable and far less 
readable than Parshely” (2010). Borde and Malovaney-Chevallier (2010) deny having modernised the text, 
however Altman’s (2010) comparison of the two translations provided by students and an academic 
indicates that the newer translation reads as having been modernised. For me, this provides a stylistic 
preference for Parshley’s contemporaneous translation.  
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individual is recognising the subject of consciousness. The objectification imposed through 
femininity means that rather than seeing women as individuals, they are seen as the category of 
Other. 
 
Beauvoir disputes that the historical fact of women’s oppression can establish an eternal truth, 
suggesting the situation is “historical in nature precisely because it is undergoing change” ([1949] 
1997: 723). To view humanity as “a historical development; it is to be defined by the manner in 
which it deals with its natural, fixed characteristics” (ibid: 725). There is recognition of material 
constraints, but the extent to which difference is imposed through the socially conferred meanings 
allows for the reversal of the oppression. If history is produced by human thought and action, this 
enables different possibilities, hence allowing for emancipation. Beauvoir identifies a common 
humanity that is currently obstructed by the difference in situation between men and women, 
imposed through the social construction of gender. A central argument of this chapter will be that 
the existential analysis does not prescribe a particular form of subjectivity, but points to the 
possibilities implied through consciousness. Women’s possibilities are curtailed through 
‘femininity as objectification’.  
 
The existentialist tenet that ‘existence precedes essence’ expresses that value and meaning must 
be conferred on the world. There is no essential human nature that is predetermined and fixed, 
rather man must make his own values in the world. This places an emphasis on intention and 
choice to act in the world. Beauvoir states that there is no truth to “what she is”, as an “existent is 
nothing other than what he does; the possible does not extend beyond the real, essence does not 
precede existence: in pure subjectivity, the human being is not anything. He is to be measured by 
his acts” ([1949] 1997: 287). Locating the individual through his acts theorises consciousness 
from the point of action. The anguish experienced through the freedom of responsibility for 
oneself in action leads to constant evasions of consciousness. The psychology of men’s 
oppression of women can be seen as “an inauthentic attempt to evade the demands of authentic 
human relationships and the ambiguous realities of human existence” (Simons 1999: 160). 
Beauvoir suggests that the invention of ‘woman’ was to allow man to cast “off the responsibility 
of existence, he abandons himself to the mirage of his en-soi, or fixed, lower nature, he puts 
himself on the plane of inauthenticity” ([1949] 1997: 624).  
 
The role of consciousness in objectification is evident from the impossibility of women’s situation 
under femininity. Beauvoir states that her original treason is that “the most passive, is still a 
conscious being; and sometimes the fact that in giving herself to him she looks at him and judges 
him is enough to make him feel duped; she is supposed to be only something offered, no more 
than prey” ([1949] 1997: 626). His responsibility is evaded if he does not have to view her as a 
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subjective consciousness able to confer meaning and thereby pass judgment. Consciousness is 
central to existential theorising, with the notion of authenticity invoking a ‘truth’ to consciousness 
that creates a moral realm (Miller 1993). The existential appeal to authenticity does not require a 
highly specified ‘authentic self’, but rather requires the recognition of our position as subject and 
object in the world.  
 
In highlighting both Beauvoir’s (1949) humanism and her consistency with radical feminism, I 
aim to highlight the centrality of social construction to the critique of sexual objectification. 
Beauvoir provides a social constructionist account, such that “women’s liberation requires the 
dismantling of the male cultural construct of woman as Other” (Simons 1999: 158). Beauvoir 
states “It must be repeated once more that in human society nothing is natural, and that woman, 
like much else, is a product elaborated by civilisation” ([1949] 1997: 734). The social 
constructionism of a world with no values provides freedom through the responsibility “for 
creating and defining our own values” (Hardie-Bick 2011: 87). Defining man through his actions 
is to theorise intentionality and choice; theorising the subject of action. The humanist claim of a 
loss of common humanity due to the structures of oppression is captured through the inauthentic 
attempt to avoid responsibility for oneself. I will later propose that the harm of objectification is 
because of the embodied and intersubjective formation of self; the normativity of the account 
arises from this social foundation of subjectivity. 
 
1.2 Radical Feminism and Beauvoir 
 
Beauvoir (1949) provides a clear precursor to the radical feminist critique of heterosexuality as 
constituting the objectification and thus violation of the humanity of women. Simons (1999) 
traces how The Second Sex provided a model for many radical feminists in the 1960s. Aligning 
existentialism with radical feminism suggests that radical feminism can be understood as a 
humanist position. Beauvoir’s (1949) phenomenology of women’s oppression pays heed to the 
biological elements of embodiment, whilst exhibiting the socially constructed imposition of 
gender. The distinction between the male and female sex as biologically given, and the masculine 
and feminine positions as socially constructed, provides the sex/gender distinction that is 
foundational to radical feminism. Simons (1999) responds to Jaggar’s (1978) criticism of radical 
feminism ‘lacking a theoretical framework’ through founding radical feminism in The Second 
Sex. In particular, Simons states that Beauvoir provides “a psychological explanation of male 
behaviour” (1999: 159). If the radical feminist argument can be traced to Beauvoir, then an 
existential understanding can provide a theoretical framework for theorising the individual on a 
radical feminist analysis. 
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Radical feminism provides an analysis of patriarchy as a system of domination in which men and 
women are divided into sex castes through the social construction of gender. Simons (1999) notes 
the convergence between radical feminism and Beauvoir, in the analysis of a struggle that 
constructs sex into caste. Beauvoir states that it “is no longer a question of war between 
individuals each shut up in his or her sphere: a caste claiming its rights attacks and is resisted by 
the privileged caste” ([1949] 1997: 726). Radical feminism theorises from the experiences of 
women, as Beauvoir provides a phenomenological account of women. To unify the category of 
woman entails both recognising the material foundation of being female – paying attention to 
menstruation and clitoral pleasure – and recognising the commonality of experience given the 
socially constructed meaning of woman: what it feels like to be gazed at and offered as sexual 
prey. Woman denotes both a biological category and a socially constructed category.  
 
It is through women’s differences from men that they have been defined as inferior, giving the 
material distinction a socially constructed meaning. In describing the horror at menstruation, 
Beauvoir states “she would retain her pride in her bleeding body if she did not lose her pride in 
being human” ([1949] 1997: 340 – 341). The entrance into womanhood in the biological sense is 
given the social meaning of being offered as prey. The phenomenology of this experience, marred 
with shame and humiliation, reflects what it means to be woman in a patriarchal society. The 
sexual maturation of one’s body, and how this is distinct in males and females, is not sufficient 
to dictate distinct subject positions. The way in which it is experienced as an affirmation of 
inferior and superior status reflects the social construction that serves to undermine our common 
humanity.  
 
Theorising the continuum of sexual violence (Kelly 1988) is crucial to the radical feminist claim 
that sexual objectification can be seen to pervade the experience of women and girls. Beauvoir 
provides an account of the continuum of sexual violence when she lists the “knee pressed against 
the little girl’s in the cinema, that hand which at night in the train glides along her leg… those 
men who follow her in the street, those embraces, those furtive touches” ([1949] 1997: 344). 
Beauvoir further discusses the violence of heterosexual sex, under the patriarchal framing. 
Beauvoir states that “the most obvious and most detestable symbol of physical possession is 
penetration by the sex organ of the male” (ibid: 346). Penetrative sex has been framed as the 
ultimate conquest in proof of masculine subjectivity and feminine objectification. Domination is 
not essential to penetrative sex, but under the current heterosexual framing, the symbolism is 
central to his domination. Beauvoir states that “the idea of penetration acquires its obscene and 
humiliating sense within a more general frame, of which it is, in turn, an essential element” (ibid). 
It is crucial to understand Beauvoir’s attention to biological embodiment as commenting on the 
meaning that is socially imposed on to the material reality. The previous chapter discussed how 
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the radical feminist argument is wrongly rejected as biologically essentialist and as arguing that 
all heterosexual sex is rape. Underplaying the element of social construction in Beauvoir’s 
analysis can result in the same misreading of Beauvoir. Social construction is at the heart of both 
radical feminism and existentialism: it is the symbolic imposition on to the biological reality that 
is of relevance. 
 
In Beauvoir’s (1949) analysis of women’s oppression, the role of sexual objectification in 
femininity provides the critique of the institution of heterosexuality that is provided by radical 
feminism. Beauvoir provides marriage and prostitution as examples of the ways in which woman 
is given to man in sexual servitude. Beauvoir explains how “to serve is to give oneself a master; 
there is no reciprocity in this relation. The nature of marriage, as well as the existence of 
prostitutes, is the proof: woman gives herself, man pays her and takes her” ([1949] 1997: 396). 
Beauvoir also discusses that, as her role has been written as object, there is an inherent 
indifference to her desire or lack of desire for sex: “any inertia on her part does not seriously 
affect her natural role: a statement supported by the fact that many men do not trouble themselves 
to find out whether the women who bed with them desire coition or merely submit to it. It is even 
possible to copulate with a corpse” (ibid: 395). This again points us towards a central argument 
of radical feminism. If the default position has erased women’s subjectivity, then consent cannot 
be conceptualised as dichotomously absent or present. The current script allows for women’s non-
responsiveness to be interpreted as affirmation of her position as sexual object and thus validation 
of his use of her. 
 
Through the imposition of objectification, sexual violation becomes the fault of the victim. 
Beauvoir demonstrates how the sexual objectification of women serves to alleviate men of 
responsibility. I will quote Beauvoir at length, to demonstrate the positioning of radical feminism 
and the supposition of the psychology that constitutes this system of oppression:  
 
“flagrant example of this duplicity is the male’s attitude towards prostitution, for it is his demand 
that creates the supply.…the respectable gentlemen who condemn vice in general but view their 
own personal whims with indulgence; yet they regard the girls who live off their bodies as 
perverted and debauched, not the males who use them. An anecdote will serve to illustrate this 
state of mind. At the turn of the century the police found two little girls of twelve and thirteen in 
a brothel; testifying at the trial, the girls referred to their clients, who were men of importance, 
and one of the girls was about to give a name. The judge stopped her at once: ‘You must not 
befoul the name of a respectable man!’ A gentleman decorated by the Legion of Honour is still a 
respectable man when deflowering a little girl; he has his weaknesses, as who does not? Whereas 
the little girl who has no aspirations towards the ethical realm of the universal – who is not a 
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magistrate, or a general, or a great Frenchman, nothing but a little girl – stakes her moral value 
in the contingent realm of sexuality: she is perverse, corrupted, vicious, fit only for the 
reformatory” (Beauvoir [1949] 1997: 625). 
 
The evasion of responsibility is inherent to defining her as object. If this evasion is understood as 
an inauthentic existence, this does not require an idealised true self. Instead, the existential notion 
of authenticity involves taking responsibility for one’s actions. The way in which feminine 
objectification makes a child responsible for his sexual use of her clearly indicates the way in 
which oppression provides an escape from responsibility. Both radical feminism and Beauvoir 
(1949) analyse the system in which women and girls are blamed for being violated and used, 
whilst men are not held responsible for the acts of violation and abuse. The transference of 
responsibility away from men shows the need to theorise men’s consciousness. As Kruks states, 
for Beauvoir it is necessary to “explain why woman’s otherness has not resulted in reciprocity, 
but has enabled man to objectify her” (1990: 100). The social construction of femininity that holds 
her responsible for her own violation is presented as naturally arising from her sex. The 
construction of femininity is read as the biologically determined reality and thus man is alleviated 
of responsibility for making her into an object. The appearance of an ‘eternal feminine’ “is 
humanly created and not natural, it is created by man (the male) through the situation which he 
imposes on woman” (Kruks 1990: 101). If masculine subjectivity is based on the objectification 
of women, this can explain the pervasive sexual violence perpetrated by men against women and 
girls.  
 
Beauvoir (1949) refers to the continuum of sexual violence and the symbolism of penetrative 
heterosexual sex in patriarchy. The examples of prostitution and marriage serve to illustrate how 
woman has been positioned as a sexual object in service of men, thus providing a critique of the 
institution of heterosexuality. The proposed ideal of reciprocity and mutual recognition allows 
that heterosexual sex does not need to be defined by dominance. The objectification of women 
serves to release man from his responsibility to act as a moral agent, which can be understood to 
encourage the systematic sexual violation of women and girls. Beauvoir discusses the 
phenomenology of women’s bodies. The equal humanity of men and women must be founded on 
the recognition of embodied differences; the argument is that these embodied differences should 
not dictate differential subject positions. The analysis through sex class and the symbolism of the 
penis attests to the fact that patriarchal oppression has been fused onto the biological foundation. 
The way in which Beauvoir’s account centralises the sexual objectification of women under 
patriarchy is consistent with the radical feminist argument. What Beauvoir adds is a clear focus 
on the individual. Beauvoir’s analysis of oppression provides a humanist account in suggesting 
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that the constraint of femininity (in objectifying women) destroys the common humanity of the 
transcendence of subjects.  
 
When we consider the intention in the act of rape, the choice of how to act seems imperative. The 
existential perspective recognises the material constraints on freedom whilst retaining a sense of 
responsibility. In advocating the use of existential theorising to criminology, Hardie-Bick and 
Lippens state that “Yes, the hormones were sky-rocketing. Yes, the biography was tragic. Yes, 
the affinities were tremendous. Yes, the visceral sentiment was unmistakeable. Yes, all those 
restrictions were in place, pre-structuring the field as it were. But choice there was” (2011: 4). 
When we consider rape, we can consider the provided explanations of high testosterone, a 
biography of the domineering mother, or the visceral sentiment of lust. Yet none of these 
‘explanations’ acts as a sufficient explanation of his action. These constraints may have structured 
the field, but his choice remained. The focus on choice is essential when understanding an act that 
violates another. If we adopt an existential analysis of the subject, action can be analysed as 
intentional and thus open to change.  
 
Theorising a subject of consciousness that has choice, whilst recognising the role of the social 
structure, is crucial for criminological theorising. In particular it is imperative for theorising the 
act of rape. As stated in Chapter One, criminological theory has tended to theorise either the 
individual or the social structure. This leads Gadd and Jefferson (2007) to propose the need to 
theorise the criminal subject within the social context. Furthermore, the recent trend of anti-
humanism in sociology and criminology has led to an explicit rejection of theorising the subject 
of consciousness. Existential criminology counters this. The humanism of existentialism can be 
used to theorise the moment of the act and consider the consciousness that directs the moment. In 
an attempt to humanise and not pathologise the perpetrator, retaining responsibility and intention 
within a recognition of oppression as structural, I propose that a humanist position must be taken.  
 
Section Two: Anti-humanism and the Sex/Gender Distinction  
 
This section considers the rise of anti-humanism in feminist theory. I will outline the central 
attacks levelled against humanism, and the target of existentialism in the ascendency of anti-
humanism. I will then consider Butler’s (1999) queer theory as an example of the shift towards 
anti-humanism in feminist theory. Understanding radical feminism through Beauvoir (1949), and 
queer theory through Foucault (1976), reflects the division between humanism and anti-
humanism beneath the disagreement in feminist theory regarding the sex/gender distinction. This 
section will present the rise of anti-humanism and how this has been applied to feminist theory. 
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The following section will dispute the anti-humanist critiques of the subject and argue for the 
need for humanism in feminism. 
 
2.1 Anti-humanism and Existentialism 
 
The rise of anti-humanism as the ‘death of the subject’ is a central tenet of the postmodern critique 
of enlightenment theorising. As Flax states, “essential to all enlightenment beliefs is the existence 
of something called a ‘self’, a stable reliable integrative entity that has access to our inner states 
and outer reality, at least to a limited (but knowable) degree” (1990: 8). Understanding humanism 
as theorising a common humanity instantiated in individuated subjects. Anti-humanism rejects 
the assumption of commonality and, in doing so, questions the foundation of ‘the subject’. Soper 
(1986) defines anti-humanism as taking the claims of humanism to be ideological. As such it 
“rejects the concept of the human subject; ‘men’ do not make history, nor find their ‘truth’ or 
‘purpose’ in it; history is a process without a subject” (Soper 1986: 11). It is claimed that the 
humanist belief in the ‘unity of the species’ is in fact used to “extinguish human plurality and 
diversity” (Johnson 1994: 1). The postmodern critique of synthesising difference into a “unitary, 
univocal whole” applies to the notion of self (Flax 1990: 4).  
 
Flax (1990) conceptualises postmodernism as involving three ‘deaths’ of enlightenment 
theoretical concepts: the death of man, the death of history and the death of metaphysics. The 
death of man opposes essentialist conceptions of human nature, instead positing that the “subject 
is merely another position in language” (Flax 1990: 32). The commitment to semiology was to 
propose that “the traditional human sciences have failed in their task because they have 
overlooked the dimension of representation from within which they have ‘observed’ their subject 
matter” (Soper 1986: 96). If representation and language can no longer be seen as the mediation 
of the subject, the subject becomes constituted through representation. There is no ultimate or 
primary reality behind signification. The death of the subject occurs “with the universal 
inscription of humankind within language and systems of codification which regulate all human 
experience and activity and therefore lie beyond the control of either individuals or social groups” 
(ibid: 97). The death of history undermines the notion of progress. It is argued that the notion of 
human history as a positive trajectory and hence a unity can only be achieved through effacement. 
The death of metaphysics condemns the use of binary oppositions, claiming that theorising 
through positing dualities of nature and culture, male and female, produces violent domination. 
Enlightenment philosophy constructed grand narratives and universal theories, while 
postmodernism theorises difference instead of identity. While humanism invokes a “conscious, 
knowing, unified, rational subject”, the anti-humanist points to conflict and disunity (Weedon 
cited in Johnson 1994: 18).   
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Existentialism can be seen to provide a humanist account, in making the transcendence of 
consciousness a unifying feature of humanity. I have argued that Beauvoir (1949) provides a 
humanist account of oppression that argues that objectification undermines a common humanity. 
The predominance of ‘existential theorising in the 1940s and 1950s was undermined by the rise 
of structuralism in the 1960s (Althusser 1968) and then further through post-structuralism in the 
1970s (Foucault 1969; 1975a)’ (Hardie-Bick and Lippens 2011: 2). The ascendance of 
structuralism and post-structuralism can be understood as ‘the rise of anti-humanism’.11 Foucault, 
amongst others, proposed that a position of humanism that “attempts to ground an image of 
common humanity in a positive description of irreducible human traits…. ultimately refers to 
some sort of metaphysical postulate, like the Cartesian conception of the universal rational soul” 
(Johnson 1994: 12). The anti-humanists “confronted the existentialist argument that social agency 
cannot be theorised without reference to the individual human subject. All of them claimed to 
find in the arguments of the existentialists no more than a Cartesian notion of an autonomous 
subject” (Kruks 1990: 183). The rational subject that was alleged to represent common humanity 
came under attack, and existentialism was rejected. 
 
Subjectivity is central to all of Sartre’s work, and his early philosophy in Being and Nothingness 
(1943) can be seen to provide a ‘profoundly Cartesian’ subject (Cohen-Solal 1985: 187). Sartre’s 
1945 lecture ‘Existentialism Is a Humanism’ propelled him to the status of a public intellectual. 
The purpose of the lecture was “to clarify the meaning of humanism and thereby to try to define 
existentialism as that doctrine which makes human life possible” (Cohen-Solal 1985: 250). 
General tenets of existentialism, in attributing responsibility and theorising man from his actions, 
are reiterated in Sartre’s lecture. Sartre states “what we are considering is an ethic of action and 
self-commitment...Our point of departure is, indeed, the subjectivity of the individual” ([1946] 
2013: 51). But from the 1960s onwards, Foucault was replacing Sartre as the dominant theorist 
(Cohen-Solal 1985). Foucault provides a prediction in the final passage of The Order of Things 
that “man would be erased like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea” ([1966] 1989: 387). 
Miller (1993) notes that it is precisely this anti-humanism that brings Foucault to prominence.  
 
 
11 Variations of post-structuralism mean that it is possible to adopt a position that is both humanist and post-
structuralist. However, when we are considering the ascendency of Foucault (1969; 1975a; 1976) contra. 
Sartre (1943; 1946), Foucault’s early formulation of post-structuralism was explicitly anti-humanist. As 
Butler (1999) also adopts an explicitly anti-humanist variant of Foucauldian post-structuralism, for this 
chapter I will discuss post-structuralism as anti-humanist. Gavey (2005) (considered in Chapter One) 
combines radical feminism and post-structuralism and Alcoff (2018) (considered in following chapters) 
provides a post-structural account of subjects. 
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Foucault rejects the true self that is implied through Sartre’s “moral notion of authenticity” (Miller 
1993: 54). Foucault followed Nietzsche in arguing against the self being given (ibid). Truth in 
general and truth about the self is created, instead of being discovered or revealed. Foucault 
suggests that the modern state is based on the humanist fiction “of ‘human nature’ and on the 
emergence of a group of ‘experts’ whose story about such questions will be considered 
authoritative and final” (Flax 1990: 40). Foucault draws on Saussure’s structural linguistics: 
“phenomenology was no match for structural analysis in accounting for the effects of meaning 
that could be produced by the structure of the linguistic type, in which the subject (in the 
phenomenological sense) did not intervene to confer meaning” (Foucault cited in Miller 1993: 
52).  
 
For Foucault, the body is “a shifting deployment of cultural and corporeal forces” (Miller 1993: 
69). Foucault (1966; 1975a) proposes that the subject is constructed through the disciplines that 
claim to study it. The rise of medicine and social science in the enlightenment locates the 
individual as an object of study. Instead of being a “humane application of scientific knowledge”, 
Foucault suggests it is “a subtle and insidious new form of social control” (Miller 1993: 14). One 
of Foucault’s (1976) central insights is the productive nature of knowledge. The discourses about 
the subject are seen to produce the subject. Confessional discourses produce what is experienced 
as a ‘deep foundational self’, but such experience “is not true in some ontological or essentialist 
sense. It is merely an effect of a subjectivity constituted in and through certain discourses” (Flax 
1990: 208). In proposing that the subject is an effect, “practice needs to be accounted for without 
even a historicised notion of the subject” (Kruks 1990: 184).  
 
Theorising the death of the subject represented humanists as naïve (Hardie-Bick and Lippens 
2011). Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were considered “exponents of an outdated philosophy of the 
subject” (Kruks 1990: 181). The common features of humanity propounded by humanism place 
the individual consciousness as the point of theorising. With the rise of anti-humanism “neither 
individual behaviour nor the human subject as an effective agent retains a place in the 
methodological agenda” (ibid: 2). With the attacks on the subject made by Althusser and Foucault, 
“existentialist concerns of freedom, choice, and responsibility were increasingly seen to be passe” 
(Hardie-Bick and Lippens 2011: 11). The rise of the structure or the discourse in place of the 
subject means that “basic assumptions about human agency which support such concepts as 
responsibility for our actions and equal respect for persons are untenable” (Kruks 1990: 4).  
 
The humanism of the existentialist subject means that it provides conscious and responsible agents 
who produce history through action. Theorising how the individual relates to the structure 
provides a central aspect of existentialism that I will discuss in the final section of this chapter. 
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The anti-humanist consideration of the relation between the individual and the structure/discourse 
concludes that the structure/discourse supersedes the individual. For structuralism ‘men’ are “the 
passive vehicles or supports of those grand historical forces which are the real subjects of history” 
(Kruks 1990: 7). For post-structuralism, meanwhile, ‘men’ are “mere constructs of discursive 
practices” (ibid). This section will now consider how Foucault’s rejection of the subject informs 
the current anti-humanism of feminist theorising.  
 
2.2 Anti-humanism and Feminist Theory 
 
The first section of this chapter has proposed that radical feminism – which arose in the 1960s – 
provides a humanist account, through rooting the theory in the existential philosophy of Beauvoir 
(1949). The last chapter considered that the criticisms of essentialism and determinism have been 
used to refute radical feminism. From the 1990s onwards, the critiques of radical feminism were 
considered to be conclusive, leading to the rising dominance of queer theory. In developing queer 
theory as a critique of feminism, Butler (1999) draws heavily on Foucault (1969; 1975a; 1976). 
Through considering the application of anti-humanism to feminist theory, I will argue for the need 
to take a humanist perspective in theorising rape. 
 
The phenomenological account of women’s oppression provided by Beauvoir (1949) relies on the 
biological category of female. The radical feminist theory continues this belief in a biological 
reality, onto which oppressive structures are imposed. This provides the distinction of sex as given 
and gender as socially constructed. In commenting on the shift from structuralism to post-
structuralism, Soper notes that post-structuralism attacks science and Western metaphysics as a 
challenge to “the residual humanist invocation of presence upon which the structuralist argument 
relies” (1986: 17). Through undermining the basis of science, this position entrenches the 
rejection of theorising ‘the subject’ that was initiated through the rise of structuralism. This 
critique of the biological materiality is central to Butler’s (1999) application of Foucault to 
feminist theory. 
 
Butler contests the notion of a pure or natural body onto which gender is imposed. From this, 
Butler suggests that ‘sex was gender all along’ (1986: 46). If bodies themselves are socially 
constructed, then the system of binary gender creates the anatomical division between the sexes. 
Butler draws on Foucault in order to refute the ‘given’ of biology; scientific disciplines do not 
find and describe the reality, rather they produce reality. To establish the social construction of 
sex, Butler (1999) invokes Foucault’s discussion of an intersex person onto whom the binary 
categorisation of sex was violently imposed. In further opposition to biological categories of sex, 
Butler (1999) discusses the difficulty of using chromosomes or hormone levels to identify 
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dichotomous categories of sex. Destabilising the biological category of sex is in part an argument 
against Beauvoir’s supposition of sex as “immutably factic” (ibid: 142). Butler suggests that sex 
must be seen as the construction of norms, suggesting that we ‘might just as well be differentiated 
on the basis of earlobe formation’ (1986: 47). The discursive production of both sex and gender 
serves to undermine the foundational premise of radical feminism’s analysis through sex class. 
The denial of this distinction also robs the solution of radical feminism in abolishing gender, as 
the all-encompassing discursive production makes gender inescapable.  
 
In opposition to radical feminism’s claim that patriarchy makes it necessary to theorise and 
collectivise around the category ‘woman’, queer theory advocates disposing of the subject of 
‘woman’ in feminism (Butler 1999). This position is reached through suggesting that this category 
is imbricated with regulatory power that results in exclusion. As with anti-humanist positions 
more broadly, the subject is said to be constructed through a process of exclusion. The subject of 
feminism is seen to rely on a false universalism that erases difference in order to supply the unity 
of the subject. Woman as the subject of feminism thereby becomes the target of deconstruction.  
 
In disputing the commonality that is alleged to hold subjects together, Butler (1999) further 
disputes the subject itself. Drawing on Nietzsche’s account of the deed without the doer, Butler 
contends that it is a “significant theoretical mistake to take the ‘internality’ of the psychic world 
for granted” (1999: xiv). The internality of a self as a point of origin of action is replaced by 
discursive possibilities. Butler suggests that the Cartesian dualism is “presupposed in 
phenomenology adapted to the structuralist frame in which mind/body is re-described as 
culture/nature” (ibid: 166). The cogito is never fully of the cultural world. If sex is seen as natural 
and gender is seen as socially constructed, then this posits a natural subject that exists 
independently of social construction. Butler states that “there is no bidding farewell to the doer, 
but only to the placement of that doer beyond or behind the deed…the “doer” will be the uncertain 
working of the discursive possibilities by which it itself is worked” (Butler 1995: 135). 
 
Butler (1999) proposes a defence of anti-humanism through noting the performative nature of 
gender and arguing that sex is socially constructed. Rather than gender as ‘being’, Butler  proposes 
gender as performance – as ‘doing’. Butler challenges Beauvoir’s account that we “somehow take 
on or appropriate” gender (1999: 12), claiming that identity outside of gendered identity is 
incomprehensible as we become intelligible through gender. As Foucault argued that the subject 
is constituted through discourse, Butler proposes that the subject is constituted through gender, 
thus making gender inescapable. The call to abolish gender, implied by Beauvoir’s (1949) 
analysis and made explicitly by radical feminists, relies on the notion that this would unveil 
(emancipate) true woman. Following from Foucault, Butler rejects the concept of a core self that 
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can be freed. Butler’s argument regarding performativity draws on Austin, Derrida, and Paul de 
Man’s interpretation of Nietzsche – “a performative act is one which brings into being or enacts 
that which it names, and so marks the constitutive or productive power of discourse” (Butler 1995: 
134). In this chapter it will not be possible to provide a detailed critique of all of the components 
of queer theory; instead, my aim is to draw attention to the advantages of humanism for theorising 
rape. 
 
Butler claims that her critique of the subject “is not a negation or repudiation of the subject, but, 
rather a way of interrogating its construction as a pre-given or foundationalist premise” (Butler 
1995: 42). In opposition to seeing the Foucauldian critique as the death of the subject, Butler 
claims it is instead “merely to claim that certain versions of the subject are politically insidious” 
(Butler 1995: 47). However, this can be disputed by the fact that Butler’s language “is deeply 
anti-humanist”, in that capacities are transferred from the subject to the discourse (Fraser 1995: 
67). Butler does not discuss people’s capacities, instead describing “ “power’s own possibility” 
and as impersonal “signifying process” ” (ibid). With agency transferred into the discourse, the 
subject has seemingly been negated. Through Butler’s critique of the subject of feminism it seems 
that Butler conceptualises identity as oppressive, such that liberation is conceptualised as 
“liberation from identity” (ibid: 71). In the last chapter I considered how post-structural critiques 
of determinism and essentialism made against radical feminist theory contested the lack of agency 
in the structural account, however, if these critiques are made in the advancement of an anti-
humanist position, they do not reinstate a position of agency, as the subject is replaced by 
discourse. The extent of fluidity presented in opposition to fixed categories undermines theorising 
the subject. 
 
An appeal to a concept of common humanity provides the basis for Beauvoir’s (1949) analysis of 
women’s oppression and underlies the argument of radical feminism. Radical feminism and 
Beauvoir consider the lived and felt experience of women, providing a critique of men’s 
development of consciousness as involving the sexual objectification of women. In contrast to 
this, the anti-humanism of queer theory removes consciousness from the theoretical frame. 
Through claiming that sex is a social construction, Butler (1995; 1999) argues for the removal of 
the subject of feminism and the subject of theorising. In considering the sex/gender distinction 
and how Butler’s argument is premised on her anti-humanism, this chapter suggests that 
theorising consciousness and experience – thus theorising a subject – is necessary to theorise the 





Section Three: Theorising Materiality and Social Construction  
 
I have proposed how the positions of humanism and anti-humanism play out in the debate of the 
sex/gender distinction. These theoretical disagreements between radical feminism and queer 
theory result in fissures in feminism over trans identity and prostitution and pornography. I will 
argue for a radical feminist position and propose the value of utilising an existential subject to 
oppose the current anti-humanist trend in feminism. Butler’s (1999) central critique of radical 
feminism presents it as biologically essentialist. In this section, I will consider the existential 
concept of situation to dispute the accusation of essentialism against existentialism. I will propose 
that a rejection of radical feminism is due to a conflation with cultural feminism, which is an 
explicitly essentialist position. In considering how in queer theory the material is replaced by the 
linguistic – through the focus on representation – I will argue that this is ultimately depoliticising. 
The act becomes lost to representation, the lived moment replaced by swirling symbolism.  
 
In finally considering how anti-normativity relates to anti-humanism, I will establish the need for 
feminism to adopt a humanist perspective. The critique of sexual objectification has been 
undermined by the rise of anti-humanism in feminism. This chapter suggests the need to theorise 
acts and subjects, establishing that the conception of subjectivity and humanity implied by the 
existential critique of objectification is not adequately refuted by the arguments of anti-humanism. 
There is a subjective experience prior to and in the moment of the act. In order to understand the 
act, one must thereby understand this consciousness. The harm of objectification is the violation 
of subjectivity; objectification can therefore be understood as the loss of our common humanity. 
Attending to the embodied and intersubjective account of self provided by existentialism 
establishes the harm of sexual objectification, without needing to posit a conception of self that 
is prescriptive and restricting. Without a subject, it seems acts such as rape cannot be theorised; 
the moment of consciousness and the responsibility of men who rape becomes lost in 
deconstructing ‘woman’ and critiquing feminism itself. In suggesting that rape needs to be 
theorised, I suggest the concept of sexual objectification is central. To this effect I hope to 
establish that radical feminism is a humanism. As I have argued that radical feminism is aligned 
with Beauvoir’s (1949) existentialism, the defence of radical feminism is combined with the 
defence of existentialism.  
 
3.1 Situation Against Essentialism  
 
Firstly, it can be suggested that Beauvoir (1949) does not posit a Cartesian mind/body dualism 
through the sex/gender distinction, as although the natural will always be culturally interpreted, 
it is conceptually possible to distinguish materiality and cultural interpretation. The recognition 
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of the materiality of sex does not posit this to be outside of the cultural interpretation. We can 
make sense of the erect penis or the lactating breast, providing the material reality. This can be 
conceptually distinguished from the pride of the erect penis or the shame of the lactating breast. 
The impossibility of providing a neutral assessment of the world is due to our epistemological 
limits: we can never escape the specific human capacities of knowing and interpreting. It does not 
seem that this needs to be taken as a metaphysical postulate that there is no possibility of 
distinguishing a material basis from a cultural interpretation. The cultural interpretation will 
always exist, but if the current cultural interpretation simultaneously valorises one and degrades 
the other, the material basis does not justify this distinction in evaluation. If gender is the cultural 
interpretation of sex, this does not mean we need to free sex of all cultural interpretation, but that 
we should question the current cultural interpretation through questioning gender. Locating the 
ghost of Descartes is often used to discredit humanist theories. Sartre’s (1943) early account of 
the subject in Being and Nothingness can be seen as individualistic and abstracted from the social 
world. However, the ‘anti-humanist blanket rejection of existentialism fails to consider French 
existentialism after the Second World War, which considered the social aspects of subjectivity’ 
(Kruks 1990: 10). Given this, I propose that existentialism provides a way theorising the 
individual within the structure. 
 
Beauvoir notes the shift in Sartre’s understanding of the individual subject, stating that by 1951 
“he knew that circumstances can sometimes steal our transcendence from us; in that case no 
individual salvation is possible, only a collective struggle” (Cohen-Solal 1985: 318). Furthermore, 
Beauvoir’s theorising clearly disputes the radical free subject of early Sartre, proposing that “at 
the most oppressed end of the continuum…. there is no moral fault because there is no possibility 
of choice” (Kruks 1990: 102). This period of existentialism can be seen as crucial for theorising 
the individual within the structure, as “at no other time and place has a group of thinkers felt 
obliged simultaneously to confront such a philosophically hegemonic Cartesianism and such a 
politically hegemonic objectivist Marxism as that of the French Communist Party. It is the 
location of their work at this intersection which makes the reflections of French existentialists on 
subjectivity and its relations to social life so distinctive” (Kruks 1990: 14). 
 
False universalism and essentialism are the central critiques provided by anti-humanism. I will 
draw on Kruks (1990) and Soper (1986) to suggest how existentialism and phenomenology can 
resist some of the criticism levelled by anti-humanists, providing a route to theorising the 
individual within the structure. Firstly, it must be noted that existentialism is founded upon 
refuting the notion of human nature. The central claim of existentialism is that in there being no 
pre-destined goal, man must make his own values in the world. To think that one is determined 
by nature is to evade the responsibility one has for oneself. The common humanity postulated by 
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existentialism is the lived ambiguity of immanence and transcendence. Transcendence is not a 
specified form of subjectivity, but the potential for the subject to choose and will themselves 
forward in the world. It is a minimal notion of subjectivity based on the possibility of freedom 
and responsibility.  
 
Soper (1986) suggests that the anti-humanists conflate the constitutive role of individuals in 
history with a teleological purpose. To say that history is a product of human action and intention 
is not to say that humanity is progressing toward some ultimate human becoming. Soper suggests 
that the main opposition levelled against humanism is not in fact of the existentialist variant of 
humanism (even though the anti-humanists cite Sartre as their opponent). The first form of 
humanism is theorising the “constitutive role of individuals in the making of history” (Soper 1986: 
21). The second form being the view that “history itself is the working out of an immanent human 
purpose” (ibid). These forms of humanism are not mutually entailing. To see existentialists as 
propounding the first and not the second form of humanism enables the compatibility of the 
subject with the structure. The subject is lived instead of posited as an essence. In theorising the 
subject, Beauvoir describes “human existence as a synthesis of freedom and constraint, of 
consciousness and materiality” (Kruks 1990: 102). 
 
The situated subject is not extricated from the social world, rather it is defined through the social 
world. The concept of situation refutes the accusation of essence. Beauvoir counterposes essence 
and situation when she states “in order to explain her limitations it is a woman’s situation that 
must be invoked and not a mysterious essence” ([1949] 1997: 723). If a subject is defined by 
essence, it would be universal and timeless. In contrast, situation emphasises the contingency and 
temporal location of subjects. Essence is unchanging, whereas situation can be changed. The 
method of phenomenology recognises the particularity of embodiment and thus does 
acknowledge a biological basis of existence. This recognition of biology does not equate to 
biological determinism. Situated subjectivity is neither the radically free subject proposed by 
early Sartre, nor is it a subject that is biologically determined. Embodiment and intersubjectivity 
are central to the concept of situation.  
 
To dispute the anti-humanist rejection of “individualistic subjectivism”, Kruks considers the role 
of agency and structure in Marcel, Sartre, Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty (Kruks 1990: 10). Kruks 
states that each of these theorists (through distinctive theories) proposes that “the recognition that 
being in situation, being an embodied subjectivity, cannot but be intersubjective” (ibid: 11). This 
thesis will argue that the critique of sexual objectification encompasses an embodied and 
intersubjective conception of self. Soper accepts the cultural conditioning of moral feeling, but 
warns against thereby overlooking and denying “the distinctive character of affective and moral 
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experience” (1986: 134). There is no need to posit a ‘natural self’, but it seems compelling to 
suggest that morality is “an intrinsic form of sensibility essential to any form of human co-
existence” (ibid). In Chapter Four I will consider how this moral realm arises from the 
understanding of the subject as embodied and intersubjective. The situated subject is defined 
through the social world, but the role of embodiment and intersubjectivity to the foundation of 
subjects gives morality an intrinsic quality to what it means to be a subject. The humanist 
maintains moral action as a form of truth.  
 
Kruks suggests that much Foucauldian explanation would be consistent with Beauvoir’s theory 
of oppression, but the crucial difference is that, “Beauvoir would never have agreed to abandon 
the notion of a repression of freedom. However suppressed, however disciplined, it is still 
freedom-made-immanent” (1990: 103). To enable the full subjectivity of women, “situation must 
be altered” (ibid). Phenomenology proposes that there is an internality in the form of experience; 
this allows us to theorise agency as not reducible to discourse. In reference to anti-humanism, 
Sartre commented that a centred subject deduced simply from reflection ‘has long been dead’, 
however, “the death of this kind of thinking subject is not the death of the subject tout court. For 
as soon as we talk of any kind of transcendence of a given situation or structure, that is of any 
kind of praxis, we still require a notion of the subject and of subjectivity” (Kruks 1990: 172). This 
can be seen through implicit notions of self underlying postmodern discourses (Flax 1990), and 
further through the way in which “in trying to exclude human intentionality from his account, 
what Foucault ends up doing is to personify and grant intentionality to the techniques” (Kruks 
1990: 187).  
 
3.2 Cultural Feminism  
 
In grounding radical feminism in Beauvoir, Simons states that Beauvoir provides “ontological 
and methodological grounds for reclaiming the specificity of women’s experience while avoiding 
the essentialism of identity politics” (1999: 152 – 153). It is in fact Beauvoir’s (1949) humanism 
that means she avoids essentialism. In stating that subjectivity capable of transcendence is 
common to all of humanity, Beauvoir argues that the female sex is constrained by her situation. 
The basic demand for transcendence over immanence is because women’s particular embodiment 
does not dictate differential subject positions. The situation that imposes gender provides 
differential access to subjectivity, to transcendence. Simons thereby dissociates Beauvoir from a 
cultural feminist position “seeking a woman-culture” (1999: 157). The intention of emancipating 
woman is not to free her from situation, as all subjectivity is situated; it is to change the situation 
so that her potential as a subject is not constrained. I will now consider the role of the accusation 
of essentialism against radical feminism. The distinction between radical feminism and cultural 
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feminism proves crucial for clarifying the radical feminist position of biology and social 
construction, and how it is not thereby essentialist. 
 
In reference to MacKinnon’s (1987) argument that the imposition of gender is through the 
institution of heterosexuality, Butler claims that in equating sexual ordering with gender, 
MacKinnon suggests that “men who are men will be straight and women who are women will be 
straight” (Butler 1999: xiii). I suggest that here Butler misinterprets radical feminist theories as 
being biologically essentialist. The radical feminist analysis is of hetero-patriarchy. The argument 
refers to the social construction of gender. A man (biological male) is only a ‘man’ (accepted 
socially prescribed position of masculinity) if he is heterosexual. It is a critique of the gender 
subordination enforced through sexual positioning. The relevance of biological categories is that 
the objectification of women is a component of the masculine identity within patriarchy. The 
consequence is that the lives of women, gay people, and trans people are constrained through the 
imposition of gender onto sexed bodies. 
 
When Butler criticises feminism for “the reification of a pre-cultural sphere of the authentic 
feminine” (1999: 46) she invokes a cultural feminist position. Radical feminism is often rejected 
on the basis of a conflation with cultural feminism (for example, Messerschmidt 1993). Simons 
(1999) suggests that the refusal to distinguish these positions erroneously dismisses the radical 
feminist argument. And as noted more recently by Mackay (2015) this conflation persists in the 
pursuit of rejecting radical feminism. Cultural feminism suggests that there are essential 
differences between men and women and that we should utilise specific female traits in opposing 
oppression (Alcoff 1988). In opposition to a female essence, all that is required in the radical 
feminist analysis is that women are subjects who are currently constrained by the imposition of 
gender. For the category of woman to exist freely outside of the imposition of gender would not 
reveal an idealised true self, but the expanded possibility for subjective agency. Soper clearly 
articulates the position put forward by Beauvoir: “women in short are human first and women 
second. This rules out both reactionary justifications for their subordination on the grounds of 
their natural inferiority or distinctive sexuality (hence her quarrel with biologism and a good deal 
of Freudianism); but it also rules out more positive ‘feminist’ demands for a recognition of some 
specifically feminine essence” (1986: 63). 
 
To clarify the central differences between these positions: cultural feminism claims that there are 
essential differences between males and females. In valorising feminine traits, this position reifies 
gendered traits as biologically determined, for instance women being passive and men being 
aggressive. Cultural feminism locks gender to sex. The radical feminist position suggests that 
there are material differences between the sexes in the form of embodiment, but that these 
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differences should not determine differential social positioning, because sex itself does not 
determine gender. Radical feminism explains the subordination of women as a product of the 
imposition and hence the social construction of gender. The biological difference between sexes 
would be largely inconsequential, if it was not for the enforcement of gender onto sexed bodies. 
Radical feminism dissociates gender from sex. Queer theory undermines the distinction between 
sex as material reality and gender as social construction. It is argued that biology and the body 
itself are socially constructed. In identity being constituted through discourse, the claim is that 
gender cannot be escaped.  
 
Another aspect of radical feminism that is alleged to invoke essentialism is the implication of a 
‘true self’ in the method of consciousness-raising (Hollway 1989). Again, I suggest that this is a 
basic notion of recognition of subjectivity and not an essentialist notion of self-revelation. The 
relevance of the method of consciousness-raising to radical feminist theory is that women’s 
narratives shared a commonality in experiencing sexual objectification. Whilst a woman may 
have held herself responsible for the abuse that she suffered, when she hears another woman’s 
story she is likely to respond with compassion and direct the blame against the perpetrator. If we 
suggest that this revelation is one achieved through sharing experiences, it is that she sees 
subjectivity in another and thus sees it as an injustice, enabling her to see the injustice against her 
own person and hence her own subjectivity. This form of subjectivity, in which one does not 
blame oneself, does not require a ‘true inner self’ that is revealed through consciousness-raising. 
 
3.3 Sex as Embodied Material Reality  
 
I will now discuss the relevance of biology to Beauvoir (1949) and radical feminism, whilst 
disputing the notion that sex is a social construction. It is necessary to recognise the biological 
particularities of females, as the construction of patriarchal oppression is upon this material 
reality. When a girl develops breasts she is likely to experience the objectifying gaze more 
intensely; her breasts may be commented on by strangers. Her breasts become symbolic of her 
sexualisation and as her breasts are a permanent part of her body, her body is permanently 
interpreted under a sexual gaze. Her breasts ‘give her away’ as a woman and thus as the 
subjugated sex. If there was not such an outward differentiation of our sexed bodies, then it would 
be difficult to impose the construction of masculinity and femininity. It is because we can be 
identified as male or female, based on basic biological manifestations, that the social construction 
of masculinity and femininity can be applied.  
 
Understanding the social construction of gender requires understanding the material distinctions 
between male and female bodies. The significance attributed to biology is crucial in Beauvoir’s 
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(1949) analysis of oppression, and in an existential account there is no value-neutral way of seeing 
the world. As Kruks states, the position is that “biological facts have no significance beyond the 
values which man chooses to give them” (1990: 108). If breasts were not objectified, if 
menstruation was not stigmatised, breasts and ovaries would still exist under social interpretation. 
Yet we can argue that breasts could be socially interpreted in the same way as a male chest; 
sexualised only in certain contexts. We can imagine a reality in which menstruation could be 
discussed openly in a similar fashion to other natural bodily processes. 
 
In response to Butler’s (1999) cited evidence for the difficulty of distinguishing men and women 
through science, I suggest this refusal of materiality provides the wrong level of analysis. In 
everyday life there is no need to submit someone to a scientific test of chromosomes to affirm 
their sex, as male and female bodies have visibly distinct biological features. These external 
features, such as breasts or facial hair, correlate to the way in which we are a sexually dimorphic 
species and thus have distinctive reproductive capacities. The radical feminist argument agrees 
that the differences between males and females are widely exaggerated through the imposition of 
gender norms. Yet the recognition of sexed embodiment is supported by considering that by and 
large people can be identified as male or female. The removal (for transmen) or the implanting 
(for transwomen) of breasts is a case in point for the physical differences that do exist, justifying 
theorising according to the category of sex class. The existence of intersex people is insufficient 
to undermine all notion of biological categorisation. What is needed is the recognition of intersex 
as a third category of biological embodiment. The presence of more embodied possibilities does 
not undermine the distinctive features of breasts and vaginas, and penises and testes found in 
individuals. As Nussbaum states, “Butler's brief exploration of Foucault on hermaphrodites does 
show us society's anxious insistence to classify every human being in one box or another, whether 
or not the individual fits a box; but of course it does not show that there are many such 
indeterminate cases” (1999: 42). It is possible to object to the oppression of intersex people in 
forcing them into the constructed binary of sex, without thereby relinquishing all sense of 
biological categories as the material reality.  
 
3.4 Political Application and Normative Theorising  
 
Butler claims that the “the deconstruction of identity is not the deconstruction of politics; rather 
it establishes as political the very terms through which identity is articulated” (1999: 189). In 
opposition to this, I suggest that the idealism of prioritising language and discourse over agency 
leads to the same lack of a political acting subject found in the anti-humanist movement. The 
inescapable nature of gender on a post-structural account results in de-politicising theory. 
Whereas the radical feminist theory relates to collective and individual political action in resisting 
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gendered categories, queer theory finds us trapped, and thus suggests we should play with the 
categories. If these categories are used as a means of oppression, playing with them without 
disposing of them, hinders rather than furthers emancipatory aims. Nussbaum (1999) identifies 
the post-structural turn in feminism with quietism. For post-structural feminism “symbolic verbal 
politics, in addition to being offered as a type of real politics, is held to be the only politics that is 
really possible” (ibid: 38).  
 
This thesis suggests that theorising requires a subject. In understanding an act committed by 
individuals, there is a subjective experience prior to and in the moment of committing the act. In 
arguing for the retention of the subject in theorising, it can be argued that the anti-humanist focus 
on language leads to abstractions that are ultimately de-politicising. Positions in which individuals 
are no more than mere effects are not conducive to political agency. It is noted that both Foucault 
and Althusser seemingly rescinded ‘the death’ of the subject (Soper 1986: 90; Kruks 1990: 5). 
For Foucault this was in direct correlation with his increasing political activism (Kruks 1990: 5).  
 
Entering a realm of complete self-identification, and thereby denying biological categorisation, 
invokes a totalising social constructionism that has damaging political consequences. To provide 
a personal anecdote of the political risk of this theoretical deconstruction of woman: in a local 
branch meeting for Sisters Uncut (feminist activist group against cuts to services for domestic 
violence) two people who identified themselves as non-binary argued for removing all references 
to she/her/sister in the manifesto for the group. It was claimed that this gendered language 
excluded trans people. Removing gendered language when referring to gendered violence is a de-
politicising tactic: we need the language of gender to articulate how this imposition is oppressive. 
It is undeniable that trans people experience violent oppression, but this can be explained through 
the framework of gender as the problem.  
 
If we allow that gender is imposed and socially constructed onto existing sexed material bodies, 
we can understand both violence against women and violence against trans people. Violence 
against women corresponds to the role of sexual objectification in femininity imposed on to the 
sex class of female, irrespective of their gendered appearance/performance. Violence against trans 
people can be explained by the fact that patriarchy violently imposes gender onto sex.12 Therefore, 
apparent deviation in the form of someone overtly rejecting the expected gendered presentation 
results in violent sanctioning. Furthermore, violence against transmen could be explained through 
a refusal to accept the person’s self-identification, reminding them that they are female. Whilst 
 
12 Here I refer to trans people as those who transition from a man to a transwoman or a woman to a transman, 
rather than those who espouse a non-binary identity purely in the linguistic realm. 
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violence against transwomen can be understood as reifying their proclaimed femininity, as to be 
feminine in patriarchy is to be in the position of the sexual object. As Jeffreys (2014) claims, the 
radical feminist position is that ‘gender hurts’. The oppressive force of gender underlies violence 
against women and trans people. Given this, the critique of gender provided by radical feminism 
is not inherently dismissive of, or unable to account for, violence against trans people. Radical 
feminist theory can encompass theorising the oppression of trans people, but resists the statement 
that ‘transwomen are women’. To enter the realm of self-identification as the ultimate determinant 
of reality is to forward a position that ultimately serves to deny biological and hence 
phenomenological distinctions between sexed bodies. The loss of the material reality could be 
seen as presenting a fully social constructionist position, but the consequence of reality being 
determined by self-identification means that in fact the intersubjectivity necessary for social 
construction has been lost. This indicates the need to theorise a material reality in order to theorise 
social construction.  
 
Feminist theory and politics requires an understanding of sexed bodies as real in order to articulate 
experiences of sexual violence. There are biological differences including vaginas and breasts, 
and penises and testes. The radical feminist argument is that these differences should not position 
us differently in terms of subjectivity. The importance of retaining a radical feminist position on 
the reality of sex class is that under this system of oppression, female embodied experience needs 
to be articulated. Given that the harm of femininity is its positioning of women as sexual object, 
resisting patriarchy requires becoming embodied. Central to early radical feminist theory was an 
exploration of female sexuality (see Koedt 1970; Shulman 1980). Statistics consistently show that 
heterosexual women experience orgasm far less than their male partners. This contrasts with 
lesbian women who experience similar rates of orgasm to the heterosexual male (Frederick et al. 
2018). This indicates the importance of understanding how gender has been imposed onto sexed 
bodies and hence how our sexual subjectivity is affected by the embodiment of ourselves and our 
partners. These findings are strongly supportive of a radical feminist argument: the masculine 
sexual subjectivity objectifies the feminine, and thus female pleasure is not the aim of scripted 
heterosexual intercourse.  
 
I suggest that this shift to considering representation as the totality loses the act to representation. 
In doing this, feminist theory floats to a meta-level in which the primary target of the critique 
becomes feminists themselves instead of patriarchy. In particular, when we consider the centrality 
of sexual violence to radical feminist theorising, these are real acts in the world, perpetrated by 
individuals that form intentions and are thereby responsible for the action. The consciousness of 
these men needs to be central to feminist theorising. This is not to place feminist theory itself 
beyond critique; we must always be mindful of oversights or exclusionary implications of theory. 
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However, I would suggest that the anti-humanist turn in feminism, through the deconstruction of 
‘woman’, has led to a loss of focus on the acts in the world that comprise patriarchal oppression, 
such as rape. 
 
In order to theorise rape it is necessary to theorise an intentional consciousness, and hence take a 
humanistic perspective. Existentialism and radical feminism provide theoretical frameworks 
within which the consciousness of the rapist can be theorised. The inescapability of gender and 
the deconstruction of woman provided by queer theory turns feminism in upon itself. 
Representation over materiality mystifies the act. The phenomenology of existentialism theorises 
the lived moment of the act; the subject of experience provides the basis of theorising. Radical 
feminism centralised women’s experience through consciousness-raising groups. Understanding 
the collective harm leads to understanding this violence as intentional, placing responsibility on 
the men committing the act. Starting from the understanding of a material reality that is socially 
constructed brings into focus acts in the world. Consciousness provides choice and intentionality 
to action. The subject as more than an effect of discourse is necessary to understand the 
consciousness that enables acts of violation to bring one pleasure. 
 
To provide a criminological theory of rape, it is necessary to theorise the moment in which he 
acts. Fluid, multiple, contradictory subjectivities are certainly lived within people’s overall 
experience of gendered lives. This can perhaps be traced through discursive positions. But when 
we look at the act as opposed to an ongoing development of self and relationships, a focus on 
discursive positions misses the importance of an act such as rape violating a fundamental principle 
of consciousness. The overt position of violent masculinity adopted in rape requires attending to 
the moment of the act, framing the question as how the structure enables this violation. In the act 
of rape, the fluctuating, contradictory self is channelled into a clear action with implications that 
firmly construct a sense of self through the annihilation of the other. When we take the act of 
rape, the description of consciousness is not prescriptive; it does not define the man totally as the 
rapist and nothing else. It is post-fact theorising of the moment of the act. This does not reify him 
into a singular existence, but considers the requisite consciousness for perpetration of such an act. 
 
Sexed bodies are real; the social construction of gender can be and needs to be overthrown. This 
will not be the unveiling of the female essence, but the removal of restrictive constraints of 
femininity that currently place women and girls in a position of sexual object for use by the 
masculine subject. As discussed in the last chapter, sexually objectifying practices, such as 
stripping and prostitution, have been reframed as women’s empowerment (Bell 1995; Nagel 
1997; Belle de Jour 2005; Egan et al. 2006; Agustin 2007; Bernstein 2007; Quan 2008). The 
replacement of the critique of sexual objectification with an embrace of sexual objectification 
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relates to the anti-normativity entailed in the shift towards anti-humanism. Radical feminist 
critiques of the sex industry are vehemently rebuked as moralistic normative judgements on sex. 
Re-establishing the need to critique sexual objectification through considering the act of rape 
highlights the importance of providing a normative account. If we want to consider the man 
responsible for his actions, we must recognise his subjectivity. The critique of sexual 
objectification is necessarily a critique of the man’s consciousness; for this, I suggest a normative 
framework is essential. As the situated existential subject is embodied and intersubjective, 
recognition of subjectivity is foundational, thus creating a moral realm. Objectification is the loss 
of a common humanity, when human beings are considered minimally as subjects with the 
capacity for choice and action.  
 
The death of the subject in queer theory results in a depoliticised theory that is anti-normative and 
presents this as progressive. If under this framework we cannot critique the man who rapes, it is 
hard to see anti-normativity as a progressive move. Benhabib suggests that we can understand the 
death of man in a strong or weak sense. The weaker sense situates subjectivity in social, linguistic 
and discursive practices. This allows that “some form of autonomy and rationality, could then be 
reformulated by taking account of the radical situatedness of the subject” (Benhabib 1995a: 20). 
For this reason, the situated subject of existentialism is not vulnerable to the critiques of anti-
humanism. In contrast, the strong version of the death of man dissolves man into “the chain of 
significations of which it was supposed to be the initiator” (ibid). In this account, “concepts of 
intentionality, accountability, self-reflexivity, and autonomy” are lost, and hence this strong 
version is incompatible with feminism (ibid).  
 
The approaches to normativity and rape are demonstrated through Beauvoir’s (1949) critique of 
the male evasion of responsibility for sexually violating women/girls (evidenced in the quote in 
section 1.2 of this chapter), in contrast to Foucault’s (1975b; 1976) claim that the farmhand could 
have been seduced by the little girl and his claim that she was happy after being violated, as she 
was given money (c.f. Jones 2016: 45 – 46).13 Foucault also advocated the removal of an age of 
sexual consent, suggesting that both the construct of childhood and the prohibition against sex 
with children were perniciously normalising (Miller 1993). Given that at the time Beauvoir was 
writing (1949), and at the time Foucault was writing (1970s) and in the current time (2021), the 
sexual violation of girls by men remains prevalent, it is imperative that feminism does not 
 
13 This example of the farmhand is provided by Foucault in The History of Sexuality Volume One ([1976] 
1998: 31 – 32) and further elaborated in Foucault’s lectures published in Abnormal ([1975b] 2003: 291 – 
292). Jones’ (2016) reading is based on the combination of the accounts of this example. A further 
consideration of the example provided in The History of Sexuality Volume One (1976) will be returned to 
in Chapter Four.  
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relinquish its claims to normativity. Patriarchy creates a system in which men are not responsible 
for their violation. Anti-normativity coheres with the exoneration of men for their sexual 
misconduct. 
 
In stating what is meant by postulating ‘normative foundations’, Benhabib expresses the 
importance of humanism to normative judgment. Benhabib states “by “normative foundations” 
of social criticism I mean exactly the conceptual possibility of justifying the norms of universal 
moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity on rational grounds…. I think that to want to deny this 
point is like wanting to jump over our own shadow” (1995b: 118). As Fraser states, “feminists do 
need to make normative judgements and to offer emancipatory alternatives” (1995: 71). If 
feminism is to offer “any value ideals at all, it inevitably draws upon the humanist capacity to 
look upon individuals in terms which seek to ‘disembed’ them from the singularity of their lived 
context” (Johnson 1994: 18). In theorising rape, a normative framework is required.  
 
The inclusion of the sex trade in the normative judgment provided by radical feminism is because 
of the material and symbolic symbiosis of the sex trade and sexual violence. Central to this thesis 
is that a radical feminist analysis critiques the men who see, treat and use women and girls as 
sexual objects. Phipps claims that a strategy of feminists who oppose the sex trade is to substitute 
“the sex worker with the (male) client”, such that when arguments are made in favour of sex 
worker rights they oppose the movement for acknowledging the rights of men to buy sex (2017: 
308). This may be a valid criticism in relation to arguments invoking criminalisation, but in 
relation to radical feminist theory’s objection to the sex industry this is a continued refusal to 
accept the critique as structural and directed at men’s entitlement. The rejection of the radical 
feminist critique of the sex industry is achieved through framing the critique as an attack on 
women who are involved in the industry. In this way, pro-sex-trade feminists twist the radical 
feminist critique of men and patriarchy into a critique of women. This sits alongside the focus on 
deconstructing ‘woman’, both of which then detract from analysing the distorted consciousness 
of man under patriarchy. An analysis of the individual is necessary for a normative framework; 
where the critique is placed and how the individual is located within social structures displaces 
the outright rejection of humanism that results in anti-normativity. The existential subject 
provides a normative framework through the focus on the act, choice, intentionality and the lived 




Beauvoir’s (1949) existential analysis of women’s oppression provides a humanist account of 
objectification as the destruction of our common humanity in the form of transcendence. Rooting 
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radical feminism in Beauvoir and highlighting Beauvoir’s humanism is to propose that radical 
feminism provides a humanist position. In considering how Butler (1999) utilises Foucault’s 
(1976) anti-humanism in her proposal that sex is a social construction, it can be seen that the 
divide between radical feminism and queer theory is the debate between humanism and anti-
humanism. Existentialism provides a position of materiality and social construction, whilst post-
structuralism provides a totalising account of social construction, making the discursive 
inescapable. The concept of situation refutes the anti-humanist charge of essence. The situated 
subject is not essential or abstracted from the social world – there is a ‘permeability between the 
subject and the social world’ (Kruks 1990: 11). The problem of the shift towards anti-humanism 
is that the elevation of language and representation has led to deconstructing woman. Women are 
then denied the very terms that articulate their oppression. The enforcement of gender onto sexed 
bodies can explain the high rates of sexual violence against women and against trans people. It is 
necessary to provide a humanist account that acknowledges the responsibility and intentionality 
of action. Therefore, in order to condemn the act of rape, it is necessary to have a normative 
framework. Feminism requires humanism.  
 
This chapter has established that in order to theorise rape it is necessary to theorise a subject of 
consciousness. The humanism of Beauvoir (1949) and radical feminism can be used to counter 
the current anti-humanist trend in feminism. This is to reinstate the subject in order to theorise the 
consciousness of sexual objectification. The next chapter will consider the psychosocial theory of 
rape, developed as an attempt to overcome the division between either theorising the subject or 

























In this chapter I will provide a critique of psychosocial criminology (Gadd and Jefferson 2007). 
The relevance of this critique is that the aim of psychosocial criminology – to provide a combined 
account of the individual situated within the society – mirrors my aim of theorising the rapist 
within a structural explanation. Furthermore, the psychosocial account of rape is offered as a 
rebuttal of radical feminism. The psychosocial account combines a psychoanalytic subject with 
an account of post-structural discursive positions. This chapter argues that the psychosocial 
account of rape is wholly inadequate. The existential subject is presented as preferable to the 
psychoanalytic subject when theorising rape, and the radical feminist account of structure is 
presented as necessary instead of a post-structural position of discourses. The first section will 
present the psychosocial account of rape, providing an overview of the theoretical perspective 
and of the method used. The second section considers the psychoanalytic subject, advancing 
existential and feminist critiques against the presentation of the rapist as vulnerable. The third 
section considers the post-structural account of discursive positions and argues for the need for a 
radical feminist critique of sexual objectification, shown through the objectifying perspective 
adopted by the psychosocial theory. Whether through the psychoanalytic subject or the post-
structural account of discursive positions, the rapist is wrongly presented as vulnerable by placing 
women’s power in the sexuality of their bodies. In rejecting this perspective of the vulnerable 
rapist, I demonstrate the need to combine radical feminism and existentialism to theorise the 
subject of rape. 
 
Section One: Psychosocial Criminology 
 
Psychosocial criminology provides a necessary intervention in criminological theory, combining 
a social explanation of crime with an account of the individual. This is in response to the fact that 
structural theories of crime have not theorised the individual, such that the only theories of the 
subject of crime tend towards psychopathological/medicalised accounts, or accounts based on the 
abstracted figure of homo-economicus (such as rational choice theory) (Gadd and Jefferson 2007). 
The intention of psychosocial criminology is thereby to humanise the subject of crime, avoiding 
both a pathologised account of the individual or a structurally determined subject. This sets the 
task as connecting the individual to the social context. According to Gadd and Jefferson “it is 
necessary to assume a conflicted human subject” (ibid: 33), providing a theory of the individual 
based on the interplay between the conscious and the unconscious. Gadd and Jefferson’s 2007 
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book introducing psychosocial criminology provides an account of the crimes of rape, serial 
murder, robbery, racial harassment, domestic abuse, as well as considering the fear of crime and 
the approach of restorative justice. As their approach locates the individual within a societal 
analysis, it is aligned with my intention to theorise the subject of rape within a radical feminist 
structural account of patriarchy. Their critique that radical criminological perspectives neglect the 
individual parallels my critique of radical feminism under-theorising the individual in accounts 
of men’s violence against women. My rebuttal of the psychosocial account focuses on the 
explanation provided of rape. 
 
Gadd and Jefferson frame their discussion of rape by pointing to the limitations of the ‘over social’ 
explanation of radical feminism (2007: 70). Although they recognise the value of radical 
feminism in situating sexual violence within the context of patriarchy and thus rejecting the 
previous psychopathological explanations of rape, they consider a number of problems that arise 
from failing to theorise the subject. The primary criticisms they provide of radical feminism are 
that the theory presents men’s position of power as uncontested and removes women’s agency. 
The psychosocial explanation of rape is thereby offered as a theoretical advancement on radical 
feminism, by complicating the analysis of men’s power through considering their inner feelings 
of vulnerability, and reinserting women’s agency into the theorisation of rape. Through rejecting 
the psychosocial explanation of rape, I establish that their refutation of radical feminism is 
unsuccessful. I will argue for the advantage of the existential subject over the psychoanalytic 
subject, whilst arguing that the radical feminist account does not need to be replaced, but rather 
supplemented with a theory of the subject. 
 
The following is my reconstruction of what I take to be the overall explanation of the date rapist 
provided by psychosocial criminology (Gadd and Jefferson 2007: 76 – 77).14 The psychosocial 
explanation of rape is that the social construction of men as powerful conflicts with men’s inner 
feelings of vulnerability, which causes anxiety. Instead of dealing with this insecurity about the 
self, the rapist projects this feeling of inadequacy onto women. The subject of rape unconsciously 
defends against the anxiety through investing in the male sexual drive discourse, in which sex is 
seen as a male entitlement that is a natural biological drive, concomitantly locating women as 
vessels for men’s sexual satiation. By investing in the male sexual drive discourse he positions 
himself as powerful, but this is an unconscious defence against his inner feelings of vulnerability. 
Once invested in this discourse, if he is unable to contain his anxiety in the moment of his date, 
 
14 Gadd and Jefferson specify this form of rape for their explanation, although as I will discuss later there 
are issues in their application of this classification. They also do not provide any discussion on other forms 
of rape, meaning we are not able to ascertain how the psychosocial explanation would differ for different 
types of rape. 
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he may then ‘split off the bad feelings and project this outward’ onto the victim – thus inflicting 
rape on her. The rapist invested in this discourse because it protected him from his feeling of 
powerlessness. The investment in a particular discursive position is an unconscious defence 
against anxiety, providing a connection between the ‘inner world’ of the subject and the ‘outer 
world’ of discourses. 
 
This psychosocial explanation brings together the psychoanalytic subject of Klein’s (1975; 1988) 
object relations theory, with Hollway’s (1984) ‘bridging’ of Foucault’s (1969; 1975a) post-
structuralism with the psychoanalytic subject. Klein (1975; 1988) proposes that forms of relating 
can either be paranoid-schizoid or depressive, depending on early nurturing experiences. The 
paranoid-schizoid position is unable to accept whole objects and thus initiates a process of 
splitting off parts of the self and projecting this onto others. The depressive position is able to 
accept ambivalence and thus relate to others holistically. The drive of the unconscious is not a 
biological impulse as found in Freud (1915a; 1915b), but a predisposition to relating to others in 
particular ways, determined by the infant’s relation to his mother (Kavaler-Adler 1993). As 
discussed in the last chapter, Foucault’s post-structuralism reduced the subject to an effect of 
discourse. Hollway (1984) reinserts the subject through proposing that particular discursive 
positions are invested in as a defence against anxieties. Hollway identifies three discursive 
positions on sexuality: the male sexual drive discourse, the have/hold discourse, and the 
permissive sexuality discourse. The male sexual drive discourse naturalises male sexual 
aggression and ‘constructs women as objects’ (Hollway 2011: 274); the have/hold discourse 
involves monogamous relationships; while the permissive sexuality discourse challenges 
monogamy, but in contrast to the male sexual drive discourse it “applies the same assumptions to 
women as to men. In other words, it was, in principle at least, gender-blind” (ibid: 275). Each 
subject will identify with a particular discursive position on sexuality as a means to defend against 
anxiety. Applying this to Gadd and Jefferson’s (2007) account of rape, the rapist is predisposed 
to relate in a paranoid-schizoid way; splitting off his feelings about himself and projecting them 
onto others (this is his position as a subject). He invests in the male sexual drive discourse 
identifying sex as a male entitlement and women as sexual objects (providing a connection to the 
social context). The discursive position of power that is adopted is motivated by feelings of 
vulnerability. 
 
For the discussion of rape, Gadd and Jefferson (2007) use secondary data to develop case studies 
of rape. They begin their discussion with interview data from two sources – Beneke (1982) and 
Levine and Koenig (1982). Beneke interviews men about their views on rape. This data only 
contains one man who is actually convicted of rape, and the quotes extracted by Gadd and 
Jefferson are from men who have not committed or admitted to rape. Levine and Koenig provide 
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data on men convicted of rape. This frames Gadd and Jefferson’s account of rape with men’s 
narratives on rape. The overall account of rape is predominately theorised from a convicted rapist 
named Jim (Gadd and Jefferson 2007: 76 – 77). Once the account has been provided, Gadd and 
Jefferson develop their main case study to ‘test the theory’ (ibid: 77). This main case study uses 
media reports of a rape trial in order to construct a psychosocial account of both the victim and 
the perpetrator. The case study is constructed from a “fairly exhaustive” reading of the press 
coverage of this case (ibid: 79), whilst the psychosocial explanation is contrasted with the feminist 
account of this case provided by Lees (1996). Gadd and Jefferson’s method of case study is 
intended to involve “detailed descriptive accounts” as a basis for a biographical interpretive 
analysis (2007: 14). 
 
I will provide a brief overview of the two cases before outlining how my critique of the 
psychosocial explanation will develop. Jim is 36 years old and has been convicted of three sexual 
offences. He claims all of his rapes have occurred in a “dating situation” (Levine and Koenig 
1982: 83). He was married at the time of his offences, and was having “normal sexual relations” 
with his wife (ibid: 85). The quotes from Jim analysed by Gadd and Jefferson detail his view of 
himself and part of his explanation for why he offended (2007: 76 – 77). Through Jim, Gadd and 
Jefferson establish the vulnerable subject investing in discourses of power as a defence against 
anxiety. This rebuffs the radical feminist analysis that singularly focuses on men’s 
dominance/power. The case of Donnellan was a trial of a university student accused of raping a 
friend who was a fellow student (ibid: 77 – 80). The alleged rape occurred after a Christmas party 
in which he helped her to her room because she was so drunk. According to her, he then raped 
her. According to him, they had consensual sex. The trial was extensively covered by the media. 
Donnellan was acquitted of rape. Lees (1996) discusses the case of Donnellan as one of several 
cases that the media focuses on in order to portray men as the victims of false rape allegations, 
thereby obscuring the fact that very few rape cases even get to court. Rape therefore remains 
prevalent with virtual impunity. Gadd and Jefferson (2007) appear to concur with the legal ruling 
of the case and hence do not define the case as rape. Through this case study, Gadd and Jefferson 
contrast their reading with Lees’ (1996) to demonstrate the agency of the alleged victim. They 
thereby reject a radical feminist analysis that undermines women’s agency by singularly defining 
them as passive victims. 
 
Having outlined Gadd and Jefferson’s (2007) theory of rape and the method used, I will now 
outline how my critique of the psychosocial explanation of rape will proceed. Within the 
psychosocial approach, the psychoanalytic subject is married with a post-structural account of 
discursive positions. My critique will prise these two apart to reject both the account of the subject 
and the account of discursive positions. I will first consider Jim to reject the psychoanalytic 
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subject defending against anxieties. An existentialist rejection of the unconscious as a regressive 
determinism is compounded within this application to the theory of rape by the resulting shifting 
of blame onto the mothers of rapists. From this, I propose that an existential account that retains 
choice in consciousness is better suited to theorising the subject of rape. This reinstates the radical 
feminist account of dominance. The next section will consider the case of Donnellan to reject the 
use of a post-structural account of discursive positions. A radical feminist critique of Gadd and 
Jefferson’s analysis reveals that the attempt to present the victim as having agency is used to 
undermine the case being a case of rape. The interpretation provided by Gadd and Jefferson 
continues narratives that blame victims and denies the reality of rape. This is seen through the 
methodological choice to theorise the subject of rape on an account that they do not take to be 
rape. The repetition of patriarchal tropes within the analysis itself reveals the structure of 
patriarchy centring on the sexual objectification of women. In both the account of Jim and the 
account of Donnellan, power is placed in women’s sexuality. This is the sexual objectification of 
women. Rejecting the psychosocial account thereby reinstates the radical feminist analysis. 
 
Section Two: The Psychoanalytic Subject Versus the Existential Subject  
 
2.1 Choice and Determinism  
 
The unconscious plays a pivotal role in the psychosocial explanation, with Gadd and Jefferson 
repeatedly stating that only a conflicted subject provides an adequate account (2007: 11; 33; 44; 
74; 96). The unconscious is not only central to the explanation of the subject itself, but provides 
the connection between the subject and the discourse, given that particular discursive positions 
are invested in as a defence against unconscious anxieties. The explanatory role given to the 
unconscious is central to the supposition of vulnerability that is used to dispute the radical feminist 
account of power. The claimed vulnerability of the rapist is the anxiety that is unconsciously 
defended against in his investment in the male sexual drive discourse. Gadd and Jefferson thereby 
take men’s expressions of vulnerability to reveal the unconscious, hence supporting their account 
if you “know how to read” the expressions of vulnerability (2007: 76). After providing some 
quotes from Beneke (1982) on men’s feelings of being vulnerable, Gadd and Jefferson provide 
the following extract from Jim – the convicted rapist from Levine and Koenig’s (1982) research: 
“you sort of expect rejection, really, when you're out with the girl. And yet when she does reject 
you, it complicates it. It multiplies your feelings, and you take your anger out on her in that way. 
I'm most angry at myself for my own lacks” (Levine and Koenig 1982: 83, in Gadd and Jefferson 
2007: 76). The psychosocial explanation provided is that “rather than deal with ‘his own lacks’, 
Jim unconsciously defends against this painful situation by splitting off the anger directed at 
himself …and projecting these angry feelings on to his hapless date” (Gadd and Jefferson 2007: 
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76). In another quote from Jim, analysed by Gadd and Jefferson, Jim states “I had low self-esteem 
and not much self-confidence” (ibid: 77). Given the link between the unconscious and 
vulnerability, these claims of insecurity are used to suggest that his enactment of dominance is an 
unconscious defence. 
 
Gadd and Jefferson frequently highlight the importance of biography to understanding the 
unconscious (2007: 63; 68; 81). The quotes used in Gadd and Jefferson’s analysis of Jim do not 
provide sufficient information to understand why Jim’s insecurities are split off and projected; 
why this is the form of defence taken. The description of splitting and projecting refers to Klein’s 
(1975; 1988) paranoid-schizoid position. As one of the modifications that Klein made to Freud’s 
(1915a; 1915b) theory was to frame the unconscious as intersubjective forms of relating instead 
of intrapsychic drives, this unconscious defence refers to forms of relating to others. This way of 
unconsciously defending against anxieties is determined by the child’s relationship with the 
mother (Klein 1975). Gadd and Jefferson state: “our particular experience of early nurturing will 
affect both our level of general anxiety and our characteristic ways of defending against it” (2007: 
53). Informing Gadd and Jefferson’s analysis with Klein (1975; 1988) and with their own claims 
made in other parts of the text therefore implies that Jim has this dysfunctional way of relating to 
others because of his specific early nurturing experiences. Using the expressions of vulnerability 
to point to unconscious defences is to further point to a dysfunctional maternal relationship in the 
history of the subject. With this tripartite relation between vulnerability, unconscious defences, 
and maternal relations, I will now begin to contest the theorising of vulnerability through an 
existential rejection of the unconscious.15 
 
Existentialism rejects the explanatory use of the concept of the unconscious as it fails to grasp 
existence in the moment, by regressing to the past. This results in determinism that eclipses the 
choice of action. I will not be considering Sartre’s critique of the coherence of the concept  of the 
unconscious, but focus on the critique of determinism, provided by both Sartre (1943) and 
Beauvoir (1949) (and generally consistent with existentialist positions). This argument against 
determinism returns us to the previous chapter’s discussion of humanism. A subject that is 
determined by the unconscious, that is in turn determined by the history of the subject, cannot be 
held responsible for his actions, and is thereby not the kind of subject appropriate for normative 
theorising. From an existential perspective, the problem of the unconscious is that it ‘rejects the 
concept of choice in the name of determinism’ (Beauvoir [1949] 1997: 78). Beauvoir takes it to 
 
15 This critique of the unconscious is directed against Freud (1915a; 1915b), Klein (1975; 1988) and Gadd 
and Jefferson (2007), as in all of these accounts the unconscious is bound with early nurturing experiences. 
Given the broad field of psychoanalytic theory, other accounts of the unconscious may not be as open to 
this line of criticism. 
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be an “axiomatic proposition” of psychoanalysis that “the human story is to be explained by the 
interplay of determinate elements” (ibid: 75). The psychosocial explanation draws on Klein 
(1975; 1988) instead of Freud (1915a; 1915b) and draws this together with a post-structural 
understanding of discursive positions. However, in retaining the centrality of the unconscious and 
its relation to early nurturing experiences, this axiom of determinism remains. This is confirmed 
by Jefferson’s statement that the unconscious “undermines the theory of identity as the product 
of individuals who rationally choose subject positions” (Jefferson 1997: 287).  
 
The existential rejection of the unconscious contests the explanatory regression to the past. Sartre 
states: “the dimension of the future does not exist for psychoanalysis….Human reality….must be 
interpreted solely by regression toward the past from the standpoint of the present” ([1943] 1989: 
458). According to Sartre, what the regressive explanation of psychoanalysis obscures is the 
concomitance of choice and consciousness. Sartre’s existential interpretation replaces the focus 
on the past with the explanatory value of the future, conceiving of consciousness as a projection 
forth; a conscious construction of self. Understanding this projection of consciousness is 
understanding the being in the moment of the act. The vulnerability that Gadd and Jefferson 
(2007) locate as proof to discredit the radical feminist explanation appears to thereby remove 
choice in the explanation of the rapist. Jim had no control over his early nurturing experiences. If 
it is these that have led to his form of relating and his level of anxiety that is unconsciously 
defended against, then he did not choose to invest in the male sexual drive discourse and rape 
women: this was determined. An explanation based in determinism fails to capture the ‘existing 
person’ (May 1983). Beauvoir recognises the constraints on the freedom of the situated subject, 
yet she maintains that “the individual defines himself by making his own choices through the 
world” (Beauvoir [1949] 1997: 80 – 81). The choice of identity is delimited, but ‘the human is 
free to design itself from numerous possibilities of modes of being’ (Binswanger 2004a: 198). 
Jim is a repeat rapist – this pattern of behaviour suggests a mode of being – and yet the 
psychosocial explanation, in its reliance on the unconscious, removes Jim’s choice in place of an 
explanation of determinism. Binswanger elucidates this key distinction between existentialism 
and psychoanalysis as considering phenomenal content versus subordinating “phenomena to 
“hypothetically postulated strivings” ” (2004b: 327). The phenomenology of rape evidences a 
chosen act of dominance. The psychosocial explanation reads this through the hypothetical 
postulate of the unconscious to invert the dominance to vulnerability and replace choice with 
determinism.  
 
According to the psychosocial explanation, the rapist splits and projects his feelings about himself 
onto the victim. However, this fails to capture the intersubjectivity of the moment, because the 
intersubjective forms of relating adopted by the unconscious are determined by the history of the 
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subject. This determined conception of the rapist should mean that men who rape share similar 
childhood experiences. In fact, it is generally found that men who rape do not have biographical 
differences from men who do not rape (Scully 1990; Pryor 1996). The similarity between the 
histories of men who rape and men who do not rape thereby supports an existential perspective 
that “the child does not contain the man he will become” (Beauvoir [1947] 1976: 40). An 
existential perspective does not dismiss the subject’s past as irrelevant, but instead considers that 
“how he commits himself to existence at the moment – also determines his past. That is, it 
determines what he can recall of his past, what portions of his past he selects” (May 1983: 172). 
Rather than seeing the rapist as compelled to rape due to his history, we can instead see the rapist 
as committed to providing a particular narrative concerning his identity and his past once he has 
committed to the act of rape. This will be central to the argument developed in Chapter Five. 
Instead of theorising a man who chooses to rape, the psychosocial explanation collapses into a 
subject that is determined through early nurturing experiences; “If a subject does not show in his 
totality the development considered as normal, it will be said that his development has been 
arrested, and this arrest will be interpreted as a lack, a negation, but never a positive decision…it 
is not thought desirable to regard their behaviour as possibly motivated by purposes freely 
envisaged; the individual is always explained through ties with the past and not in respect to a 
future towards which he projects his aims” (Beauvoir [1949] 1997: 82). The reliance of the 
explanation of vulnerability on the supposition of the unconscious removes rape as a ‘positive 
decision’, with the ‘freely envisaged purpose’ of dominance. An adequate explanation of rape 
should be based on choice not determinism, with a focus on how he projects his being in the world 
as opposed to regressing to the history of the subject.  
 
The problem with a determined analysis of the subject, and in particular the subject of rape, is 
that this removes the responsibility of the subject. In the last chapter I argued that feminism 
requires humanism in order to take a normative position. Although Gadd and Jefferson (2007) 
explicitly aim to theorise the subject of crime, their reliance on the unconscious, and thereby on 
a deterministic explanation, cuts against a subject open to normative evaluation. Sartre’s 
opposition to the Freudian unconscious is partially the way in which this provides “potential 
excuses for certain forms of behaviour” (Onof: section c). Theorising a conscious subject allows 
us to retain full responsibility. In the same vein, Beauvoir places the weakness of the 
psychoanalytic system in their rejection of “the idea of choice and the correlated concept of value” 
([1949] 1997: 76). According to the psychosocial account, we cannot blame Jim for rape, because 
his rape is produced not through any choice of his own, but as a culmination of his anxieties and 
his unconscious way of defending against them. Both of these are determined by his early 
nurturing experiences, which he evidently had no control over. Just as the existentialists found 
Freud’s account of mental processes to be unable to provide a humanist psychology (Izenberg 
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1976), Gadd and Jefferson’s psychosocial criminology fails to locate the subject that can be held 
responsible for his actions. The problem of structural accounts of crime that under-theorise the 
subject is in part a problem of determinism, and yet the central role given to the unconscious in 
Gadd and Jefferson’s psychosocial account simply replaces this determinism with determinism 
based on the history of the subject. As Beauvoir states in rejection of psychoanalysis: “a 
mechanistic psychology cannot accept the notion of moral invention” ([1949] 1997: 82). If the 
rapist is the vulnerable subject that Gadd and Jefferson portray, we cannot blame him for his 
actions. Theorising men’s violence against women requires theorising a subject that can be 
morally condemned. This is denied by the determinism of the unconscious in the psychosocial 
explanation.  
 
Relieving the rapist of any responsibility is even more problematic once we realise who is really 
to blame, according to this theory: the mother. Again, because of the brief information and 
analysis that is provided of Jim, this is not immediately apparent. The more extensive, 
biographically-informed account of Jeffery Dahmer, the serial sexual murderer (Gadd and 
Jefferson 2007: 85 – 102), brings this implication to the fore. From the analysis provided of 
Jeffery Dahmer, it is evident that – according to the psychosocial explanation – failed mothers are 
the root cause of men’s sexual violence. I will now demonstrate this by considering the “pen 
portrait” Gadd and Jefferson provide of Dahmer and their explanation of his offending (2007: 87). 
The case study is framed by Dahmer’s mother’s depression, validated with a quote from a doctor: 
she was “assessed by her doctor as ‘constantly angry, frustrated and demanding and generally 
very unreasonable’” (Gadd and Jefferson 2007: 88). We are alerted to her inadequate mothering: 
her difficulty breastfeeding, her affair and a court order (ibid: 87 – 88). Gadd and Jefferson’s 
eventual explanation of this case draws on Masters’ (1985; 1993) speculation that Dahmer’s 
disturbances began with “the traumatic event of Dahmer's hospitalization for a double hernia 
operation at the age of four” (Gadd and Jefferson 2007: 96). His mother’s inability to correctly 
nurture him at this time of trauma is seen to be the root cause of the sexual murders he committed. 
Gadd and Jefferson suggest the effect of the traumatic event will be dependent on “the nature of 
his actual relationship with his significant ‘objects’ (mother, crucially, but also father) and how 
these had been internalised” (2007: 96). When considering why Dahmer’s father was unable to 
provide the necessary identification to compensate for the fact that “the mother–infant 
relationship…  is pathological” (ibid), they then suggest that the father was unable to provide this 
role to his son “as a parent struggling with his wife's mood swings, Lionel retreated back into the 
world of work” (ibid). The problem with the psychosocial reliance on the unconscious is not 
simply that this provides a determined subject that is not responsible for his behaviour, but that 
this analysis places the blame squarely on mothers. A non-pathological explanation of the 
offender is provided through the pathologisation and blame of the perpetrator’s mother.  
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Gadd and Jefferson claim to disentangle the psychoanalytic subject from its previous pathological 
applications to criminology (2007: 33). However, what Gadd and Jefferson fail to acknowledge 
is that previous psychoanalytic explanations of sexual violence tended towards a sympathetic 
portrayal of the offender by displacing blame onto mothers. As discussed in Chapter One of this 
thesis, the psychoanalytic idea of the ‘shy and fearful’ rapist blamed various forms of mothering 
for men’s sexual violence (Albin 1977; Gavey 2005; Scully 1990). Albin considers the range of 
psychoanalytically informed methods of blaming mothers, considering that “by 1975 women do 
not merely cause men to rape but have become rapists” (1977: 429). If the psychoanalytic 
explanation of sexual violence has often provided a sympathetic portrayal of the offender through 
shifting blame and pathology onto the failed mother, then it is evident that Gadd and Jefferson’s 
psychosocial account has not progressed from the earlier uses of psychoanalysis in the explanation 
of rape. The vulnerability that is supposed to refute the radical feminist position relies on the 
concept of the unconscious. This presents a determined subject that displaces responsibility for 
men’s sexual violence on to mothers. The existential subject, in its rejection of the unconscious, 
is able to retain a normative lens on the rapist himself. I propose that this is essential if we are to 
theorise the subject of rape. 
 
Recognising the consistency between the psychosocial explanation and previous psychoanalytic 
explanations, despite Gadd and Jefferson’s (2007) claims of differentiation, brings me to a 
methodological critique of the case of Jim. Gadd and Jefferson fail to mention that the men in 
Levine and Koenig’s (1982) data are undergoing psychoanalytic treatment.16 This seems highly 
problematic given that Gadd and Jefferson use the quotes from Jim to discover the vulnerable, 
defended (psychoanalytic) subject. Hudson (2005) and Bonnycastle (2012) provide two more 
recent examples of studies of convicted rapists undergoing treatment in prison (no longer 
psychoanalytic treatment as sex offenders are now given cognitive behavioural therapy). They 
both recognise that the narratives provided by the men in the interviews often repeat the narratives 
and explanations they are provided for their offending in their cognitive behavioural therapy 
(Hudson 2005: 77; Bonnycastle 2012: 61). Using this data for the purpose of researching reasons 
for men’s sexual violence thereby requires acknowledging the ways in which the men’s 
explanation of themselves is influenced by the therapy they are receiving. This is particularly the 
case given that completing treatment by endorsing the therapeutic explanations of oneself often 
has ramifications for the offender’s sentence, probation or benefits within the prison. The claims 
of Jim having low self-esteem and low confidence could reflect the psychoanalytic explanation 
 
16 Furthermore the details of this psychoanalytic treatment are extremely alarming, one man describes the 
capsule as a tiny space which the men were forced to stay in together without any clothes on to ‘disrupt 
defences’, the men were also drugged with Ritalin (Levine and Koenig 1982: 60 – 62; 144). 
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he has been given for his offending. Gadd and Jefferson could have used quotes from Scully’s 
(1990) study of convicted rapists who are not undergoing any treatment, or they could have used 
data from Hudson’s (2005) study of convicted rapists undergoing cognitive behavioural therapy. 
This would provide a stronger methodology that does not presuppose the form of subjectivity that 
the theory sets out to explain.  
 
2.2 Reinterpreting Claims of Vulnerability  
 
We can firmly reinstate the radical feminist position on men’s power by reinterpreting the claims 
of vulnerability from an existential perspective, focused on choice and self-construction in the 
moment. The expressions of vulnerability can in fact be taken as expressions of these men’s 
sexual objectification of women. Instead of the psychoanalytic focus on looking for the inner 
defended subject, “what attracts our attention in existential analysis is rather the content of 
language expressions and manifestations insofar as they point to the world-design” (Binswanger 
2004a: 201). When we consider how he constructs the world through these expressions of 
vulnerability, it is in fact his dominance that is revealed. I will establish this through considering 
one of the quotes from Beneke (1982) that Gadd and Jefferson (2007) begin their supposition of 
vulnerability with, and then returning to Jim from Levine and Koenig (1982). Jay, an interviewee 
from Beneke’s data, admits to fantasising about raping women. The following are two quotes 
from Jay that Gadd and Jefferson claim reveal the inner defended subject:  
 
“A lot of times a woman knows that she’s looking really good and she’ll use that and flaunt it, 
and it makes me feel like she’s laughing at me and I feel degraded” (Beneke 1982: 43, in Gadd 
and Jefferson 2007: 74) 
 
“Just the fact that they can come up to me and just melt me and make me feel like a dummy, makes 
me want revenge. They have power over me so I want power over them” (Beneke 1982: 44, in 
Gadd and Jefferson 2007: 74) 
 
Jay is here locating women’s power in their sexuality; his feeling of degradation is because 
women are seen to be flaunting their sexual attractiveness. His hostile feeling of revenge is in 
response to the sexual power of women’s bodies. The world-design, the lens through which Jay 
views the world, is to invest women’s bodies with an overpowering sexuality that he feels 
compelled to control – “want revenge. They have power over me so I want power over them”. 
The sexual objectification of women does not make her a passive object. In fact, she can be read 
as having an enticing, provocative sexuality. This was discussed in the first chapter in reference 
to previous explanations of the rapist that presented women’s sexuality as ‘dangerous and lurking’ 
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(Gavey 2005: 9). If the power against which Jay is positioned as vulnerable is the sexuality of 
women’s bodies, this must be understood as the sexual objectification of women. This locating 
of women’s power in the sexuality of their bodies, in fact presupposes his own position of 
dominance, not vulnerability. Jay’s world-design reduces women to the sexuality of their bodies, 
and thus their presence is interpreted as flaunting their attractiveness and hence they are seen to 
precipitate his desired attack.  
 
Quotes from Jim further demonstrate the idea that claims of vulnerability are based on the sexual 
objectification of women, and thereby presuppose a position of masculine dominance. These are 
the two quotes that Gadd and Jefferson used as a basis for their interpretation of Jim as a 
vulnerable subject:  
 
“you sort of expect rejection, when you’re out with a girl. But then when she does reject you it 
complicates it. It multiples your feeling and you take your anger out on her…I’m most angry at 
my own lacks” (Levine and Koenig 1982: 83, in Gadd and Jefferson 2007: 74)  
 
“I wouldn’t take no for an answer. I think it had something to do with my acceptance of rejection. 
I had low self-esteem and not much self-confidence and when I was rejected for something I 
considered to be rightly mine, I became angry and went ahead anyway.” (ibid, in Gadd and 
Jefferson 2007: 75) 
 
Women make Jim feel inferior when they do not validate his position of sexual dominance. Jim 
expects rejection and thus expects resistance from his sexual advances, but he does not take no 
for an answer as he has constructed women as sexual objects, making him entitled to the sexual 
use of her. Her rejection of his sexual advances are seen as a rejection of something that is ‘rightly 
his’. This expresses masculine entitlement to women’s bodies; the sexual use of her body is 
something he is entitled to, precisely through him constructing a dominant sense of self in which 
she is reduced to a sexual object. These claims of vulnerability – ‘having low self-esteem and not 
much self-confidence’ – do not reveal the true inner vulnerable subject, because it is 
contextualised by his consideration of her body as rightly his.  
 
Instead of Gadd and Jefferson’s (2007) interpretation based on the hypothetical postulate of the 
unconscious –  presenting a determined subject that regresses to the past and hence misses the 
intersubjectivity of the moment – this interpretation considers the intersubjective moment and his 
choice in constructing women as sexual objects and concomitantly positioning himself as 
dominant. Considering his experience in the moment rather than his past experiences, and 
considering his orientation towards the future (his way of being), the claims of vulnerability are 
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premised on his prior assumption of dominance in presenting a view of the world that positions 
women as sexual objects, either provoking sexual attack from their overwhelming sexual 
attraction, and/or as bodies that men are entitled to. Providing an existential as opposed to a 
psychoanalytic reading permits us to see the claims of vulnerability in the context of the sexual 
objectification of women, and hence in the context of his dominant self-construction. This 
reinstates the radical feminist position of dominance as the explanatory concept in rape. I will 
return to these expressions of vulnerability relating to women’s sexual objectification in Chapter 
Five. This will further this refutation of Gadd and Jefferson by accounting for these men’s claims 
of vulnerability as rationalisations for rape. 
 
Existentialism “presupposes the existence of an entity that contemplates its existence, that 
decides, that chooses how it will become” (Hardie-Bick and Lippens 2011: 1). This is in stark 
contrast to the psychoanalytic subject of psychosocial criminology, which is determined by the 
unconscious, whilst the unconscious is determined by the subject’s early history. The advantage 
of the existential subject when theorising rape is that this achieves a humanistic perspective that 
is capable of maintaining the normative approach necessary for theorising rape. A criminological 
explanation of rape that is infused with an existential subject as opposed to a psychoanalytic 
subject can reinstate the radical feminist explanation of rape that Gadd and Jefferson (2007) aim 
to overturn. An existential subject is distinct from a pathologised subject. It is also distinct from 
the abstracted figure of the rational offender simplistically weighing up pros and cons, devoid of 
any depth of subjectivity (for example see Cornish and Clarke 2014). Psychosocial criminology 
assumes that only the psychoanalytic subject is capable of fusing a social explanation with an 
adequate account of the subject. This section rejects the role of the psychoanalytic subject, and in 
doing so reinstates the radical feminist account of explaining rape by dominance. The 
psychoanalytic subject reliant on the unconscious is a determined subject. Not only does this 
prevent the attribution of blame to the rapist, in fact it displaces responsibility for sexual violence 
onto failed mothers. This psychosocial account repeats previous psychoanalytic explanations of 
rape that sympathised with the offender and directed blame at various forms of mothering. The 
men’s expressions of vulnerability can be reinterpreted as revealing a world-view that sexually 
objectifies women, thereby positioning themselves as dominant. The expressions of vulnerability 
do not reveal the inner defended subject, they reaffirm the radical feminist explanation that rape 






Section Three: A Radical Feminist Account of Structure Versus Post-Structural Discursive 
Positions  
 
Through the case of Donnellan, Gadd and Jefferson provide a psychosocial account of the victim 
and perpetrator (2007: 77 – 84). This section of their theorising is particularly aimed at the 
criticism of radical feminism removing women’s agency. The analysis they provide thereby 
attempts to retheorise women’s agency, contrasting their analysis with Lees’ (1996) feminist 
analysis of the case. To briefly recap, the case involved a rape accusation against a university 
student in which the trial was extensively covered by the media. The defendant was acquitted. 
The media presented the case as a false rape allegation: presenting a sympathetic portrayal of the 
defendant that believes his innocence thus representing him as the real victim. Lees (1996) uses 
this case to demonstrate the patriarchal narrative of the media, in terms of which cases they choose 
to report and the way that they emphasise men’s risk of false rape accusations, while ignoring the 
pervasive existence of rape and the inadequacy of the criminal justice system’s response to rape. 
According to Gadd and Jefferson (2007), Lees’ analysis – that the media representation provided 
a patriarchal distortion that silences women – repeats the radical feminist mistake of denying 
women’s agency by providing an account of women as only victims in relation to sex. Gadd and 
Jefferson’s attempt to locate the woman’s agency in this case centres around the role of discursive 
positions of sexuality. I will consider the psychosocial analysis of this case, focusing on their 
account of the victim, to argue for the advantage of a radical feminist analysis of structure in 
opposition to a Foucauldian analysis of discourses when theorising the act of rape.  
 
My critique of the social side of psychosocial criminology (post-structural discursive positions) 
and my reinstatement of radical feminism will develop in three parts. Firstly, I will consider the 
positioning of the victim within the post-feminist permissive sexuality discourse and how Gadd 
and Jefferson (2007) claim Lees’ (1996) analysis misses the importance of this shift for feminism. 
The agency of the victim is found in the multiplicity of discourses of sexuality. Secondly, I will 
consider how Gadd and Jefferson’s own analysis is a case in point for the structure of patriarchy 
in which women are positioned as sexual objects, rather than a multiplicity of discursive positions. 
This can be established by the fact that the woman’s active sexuality/promiscuity leads to a 
description of her as a ‘voracious vamp’. Linking back to my criticism of Gadd and Jefferson’s 
account of the defended rapist, Gadd and Jefferson crucially overlook the role of placing women’s 
power over men in their sexuality as an aspect of the sexual objectification of women. Thirdly, I 
will consider how this reading of agency in the discursive position of post-feminist permissive 
sexuality and the subsequent description of the victim as a voracious vamp results in the inevitable 
analysis that the case is not rape. Given the claimed intention to theorise the subject of rape, taking 
a case that is then theorised to be not rape is not only flawed, but repeats histories of rape-denial. 
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Gadd and Jefferson’s attempt to dispute Lees’ (1996) ‘traditional feminist’ victim/perpetrator 
reading of the case results in an analysis that repeats the patriarchal trope that whores cannot be 
raped.  
 
3.1 Post-feminist Permissive Sexuality  
 
A key distinction between theorising a post-structural account of discourses in comparison to a 
radical feminist account of structure is distinct conceptualisations of power. For a radical feminist 
account of structure, power is seen as an oppressive force held by men through their socially 
constructed positioning as sexual subjects and withheld from women through their socially 
constructed positioning as sexual objects. The vision of a non-patriarchal future would remove 
this differential positioning found in the sexual objectification of women, thus removing men’s 
power over women. A post-structural account of discourses presents a theory of power that it is 
circulating everywhere; all relations are infused with power (Foucault 1976).17 Subjects will be 
variously discursively constructed but cannot escape relations of power . As McCallum claims, 
this account of sexuality and power challenges “the feminist dream of equality” (1996: 96).The 
non-patriarchal future does not remove power but multiplies the positions that can be occupied. 
Whereas radical feminism sees sexual objectification as key to women’s disempowerment, a post-
structural account denies the singularity of this: crucial to the theoretical shift is the proposal of a 
multiplicity of discourses. It is within this claimed multiplicity of discourses that the victim of 
this case is theorised as having agency.18 
 
The three discourses on sexuality identified by Hollway (1984) are the male sexual drive 
discourse, the have/hold discourse and the permissive sexuality discourse. Broadly, in the first, 
sex is seen as a male entitlement; in the second, sex is seen within monogamous relationships; in 
the third, sex is seen for the pursuit of pleasure and thus not restricted to monogamy. It is only 
within the male sexual drive discourse that women are not able to access a subject position 
through this discourse: women are positioned as objects and hence this subject position is only 
open to men. Theoretically, women can access a subject position through the have/hold discourse 
or the permissive sexuality discourse. However, the male sexual drive discourse is given a 
 
17 This Foucauldian account of power is provided within the wider frame of anti-humanism, as power 
relations are “nonsubjective” and do not “result from the choice or decision of an individual subject” 
([1976] 1998: 94 – 95). In some ways, power is everywhere because subjects are nowhere. In the next 
chapter I will continue this consideration of the connection between this conceptualisation of power and 
the position of anti-humanism. 
 
18 I will refer to victim rather than alleged victim or complainant on the premise of believing women’s  
testimonies of sexual violence to counter Gadd and Jefferson’s (2007) incredulity of the woman in this 
case. 
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primacy such that it ‘acts as a brake on the other discourses’ (Gadd and Jefferson 2007: 48), 
meaning that men’s infidelity is more socially accepted within the have/hold discourse and the 
permissive sexuality discourse is more easily accessible to men as “for single women even in 
post-feminist times active sexuality still only has limited discursive warrant” (ibid: 82). The 
caveat provided through giving a primacy to the male sexual drive discourse in fact brings the 
position much closer to the structural analysis that the objectification of women is central to the 
cultural construction of sexuality. This is seemingly overlooked in the subsequent locating of 
agency through the claimed investment in the post-feminist permissive sexuality discourse.  
 
Hollway (1984) identifies the permissive sexuality discourse as arising with the sexual revolution 
of the 1960s. Gadd and Jefferson (2007) add to this the post-feminist permissive sexuality 
discourse. This can be seen to refer to the increase of permissive sexuality through the 
increasingly sexualised culture. Post-feminism also refers to some of the shifts discussed in the 
first chapter of this thesis. Radical feminism drew together practices of prostitution and 
pornography with rape and domestic violence, locating the sex industry as a form of violence 
against women. The rejection of radical feminism on the supposition that this position denies 
women’s agency and choice has resulted in feminist positions celebrating or encouraging the sex 
industry as empowering for women (Bell 1995; Nagel 1997; Egan et al. 2006; Bernstein 2007; 
Bell 2009). A key slogan that summarises this current feminist position is ‘sex work is work’. I 
have argued in Chapter One that this repackaging of sexual objectification as liberation is 
damaging to the cause of emancipating women. In the last chapter I further considered how the 
loss of critical interrogation of sexually objectifying practices relates to the rise of anti-humanism 
in feminist theory. The critique I am providing of Gadd and Jefferson’s psychosocial account 
furthers these arguments. 
 
The evidence provided for locating the victim within the post-feminist permissive sexuality 
discourse is her claim that “a kiss is just a kiss”, her promiscuity (she has had several one night 
stands), and her openness about her sexual activity (Gadd and Jefferson 2007: 81). According to 
Gadd and Jefferson, recognising this discursive investment recognises her agency in relation to 
sex.  Gadd and Jefferson thereby contest Lees (1996) attempt to redefine her as a traditional victim 
as they suggest that the case was newsworthy because the “role reversal was itself embedded 
within a larger, (post)feminist meta-narrative about contemporary changes in gender relations: 
she, not he, was the sexually active one; she, not he, was into causal sex” (Gadd and Jefferson 
2007: 79). Lees (1996) discusses the case of Donnellan alongside other trials that were covered 
in the press, to illustrate that the media and the judiciary provide male perspectives that remove 
the perspective of women. Lees considers the backlash against feminism in the media reporting 
of rape, choosing cases that make men appear to be the victim of false rape allegations. Through 
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this, women are “stereotyped as sexually provocative and blamed by the judiciary and the press” 
(Lees 1996: xi). What Lees sees as a backlash against feminism in the distorted media reporting 
of rape, Gadd and Jefferson see as a post-feminist reality in which women’s active sexuality 
undermines the credibility of the rape charge. Lees’ belief in the victim is seen to deny women 
agency, whilst Gadd and Jefferson’s incredulity of the victim is claimed to reinstate women’s 
agency. 
 
My contention is that this post-feminist discursive positioning of women suggests that women can 
hold power over men through their sexuality. This relates directly to the distinct conceptualisation 
of power in the rejection of structure for discourses. The shift to embracing the sex industry within 
feminism – renaming prostitution as sex work and framing stripping and pornography as 
empowering pursuits for women – places women’s empowerment in the sexual power of their 
bodies; power that is not for themselves in terms of their own sexual pleasure, but for the male 
viewer/user. Gadd and Jefferson’s (2007) supposition of agency through placing the victim in this 
discourse is to imply that the victim has a sexual power that the defendant lacks. In the last section 
I argued against Gadd and Jefferson’s vulnerable defended subject, given that the vulnerability 
was in relation to the alleged sexual power of women, which can in fact be seen as constitutive of 
the sexual objectification of women. The terminology used by Gadd and Jefferson to describe the 
victim in the case of Donnellan, and their overall perspective that this case was not a case of rape, 
once again reveals that Gadd and Jefferson mistake the power imputed to women as part of their 
sexual objectification as genuine power and hence agency. This is to argue that the radical 
feminist account of structure centred on the sexual objectification of women should be reinstated, 
as it is through the dispersed account of power provided by an analysis of discourses in which 
women’s power is located as sexual power over men; confusing the linchpin of patriarchy for 
women’s agency. 
 
3.2 Voracious Vamp  
 
Challenging Lees’ (1996) analysis of the case, Gadd and Jefferson state that this case was “not 
predatory rapist and virginal victim but Mr Nice Guy and Ms Voracious Vamp” (2007: 79).19 A 
‘vamp’ is defined as “a seductive woman who uses her sexual attractiveness to exploit men” (OUP 
2020). In being a term that singularly denotes women, it is a gendered pejorative that can be held 
alongside ‘slut’, ‘slag’, ‘whore’ and the litany of other words used to discredit and degrade 
 
19 Hollway and Jefferson previously provided an analysis of this case, in which they used this phrasing in 
reference to the defendant and victim (1998: 409). The account Gadd and Jefferson (2007) provide is 
predominantly a repetition of the account provided by Hollway and Jefferson (1998). 
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women. To depict her as a voracious vamp further implies the excessive sexual desires of the 
‘nympho’. Whilst the evidence presented for placing her in the discursive position of permissive 
sexuality does indicate an active sexuality, there is nothing to suggest that she uses her sexuality 
to exploit men. What Gadd and Jefferson inadvertently prove by depicting her as a ‘voracious 
vamp’ is that women cannot be situated as sexual subjects under the constraint of the structure of 
patriarchy. Despite the shifting social mores on one level allowing her to have a promiscuous 
sexuality, she will be interpreted as a sexual object. The  attempt to re-theorise women’s agency 
in discussions of rape through claiming that the victim is not a virgin but a vamp misses the unity 
of sexual objectification in the virgin/whore dichotomy. This directly impacts on theorising the 
rapist. Lees discusses Benedict’s (1992) distinction between the vamp version of rape and the 
virgin version: ‘in the vamp version, the woman has loose morals and sexual excess such that she 
compels the man to rape her. In the virgin version, the rapist is a depraved monster who has sullied 
an innocent’ (Lees 1996: 67). Gadd and Jefferson’s description of the victim as a vamp is thereby 
completely consistent with cultural narratives that blame victims of rape. 
 
As Lees argues, making women “responsible for tempting men” is a component part of viewing 
men’s sexuality as natural and hence uncontrollable (1996: xix). Gadd and Jefferson’s (2007) 
concession that the male sexual drive discourse acts as a brake on the other discourses is to admit 
the dominance of this conceptualisation in which men are seen as sexual subjects and women are 
seen as sexual objects. But seeing it just as a brake on the other discourses fractures the structure 
into discourses, dispersing power between subjects and hence locating women’s agency in one of 
the other discursive positions. Rather than seeing the male sexual drive discourse as a brake on 
the other discourses, I propose it is most accurate to theorise the structure of patriarchy as the 
sexual objectification of women. This means that despite material shifts in terms of women being 
‘permitted’ to have many sexual partners, there is not a corresponding shift in how women are 
viewed, exemplified by Gadd and Jefferson’s description of her as a vamp. Sexual objectification 
is a constraint on women’s agency, which means that she will always be interpreted through a 
reduction to her sexuality: frigid, virgin, spinster, whore, vamp – but never a sexual subject. The 
attribution of the power of women’s sexuality is central to the objectification of women. When 
women are seen to have this power it does not in fact attribute agency to them, it reduces them to 
a sexuality that is defined in relation to men. By describing the victim as a vamp, Gadd and 
Jefferson reveal sexual objectification as a constraint on women’s agency, as opposed to a 
multitude of discourses that can allow women to occupy a subject position within them.  
 
The reading of the victim as a vamp is drawn through the entirety of Gadd and Jefferson’s (2007) 
analysis of the case. According to the defendant, it was the victim who initiated sex with him 
twice during the night: she fell asleep during the second round of intercourse, he then stopped, 
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she then falsely accuses him of rape (Gadd and Jefferson 2007: 80). Gadd and Jefferson’s 
psychosocial account of the victim takes the defendant’s depiction of the events as true. Gadd and 
Jefferson suggest that “perhaps both getting extra drunk and the subsequent sexual advance were, 
unconsciously, a way of keeping Donnellan’s apparently waned sexual interest alive” (ibid: 82). 
This analysis is more proof of a sexually objectifying interpretation of women. She is seen to 
covet the sexual attention of men to the extent that all her actions can be interpreted as relating 
back to seeking sexual attention. Getting very drunk could have been an accident, or there may 
have been many factors in her life that could lead to the desire for intoxication, and yet Gadd and 
Jefferson interpret her actions only in relation to Donnellan’s sexual interest in her. As a vamp, it 
is evident that she made a sexual advance and hence was not raped. And as a vamp, her state of 
inebriation is just another factor in her exploitation of men. Gadd and Jefferson’s analysis is a 
case in point for the overarching structure of patriarchy as the sexual objectification of women: 
in seeing her as a vamp her viewpoint is not credible and all her actions can be seen to relate to 
her desired sexual attention from men. 
 
There are two important facts that are included in Lees’ (1996) analysis and conspicuously absent 
in Gadd and Jefferson’s (2007) construction. Lees states: “the reason why she reported it was that 
Donnellan had continued to harass her at lectures…she had gone to her tutor and asked to be 
excused from lectures…. the tutor said this could be arranged only if she made a formal 
complaint…. Donnellan on the apparent advice of Lord Russell, contacted the police himself and 
demanded that he stand trial, instead of going to the college disciplinary hearing” (Lees 1996: 81 
– 82). If he is Mr Nice Guy who did not rape her then why did he continue to harass her? And if 
she is a vamp that was out to get him through a false rape allegation, why did she only report it to 
the university when this was presented to her as the only way she could be excused from lectures? 
Gadd and Jefferson’s analysis fully believes the defendant’s account of the event and entirely 
discredits the victim’s account. It must also be noted that in discussing the ethical implication of 
the psychosocial method in its interpretation of this case, Hollway and Jefferson (2013) state that 
they contacted both the victim and the defendant for their consent. The defendant responded and 
requested changes to the account, which the researchers accepted. The victim did not respond, 
and hence had no control over the resulting narrative. The silencing of the victim through the 
interpretation provided indicates that the psychosocial analysis repeats the narrative of the 
defendant. Lees states that the “rape trial represents in stark form the way a woman is denied the 
opportunity to describe her experience and the male perspective predominates” (1996: xx). Gadd 
and Jefferson’s psychosocial account provides another instance of the dominance of the male 
perspective; the victim is interpreted through an objectifying lens that casts her as a vamp, thus 
not credible and thus not raped. 
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The post-structural analysis of multiple discourses and circulating power is used in this case to 
situate women’s agency in sexual power over men. This parallels the post-feminist reclamation 
of the sex industry as liberating and empowering for women. The resulting analysis provided by 
Gadd and Jefferson (2007) can be used to demonstrate that when she is interpreted as a sexual 
object she is interpreted not as a credible subject; her testimony is disbelieved and she is reframed 
as the perpetrator (of a false accusation of rape). Instead of being a position of agency, this is a 
constraint on her agency. This is not to deny her choice in her active, promiscuous sexuality, but 
it draws attention to how she cannot choose how she is interpreted. Under the structure of 
patriarchy, her sexual activity will mean she is interpreted as a vamp, which frames her as 
compelling men to violate her. The advantage of a structural analysis is that we can understand 
why she will be called a vamp whilst her male counterpart will be called nothing: as sexual subject 
he is free to be promiscuous without this tarnishing his reputation; as sexual object her 
promiscuity will place her as a whore, a vamp, a slag. Gadd and Jefferson’s deployment of the 
post-structural shift to discourse, with its concomitant shift in the conceptualisation of power, 
retheorises women’s agency to deny the case of rape. This parallels the repackaging of sexually 
objectifying practices as women’s empowerment. 
 
3.3 Not Rape  
 
The way in which Gadd and Jefferson (2007) accept the defendant’s account of the case as true 
and discredit the victim’s account is consistent with the methodology that produces a case study 
from media discussions of the trial. Gadd and Jefferson state that the reading of the press coverage 
is “fairly exhaustive” (2007: 79). Yet the distortion of media reporting is a particular issue in the 
representation of sexual violence. This is precisely the angle from which Lees (1996) considers 
the case of Donnellan. Representations of sexual violence in the media contain a multitude of 
distortions. Lees considers the case of Donnellan as representative of the media’s increased 
tendency – as part of a backlash against feminism – to focus on possible false allegation cases, 
giving the impression that men are at a great risk of being falsely accused and taken to court (this 
is also noted by Kitzinger 2009). Another media distortion is the over-representation of cases of 
stranger rape; the reality is, most rapes are committed by men who are known to the victim 
(Hudson 2005; Horvath and Brown 2007; Kitzinger 2009). There are both ‘ideal victims’ (Christie 
1986) and ‘ideal perpetrators’ in media constructions. In brief, this idealised version of rape 
involves the young virgin white girl attacked by the unknown black man. Donnellan is white and 
middle class, fitting the media image of ‘Mr Nice Guy’ a.k.a not a rapist. The construction of the 
predatory black rapist who threatens white women is a key premise of patriarchal white 
supremacy. The media’s focus on cases with black perpetrators and white victims, and the placing 
of ‘race’ as the explanatory factor, demonstrates the ideological function of representations of 
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sexual violence. In the first chapter I distinguished the representation of rape from the act of rape. 
The use of media representations to theorise the subject of rape conflates the discursive 
representation with the act of rape. It is not sufficient that Gadd and Jefferson claim to have 
compiled a comprehensive reading of the press coverage, as a large quantity of distorted data does 
not make it objective.  
 
The methodology of developing a case study from the representation of rape is further 
problematised by the third person perspective of the media accounts. The methodological choice 
of a case that allows for a direct competition of testimony misses theorising the rapist. When rape 
is reduced to competing testimonies, the arbitration rests on the credibility of the actors. The result 
of this is that the explanation places the victim as not credible; as a vamp, her testimony of 
violation cannot be accepted, and thus the defendant’s narrative is accepted. Lees considers the 
institutionalisation of male norms in every stage of the rape trial, claiming this is “particularly 
disadvantageous in an adversarial system of justice, where the aim is not so much to inquire into 
the truth as to field a contest between two parties who are putting forward different versions of 
the truth” (1996: xx). The psychosocial account of rape continues this adversarial perspective, 
and it is as a consequence of this that the victim in the case of Donnellan is disbelieved. To theorise 
the rapist through a case that is not taken by the theorists to be a case of rape seems to reduce all 
rape to competing testimony, such that the rapist slips from theoretical grasp under the constant 
question of ‘was this act actually rape?’ 
 
A further major issue with Gadd and Jefferson’s (2007) analysis of this case is that they classify 
it as date rape, when there is no pretext of the two people meeting for a date; they are friends at a 
party. Lees (1996) specifically discusses how the media’s incorrect presentation of this case (and 
others) as date rape serves to trivilaise these cases of rape. Lees notes: “ ‘date rape’ is increasingly 
being used to describe rapes where there has been some contact between the defendant and victim 
before-hand but not a prearranged ‘date’. By extending the term ‘date rape’ to cover other rapes, 
the implication is presumably that such rapes are not as serious as ‘real’ rapes” (1996: 66). To 
present it as a date rape presupposes there is a sexual relationship or pretext between the victim 
and defendant, yet again endorsing the defendant’s narrative and refuting the victim’s claim. We 
are told that the defendant desired a relationship with the victim, whilst the victim was not 
attracted to the defendant and thus only wanted to be friends (Gadd and Jefferson 2007: 79 – 80). 
The framing of the case as date rape imposes the defendant’s desire for a sexual relationship onto 
their friendship. Gadd and Jefferson’s (2007) disputation of Lees (1996) therefore returns the 
narrative to the media coverage, which upholds the narrative of the defendant. Gadd and 
Jefferson’s methodology is flawed in accepting media representation to be neutral material for 
constructing case studies of the act and subject, for claiming to theorise the criminal subject of 
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rape through an account that is not taken to be rape, and through wrongly categorising the act as 
a date rape. 
 
Like Gadd and Jefferson I do not know if this case was a case of rape. With only the information 
given by the trial and the media coverage it is not possible to definitively discern what happened 
on the night in question. However, to dislodge Gadd and Jefferson’s certainty that this was not a 
case of rape and their highly problematic reconstruction that fully repeats the defendant’s 
narrative, I have provided a reconstruction from the information provided (Gadd and Jefferson 
2007: 79 – 80) that suggests this was a case of rape. The defendant and the victim are friends, but 
the defendant is sexually interested in the victim and is interested in a romantic/sexual relationship 
with her. The victim does not share this sexual interest as ‘she did not fancy him’. To explain the 
incident itself, we could focus on the overlap in the accounts of her being asleep and thus 
unconscious during the interaction. She claims to wake to him having sex with her and he claims 
she fell asleep during consensual intercourse. This is a consistent depiction of her being in a semi-
conscious state. There is no suggestion that the defendant was in a similar state of intoxication; 
although it is claimed that he was drunk, there is no claim of him losing consciousness. The very 
fact that he assisted her home from the party because of her level of intoxication suggests he was 
less drunk than her. We therefore have a very intoxicated woman slipping in and out of 
consciousness and who has little memory of the event, and we have a man who claims to 
remember everything that happened and who at no point seems to be inebriated to the point of 
losing consciousness. This could easily therefore be interpreted as a man who exploits the 
woman’s position of vulnerability: he uses the way in which the alcohol has made her into an 
object through losing consciousness to finally get the sexual use of her body that he has always 
desired. Choosing the moment that she is most drunk ensures she cannot defend herself in the 
moment, and nor can she defend herself in court. In the knowledge of her semi-conscious state he 
knows that he can be the sole author of the event after it has occurred. The credibility that Gadd 
and Jefferson provide to the defendant’s claims, and the categorisation of the victim as a vamp, 
indicate that their interpretation allows the defendant to continue defining this event. 
 
The case is not defined as rape because the woman is positioned in the post-feminist permissive 
sexuality discourse, which in turn posits that she has sexual power over men. It is crucial to an 
understanding of sexual objectification that this is not conceptualised as an absence of power 
through the attribution of a position of passivity, as in fact a key functioning of sexual 
objectification is to attribute a sexual power to women’s bodies. This complexity of sexual 
objectification is lost in the shift to discourses, as in attempting to theorise circulating power this 
sexual objectification becomes reassigned as women’s power. This is central to an analysis of the 
rapist as vulnerable; men’s vulnerability is seen in relation to this alleged sexual power of women. 
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This allows the convicted rapists to be presented as vulnerable defended subjects, and it allows 
the trial of the rapist to be presented as a false accusation – a vulnerable man who suffers under 
the manipulative power of the vamp. The radical feminist account of structure needs to be 
reinstated in order to capture the complexity of sexual objectification. The attempt to make the 
account of power more nuanced and not unidirectional in fact rebrands women’s oppression – 




The psychosocial explanation of rape proposes that the rapist is vulnerable, and that investing in 
a discursive position of dominance through enacting rape is a response to this vulnerability. This 
explanation brings together the psychoanalytic subject of Klein (1975; 1988), unconsciously 
defending against anxieties, with Foucauldian post-structural discursive positions on sexuality. A 
particular discursive position will be invested in as an unconscious defence against anxieties. The 
problem with this defended subject is that it is also a determined subject. The choice of the rapist 
is lost as the unconscious is given a primary explanatory role. With this, the responsibility of the 
rapist is also lost. Worse still, the responsibility becomes displaced on to the mother, as early 
nurturing experiences are the root of unconscious defences. In contrast, an existential account of 
the subject provides a thoroughly humanist perspective that maintains choice in subject formation. 
Applying an existential analysis to the men’s expressions of vulnerability reveals that the ‘world-
design’ of these men in fact involves the sexual objectification of women; they see themselves as 
vulnerable in relation to the alleged sexual power of women. The expressions of vulnerability can 
thereby be used to demonstrate a conscious position of dominance through sexually objectifying 
women. The positioning of men as vulnerable in relation to the sexual power of women’s bodies 
is furthered through the use of post-structural discursive positions. In Gadd and Jefferson’s (2007) 
main psychosocial case study, the victim is given agency through being positioned in the post-
feminist permissive sexuality discourse. The description of the victim as a vamp provides proof 
that women are not situated as subjects in relation to sexuality, making a structural analysis of 
sexual objectification applicable. The attempt to identify circulating power results in attributing 
women power in the sexuality of their bodies, resulting in a denial of rape.  
 
The account of the vulnerability of the rapist is premised on the alleged sexual power of women’s 
bodies. The resulting account blames ‘real’ rape on the mother of the rapist, and denies other rape 
through blaming the victim. As discussed in Chapter One, mothers and victims were identified as 
the true culprits, as part of the individualised explanation of rape provided prior to second-wave 
feminism. Gadd and Jefferson’s (2007) rejection of radical feminism therefore brings us full 
circle, back to theories that fail to locate the subject of rape: if the case was rape, the man must 
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be a vulnerable subject failed by his mother, but for many cases there is no subject of rape as the 
woman is a whore and thus there was no rape. In the next chapter I will develop a method for 
theorising rape derived from the perspectives of existentialism and radical feminism, addressing 
the problems outlined with Gadd and Jefferson’s methodology. This begins to theorise the subject 
of rape in the moment of the act through combining Beauvoir’s (1949; 1953) existentialism with 





























This chapter begins to provide my account of the rapist within a radical feminist structural 
explanation of rape. Sexual objectification is a denial of subjectivity that rests on the recognition 
of subjectivity. Beauvoir’s (1949;1953) existentialism and symbolic interactionism present an 
account of the subject as fundamentally intersubjective and embodied. The denial of her 
subjectivity results in an absence of shame from violating her. Sexual objectification allows men 
to gain a positive sense of self from the act of rape.  
 
The first section introduces a philosophical method of vignettes of rape from the victim’s 
perspective, as an aid to theorising the subject in the moment of rape. This method is justified 
through radical feminism and phenomenology. The second section provides the definition of 
sexual objectification as a denial of subjectivity. This definition is reached through an argument 
that sexual interaction is not inherently objectifying, as positive sexual interaction is based on the 
recognition of sexual subjectivity. The radical feminist critique of sexual objectification – such 
as the one provided by MacKinnon (1989) – should be understood through an intersubjective and 
embodied conception of the subject. On this understanding of the subject we can consider the 
distortion of consciousness involved in rape, and further delineate that the denial of subjectivity 
necessarily involves a recognition of subjectivity. This section will consider how, according to an 
existential account, the distortion of the foundation of consciousness is distinguished from a 
pathological explanation. Next, I will consider how this distortion of consciousness is normalised 
through the social construction of gender. The final section of the chapter considers how 
MacKinnon’s (1989) definition of sexual objectification implies an interactionist subject. This 
draws out the overlap between symbolic interactionism and existentialism both providing an 
account of subjectivity in which the ‘self’ is presented through interaction. Internalising the 
perspective of the other on oneself, brings out the role of moral emotions in constraining action. 
This can be considered through the concept of ‘the looking-glass self’ (from symbolic 
interactionism) and the concept of ‘the look’ (from existentialism). The denial of subjectivity 







Section One: Vignettes of Rape 
 
This section will introduce the method of theorising rape through vignettes developed from the 
victim’s account of rape. This method can be derived from the theoretical perspectives that I have 
so far espoused: the combination of radical feminism and existentialism. This method also 
develops in response to the problems outlined in the last chapter with the methodology of the 
psychosocial explanation of rape. The vignettes of rape provide a basis for theorising sexual 
objectification as a process in the mind of the rapist. I will justify the method of vignettes, present 
the vignettes of rape, and provide some initial discussion of the vignettes. 
 
1.1 The Method of Vignettes 
 
A vignette is “a brief evocative description, account or episode” (OUP 2020). Vignettes are often 
used in survey research, in which case they tend to be hypothetical scenarios designed to test 
certain intuitions or beliefs (c.f Finch 1987). Instead of using hypothetical/constructed vignettes, 
I propose using brief descriptions of actual accounts of rape. In contrast to a standard qualitative 
or quantitative methodology found in criminological research, this is a philosophical method to 
aid the development of a theory of sexual objectification. Vignettes focus on the moment of the 
act, providing a basis from which to theorise the subjectivity of the rapist in the moment of rape. 
The general feature of the vignettes, alongside some specific details, will be used to tease out the 
theory of sexual objectification in the mind of the rapist.  
 
The first vignette is my own experience, whilst the second vignette is my recounting of a friend’s 
experience. The third vignette is a first person account provided by Alcoff (2018) in her book on 
sexual violation. The fourth vignette is developed from Sanday’s (1990) book on fraternity gang-
rape – the vignette contains victim testimony and an account of the perpetrators’ behaviour after 
the event. All of these vignettes present cases in which the sexual act was started when the victim 
was unconscious. They are all cases with male perpetrators and female victims. The use of 
vignettes, as a brief description of the moment of rape from the perspective of the victim, can be 
justified through the approach of radical feminism and the existential method of phenomenology. 
This theoretical grounding of the method will be provided before presenting the vignettes.  
 
Radical feminism was founded on the testimonies of women. In consciousness-raising groups 
women spoke out about their experiences of abuse by men (MacKinnon 1989; Mackay 2015). 
These accounts were descriptions of what men had done to them – they did not require the life 
histories of the abusers. More recently, women and girls have shared their experiences of sexual 
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violation on websites such as Everyday Sexism20, Everyone’s Invited21, and as part of the ‘Me 
Too’ movement. What is achieved through the collation of victim testimony is not details of the 
history of these men, but an understanding of the systematic treatment of women and girls in this 
way. Alcoff states that sexual violations “should be judged, not in isolation, but as part of a 
cultural pattern” (2018: 7). To truly acknowledge the cultural pattern of sexual violence, we need 
a method that can capture the repetition of the act by various men in various social locations. This 
is achieved through the abstraction involved in the victim’s description of the moment of rape, as 
opposed to individualising the rapist through his biography.  
 
The use of my own experience and the experience of a friend mirrors the development of radical 
feminist theory from women sharing their experiences with each other. Radical feminist 
theorising is not an abstract theory; the analysis that centralises sexual objectification develops 
from the experience of women. My support for radical feminism develops from its ability to 
explain the world as I have experienced it. The use of my experience alongside my friend’s 
experience (when we were both 16) also indicates the way in which girls grow up surrounded by 
sexual violence; not only was I awoken to the violence of patriarchy through my own experience, 
but through the experience of others.  The reality of the pervasive nature of sexual violence is 
what motivates a radical feminist critique of sexual objectification. Using my own experience 
allows me to theorise rape as real, overcoming the representations of rape as contested.  
 
Presenting rape as a reality counters the contested representation of rape provided by Gadd and 
Jefferson’s (2007) methodology in their main case study of rape. As discussed in the last chapter, 
theorising rape as contested fails to theorise the subject of rape, as the question shifts to whether 
the act was an act of rape, premised on the credibility of the subjects involved. This representation 
of rape as fundamentally contested mirrors the legal treatment of rape. Legally, whether an act 
constitutes rape depends on the perceived absence of consent. Not only does this present a 
problematic contractual understanding of sex (Pateman 1980; MacKinnon 1989; Pineau 1989), it 
also brings in arbitration between competing accounts of events. If the questioning proceeds on 
the basis of establishing whether she agreed (or whether he reasonably thought she agreed) to the 
interaction, the focus on his actions is obscured.  Even when the victim is unconscious, the media 
and courts can be seen to fixate on the lack of her memory of consent, instead of viewing the lack 
of consciousness as impinging “on her ability to give true or meaningful consent” (Lovett and 
Horvath 2009: 129).  Using victim testimony to provide the salient details of what happened in 
that moment avoids the reduction of rape to conflicting accounts. Believing victims’ testimony 
 




presents rape as a reality, providing a radical feminist method that bases the theorising of 
patriarchy on a validation of women’s experience of sexual violation. 
 
Permitting the victim’s story to provide the basis of understanding the moment restores the voice 
to the victim, as in court cases and media reporting “the victim is often invisible and silent, the 
anonymous object of competing discourses” (Kitzinger 2009: 83). In the majority of rape cases 
only the victim and perpetrator are present. I propose that this places the victim as the most reliable 
narrator of the event. Evidently the offender’s perspective is necessary to theorise his mind, 
therefore the theory that I develop will consider studies of convicted rapists (Scully 1990; Pryor 
1996; Hudson 2005; Bonnycastle 2012). I propose, however, that his investment in distorting the 
act means that the case itself should not be constructed from his account of the events. 
Furthermore, rape is vastly under-reported (Stern 2010), meaning that theorising from reported 
cases in fact involves theorising from the margins of rape. It is only through theorising from 
victims’ accounts that we can overcome this problem.22 None of the cases in the vignettes were 
reported to the police. The choice of these four vignettes provides an insight into the many cases 
that never reach the police, the courtroom or the media. These are the unspoken cases that we live 
with, outside of any possibility for formal ‘justice’. 
 
The method of vignettes is also supported by the principles of phenomenology, both on the level 
of specificity and abstraction, as well as the use of first person experience as providing theoretical 
insight.  Beauvoir’s account of women’s oppression in The Second Sex (1949) and her essay on 
Marquis de Sade (1953) provide a “concrete phenomenological-existential approach” (Bergoffen 
2012: 39). The examples of sexual objectification that Beauvoir provides in The Second Sex 
(discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis) can be seen as vignettes. They are brief descriptions to 
document the treatment of women and girls; individual instances that are representative of a 
general phenomenon. Existentialism has been characterised as “the intentional use of the concrete 
as a way of approaching the abstract, the particular as a way of approaching the general” 
(Warnock cited in Kruks 2001: 6 – 7). A description of an instance of rape is concrete and 
particular, but allows us to theorise the generality of this instance by avoiding the specificities of 
the individual case. Central to phenomenology is a first-person description that attempts “to 
bracket the subjective particulars in order to find some essentially shared qualities” (Heyes 2016: 
 
22 Using victims’ accounts instead of offenders’ accounts in order to reach cases that are not reported to the 
police is necessary as conducting research on unconvicted rapists involves serious “ethical and practical 
difficulties” (Horvath and Brown 2007: 421). Smithyman (1978) did conduct research asking for self-
declared rapists in the general population, but even then there is the issue of the bias included through the 
men that both define their actions as rape and further are willing to expose their behaviour to a researcher; 
this is highly unlikely to find a random sample of unconvicted rapists. 
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364). Given this, I suggest that phenomenology is able to locate the individual within a structural 
analysis, focusing on the acts that are repeated and not the histories that mark men as individuals.  
 
In Gadd and Jefferson’s (2007) theorising on rape, their method of developing the case study from 
media coverage replaces the phenomenology of the moment of rape with the discursive 
construction of rape. The mistake of taking the discourse as the moment results in an erasure of 
the victim. The centralisation of women’s experience to radical feminist theory aligns radical 
feminism with the method of phenomenology. In the first two chapters of this thesis I discussed 
the rise of post-structural feminism as a rejection of radical feminism. Central to the anti-
humanism of this shift is to displace the use of phenomenology (the theoretical relevance of 
experience) with the position that “experience and subjectivity are produced through the interplay 
of discourses” (Alcoff 2000: 39). Alcoff argues against this complete replacement of theorising 
experience for theorising discourse by drawing on the phenomenological approach presented by 
the situated subject of Merleau-Ponty. Kruks also draws together second-wave feminism and 
existential phenomenology in her call to ‘retrieve’ experience in the face of ‘the discourse 
reductionism of the postmodern feminist project’ (2001: 132). 
 
Foucault’s anti-humanism provides an exemplar of theorising discourse in opposition to 
phenomenology. This leads to one of Foucault’s highly problematic claims that the farmhand’s 
sexual molestation of the little girl was constructed through criminalising discourse, disputing the 
reality/harm of the act itself (Foucault [1976] 1998: 31 – 32).23 Alcoff rejects Foucault’s position 
through theorising in part from her own experience of being sexually abused as a child.24 In 
criticising Foucault’s position, Alcoff (1996; 2000) forwards the need to theorise the 
phenomenology of sexual violence as not reducible to discourse. Alcoff states that “without 
phenomenological descriptions discursive analyses of sexual practices are more likely to be 
distorted” (2000: 52). My method of theorising rape from vignettes of victim testimony supports 
this phenomenological perspective that maintains that the experience of sexual violence should 
not be reduced to discursive representations. The ‘embodied knowledge gained from experience’ 
(Alcoff 2000: 54) credits women’s experience of being violated with knowledge of that form of 
violation. My own experience of rape thereby makes me well placed to theorise the subjectivity 
of the rapist.  
 
 
23 We can see here how the dispersed account of power criticised in the previous chapter converges with 
the anti-humanist perspective: as discourse replaces phenomenology and thus sexual abuse is reduced to a 
construction of discourse, the farmhand is not seen to have power over the little girl. 
 
24 This is a separate instance of sexual abuse than Alcoff’s experience that is used as vignette three. 
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The use of my own experience provides a self-reflexive approach consistent with feminist 
epistemologies that reject the possibility of the objective/neutral researcher. As Fenge et al. state 
“researcher positionality involves recognition of the multiple roles and identities that they bring 
to the research process” (2019: 6). Foss and Foss define ‘personal experience’ used as evidence 
in feminist research as “the consciousness that emerges from personal participation in events” 
(1994: 39). Ahearne (2021) discusses how the use of an autobiographical approach in research 
can be academically dismissed through accusations of lacking professionalism, being overly 
emotional, lacking rigour or credibility, indicating narcissism or personal problems. Using 
personal experience within my methodology refuses the patriarchal silencing of women’s voices 
and the androcentrism veiled in the aim of an objective researcher. In opposition to attempts to 
expunge the research of the researcher feminist phenomenology suggests placing our experience 
within the research and laying claim to the value of our positionality. This method attests to the 
view that “Far from my experiences being a barrier to acquiring knowledge, my biography is the 
site in which knowledge is produced” (Ahearne 2021: 5). 
 
The experience of telling people about the topic of my thesis led to reactions of discomfort or 
responses that such research must be depressing. My ‘insider’ perspective is what in fact provides 
me with the capacity and motivation to research violence against women. In experiencing rape, I 
am not shocked by rape. An outsider perspective is perturbed by the topic itself. The use of being 
victimised to theorise the subjectivity of the offender provides a unique form of insider research, 
through extending the knowledge claims to knowledge of others. More common forms of insider 
social research involve the researcher identifying as a member of the group being researched. My 
proposed methodology thus extends the notion of insider research to suggest that the victim can 
theorise the perpetrator. Brison provides a clear account of why this first person experience 
provides a perspective that differs from the outsider: “Whereas most people around me were 
determined to see what happened to me as an inexplicable, random isolated incident …I – still 
hearing my assailants vile antifemale epithets and still seeing, feeling and even smelling the sexual 
degradation he subjected me to – viewed myself as having been very nearly murdered by 
misogyny” (2008: 191). The lived experience of sexual violence can then be seen to grant 
epistemic privilege to the victim in relation to the moment of sexual violence. This turns the 
experience of being objectified into a position of subjectivity able to place the rapist as an object 
of study, for which I have the power to make knowledge claims. 
 
Downes et al. (2014) oppose the definition of victims as fragile and the consequent categorisation 
of all research on violence and abuse as sensitive. The assumption that telling the story of one’s 
victimisation is a negative experience makes it difficult to get ethical approval for qualitative 
research on violence against women. To dispute this assumption, Downes et al. propose the 
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positive empowerment approach through which they conceptualise victims as active agents well-
placed to make decisions about whether they feel able to speak about experiences of victimisation. 
Finding that many women who participate in feminist research on violence benefit from the ability 
to narrate their experiences of victimisation. The use of my own experience within the 
methodology of vignettes supports this positive empowerment approach. The inclusion of my 
own experience within this thesis provides testament to women’s resilience despite the attempts 
of patriarchy to annihilate our subjectivity. I will now present the four vignettes of rape followed 
by some discussion on the features of the vignettes.  
1.2 Four Vignettes of Rape 
Vignette 1 
Aged 16 I was approached by a man (age 20s-30s) who asked for my phone number – he said 
we could go for a drink. When the car arrives to collect me there are three other men in the 
car. When we arrive at the address, there are more men in the house. They prepare me a drink 
and they sit round chatting to each other. One man tells me to hurry up with my drink. The 
drink has been spiked. I fall unconscious. My unconscious body is carried upstairs and placed 
on the bed. The men take turns to have sex with my unconscious body. I slip in and out of 
consciousness aware that different men take their turns to position my limp body and use it in 
the act of sex. 
Vignette 2 
B is 16 and she has an older sister who lives with her boyfriend (age 20s-30s)25 and their 
young children. She goes to her sister’s house and they are drinking alcohol. B starts losing 
consciousness, so her sister helps her to the bed and returns to her friends downstairs. B falls 
unconscious on her sister’s bed. Her eyes open to find her sister’s boyfriend is having sex with 
her body. She freezes, not knowing what to do, so she closes her eyes pretending she has not 
regained consciousness. He continues to have sex with her seemingly unconscious body. 
Vignette 3 
“imagine, if you will, what it feels like to wake up and find yourself in a strange bed in the act 
of sex, within, shall we say, the passive position. Imagine that the other party is someone you 
know and perhaps are even in something of a relationship with, but someone you have not had 
 
25 I have included ages in the first two vignettes to highlight the prevalence of adult men targeting adolescent 
girls. According to police data “females aged 10 to 24 years were disproportionately more likely to be 
victims of sexual offences” (ONS 2021b: section four). 
 92 
sex with before this point. It is as if you are entering into an event in the middle. Someone else 
has had you signed in, delivered up, and things have gotten well underway before you have 
arrived. It may seem implausible that one can wake up only at this late stage of an activity, 
but imagine that before sleeping you drank alcohol and/or did some drugs, perhaps given to 
you by the person who is now on top of you. This is the sort of thing that happened to me"  
(Alcoff 2018: 6). 
Vignette 4 
The XYZ are a fraternity in an American university. At a party at the XYZ house, Laurel is 
high on acid and she has been drinking. It is noted by many people that Laurel is in a semi-
state of consciousness due to the intoxication. A group of the fraternity ‘brothers’ have sex 
with her. She contacts the administrator and states she was “raped by five or six, maybe more, 
male students at the XYZ house” (Sanday 1990: 60). After the incident, the XYZ house have a 
note on their household notice board proclaiming new riffing techniques including the 
“unconscious riff” and the “corpse riff” (ibid: 67). Riff being a term used by the fraternity 
brothers to refer to “getting sex from a woman”. It seems “that “unconscious riff” and 
“corpse riff” refer to getting sex from a comatose woman, which supports Laurel’s contention 
that during the incident she was drifting in and out of consciousness” (Sanday 1990: 67 – 68). 
In Gadd and Jefferson’s (2007) main psychosocial case study of rape, the victim claims to 
have been unconscious, but this is quickly elided in their analysis. Through the erasure of the 
victim, Gadd and Jefferson overlook the reality of this form of rape. My response – to reinsert 
the perspective of the victim and the reality of rape – places an unconscious victim as the 
unifying feature of the vignettes. Heyes notes that this form of sexual assault is ‘long standing’ 
and can involve the victim being “asleep, drunk, drugged, anaesthetised, asphyxiated, 
suffering from a head injury, or in a coma” (2016: 362). Heyes further states that the most 
common response to her work on rape of unconscious victims was “third or first person 
anecdotes about being sexually assaulted while unconscious” (2016: 363). From three years 
of data from the Crime Survey for England and Wales (2017 – 2020) it was found that ‘over a 
fifth of victims were unconscious or asleep during the most recent incident of sexual assault 
by rape or penetration’ (ONS 2021a: section five). This form of rape should not be seen as 
rare. 
Choosing cases in which the act begins when the victim is not conscious has theoretical 
advantages for theorising the role of sexual objectification in rape. Firstly, through the loss of 
consciousness it provides a literal manifestation of a person being reduced to an object. Given 
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this, the use of an unconscious body in the pursuit of sexual satisfaction provides an 
indisputable example of sexual objectification. Furthermore, such cases provide theoretical 
clarity through isolating his consciousness as the relevant variable. This avoids questioning 
the victim’s character or actions. The unconscious victim cannot be misinterpreted as desiring 
sex or leading the perpetrator on. In the complete absence of her consciousness the intention 
of his act is clear. 
 
Having sex with someone who is unconscious provides a disturbing representation of 
patriarchal sexuality. Providing four vignettes in which this occurs in varying contexts aims to 
demonstrate that such perversity is not marginal, thus revealing the extent to which gender 
distorts the formation of subjectivity. The men in these vignettes, in varying circumstances 
and with unique biographical histories, chose in that moment to have sexual intercourse with 
an unconscious female body. It is this choice that requires theoretical consideration. For this 
we do not need to know the individual life histories of these men; the choice is found within 
the moment. An unconscious female is reduced to a body; a body that cannot undress itself, a 
body unable to position itself for sex, a body unable to be aroused to aid an easy insertion of 
the penis. The acts of undressing, positioning the body and preceding to sexually use the body, 
require sustained intention and direct engagement with the unconscious body of the victim. 
Alcoff presents the theoretical pertinency of sex with a ‘comatose body’, raising the questions: 
“What makes someone, a young man, want to have sex under these kinds of circumstances 
when he might have them otherwise? What is the nature of desire that leads to such events? 
What are the beliefs necessary to generate such action, or to think afterwards that no harm was 
done?” (2018: 7). Considering the beliefs and desires which can explain sex with unconscious 
bodies is centred on the moment of the act, without the need for historicising considerations 
of case histories. 
 
With these vignettes I hope to avoid the question of whether each case is rape, through focusing 
on how it is possible for these various men to gain a positive sense of self from having sex 
with  someone who is unconscious. In vignette four the victim reported the rape to the 
university. Sanday states that “from the beginning when the news of XYZ incident first filtered 
out, there was vigorous debate over the definition of what happened” (1990: 61). This constant 
questioning over whether a case constitutes rape often includes minimising the actions of men 
or making women responsible for their own violation. Alcoff does not define her own 
experience as rape – she introduces this example (vignette three) within a discussion of the 
need to recognise acts that harm women’s sexual subjectivity but that may not fit the 
description of rape for the victim (2018: 6 – 9). As Alcoff includes this act as a ‘sexual 
violation’, the acceptance of this broader category is consistent with my use of the example. I 
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propose that the men in these vignettes must be explained through the process of sexual 
objectification, irrespective of anyone’s opinion about whether each case constitutes rape. The 
theoretical question is not ‘was this rape?’ but ‘how can we explain the consciousness of the 
men in these examples?’ 
 
The choice to include two cases of single perpetrator rape and two cases of group-rape aims 
to highlight the construction of a collective identity found in all acts of rape. 26 The structural 
analysis that explains rape through gender posits that the sense of identity gained from rape is 
a collective sense of identity. The dominance is gained through developing an identity based 
on the membership to the dominant group. The collective sense of identity and the role of male 
bonding through the sexual objectification of women is most evident in group-rape. In group-
rape “the extent to which women are treated as sexual objects to be passed around, humiliated 
and denigrated in the pursuit of male bonding and achieving enhanced masculine status is far 
more apparent” than in lone rape (Horvath and Woodhams 2013: 3). Lees notes that in group-
rape the victim is often unconscious, highlighting “her status as a surrogate victim in a drama 
where the main agents are the males interacting with each other” (1996: 42). In presenting two 
cases of group-rape alongside two cases of men who rape alone, I aim to draw out the idea that 
rape involves a collective construction of identity even when men rape on their own. 
 
The way in which group-rape is found in the various all-male institutions/settings that exist in 
society can further be used to demonstrate the structural analysis of rape. In Sanday’s research 
she states that “the kind of behaviour that this case illustrates appears to be widespread not 
only among fraternities but in many other exclusively male contexts …also found outside 
universities where men band together in clubs, work groups, athletic teams, military units, and 
business conventions” (1990: 4). Additionally, group-rape is found in street gangs, prisons and 
ceremonies (da Silva et al. 2013). Given that group-rape is found in these various contexts, 
perpetrators of group-rape “are men and boys from all walks of life” (Horvath  and Woodhams 
2013: 1). Men involved in group-rape are not unified in their life histories or cultural/socio-
economic location, but the correlation of this form of rape with all-male settings points to a 
structural explanation.  
 
26 I am using the term group-rape to avoid the racial connotations of ‘gang’ and also avoid the implication 
that the men engaging in this form of rape are involved in other illegal activity and thus are members of a 
street gang (Horvath and Woodhams 2014; da Silva et al. 2014). Though criminal activity could form the 
basis of the group, group membership can also be through university, sports teams, business partners, 
soldiers (Sanday 1990; Horvath and Woodhams 2014; da Silva et al. 2014), The other alternative is to refer 
to this form of rape as ‘multiple-perpetrator rape’ (Horvath and Kelly 2009), however this often becomes 
shortened to MPR providing an overly clinical phrasing. Furthermore, the contested definition of ‘group’  
(da Silva et al. 2014) can be overcome through understanding the men to be a group through participating 




The relationship between the victim and perpetrator varies in these four vignettes. In the first 
vignette, the perpetrators are unknown to the victim. In the second vignette, the perpetrator is 
a family member. In the third, the perpetrator is the victim's boyfriend. In the fourth, the 
perpetrators are acquaintances. This demonstrates that rape occurs within a range of 
relationships between the victim and perpetrator.27 The account of the sexual objectification 
of the perpetrator must thereby be able to account for varying degrees of knowledge of – and 
intimacy with – the victim. In the next chapter I will consider the advantage of providing an 
account that is not specific to a particular relationship between the victim and perpetrator. 
 
Another difference found in the vignettes involves the perpetrators’ involvement in the 
victim’s loss of consciousness. In the first vignette, the perpetrators spike the victim’s drink; 
the intention is to make her unconscious and sexually use her body. Once the drug has worked 
and she falls unconscious, she is then taken to the bed to be installed. In the second vignette, 
the victim is not spiked; she has only consumed alcohol. In the third vignette, the drink and 
drugs were taken willingly but given to her by the perpetrator (her boyfriend). In the fourth 
vignette, the victim attends the party having already consumed acid, and then consumes 
alcohol provided by the fraternity at the party. In terms of reported rape, Horvath and Brown 
(2007) found that the most common form of ‘drug-assisted’ rape in fact involves victims 
voluntarily consuming alcohol. They distinguish between opportunistic and predatory rape 
depending on whether the substance was intentionally administered to the victim. A mixed 
instance is categorised as when the alcohol/drugs were supplied by the perpetrator but taken 
willingly. Horvath and Brown propose that both the mixed case and the intentional spiking 
represent a predatory act. Although it is only the first vignette in which the victim is 
intentionally spiked, the involvement of all of the men in the supply of intoxicants blurs the 
line between creating and exploiting a vulnerability.  
 
The method of theorising through vignettes of rape from the perspective of the victim is supported 
by radical feminism and phenomenology. This method provides the moment of rape to theorise 
the subject of rape. The level of abstraction and the focus on the moment enables us to capture 
the generality of men’s sexual violence against women, allowing us to theorise the individual in 
a way that is compatible with the structural analysis of radical feminism. In this chapter and the 
next chapter the vignettes will be drawn on to theorise the mind of the rapist. This will involve 
 
27 Data from the Crime Survey for England and Wales shows that “victims who experienced sexual assault 
by rape or penetration since the age of 16 years were most likely to be victimised by their partner or ex-
partner (44%). This was closely followed by someone who was known to them other than a partner or 
family member (37%), which includes friends (12%) and dates (10%). More than one in seven women 
(15%) reported being assaulted by a stranger” (ONS 2021a: section four). 
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considering the general feature of an unconscious victim, specific elements of the vignettes, as 
well as an additional detail from my own experience.  
 
Section Two: Defining Sexual Objectification  
 
This section begins with a philosophical exploration of the definition of sexual objectification, 
considering the connection between how sexual objectification is defined and the central dispute 
over whether objectification is necessarily harmful. Through this discussion I will reject the 
alignment of radical feminism with Kant (1780). This provides my central argument that when 
the subject is theorised as embodied and intersubjective, sex is not inherently objectifying. This 
allows the claim that sexual objectification is inherently harmful without vilifying sex. This 
section establishes an initial definition of sexual objectification as a denial of subjectivity. The 
second section uses the vignettes to draw out how rape is both disturbing and normalised. This 
proposes that it is disturbing because of the role of intersubjectivity and embodiment in subject 
formation, hence rape represents a distortion of consciousness. This clarifies that the denial of 
subjectivity is in fact based on a recognition of subjectivity. The normalisation of this distortion 
of consciousness is considered through a detail from my own experience that highlights the role 
of the social construction of gender in the act of rape. Sexual objectification is a distortion of what 
it means to be a subject, but this distortion is normalised through what it means to be a subject 
under patriarchy.   
 
2.1 Sexual Objectification: Definitions and Disputes 
 
The radical feminist critique of sexual objectification brings together rape, prostitution, 
pornography, domestic violence, sexual harassment. All of these behaviours are understood as 
enacting male dominance through the sexual objectification of women. MacKinnon defines 
sexual objectification as “having a social meaning imposed on your being that defines you as to 
be sexually used” (1989: 140). Presenting sexual objectification as central to women’s oppression 
is to present sexual objectification as necessarily harmful. As I have argued in previous chapters, 
this critique of sexual objectification as the crux of patriarchal oppression becomes rejected in 
third-wave feminism. The current mainstream feminist stance on sexual objectification is that it 
can be a form of liberation and hence it can represent women’s agency. This shift to embracing 
the sex industry results from the claimed victory of sex-positive feminists in the ‘sex wars’ of the 
1980s (Phipps 2014). Radical feminism is criticised for denying women’s agency and branded as 
‘anti-sex’ (Vance 1984; Synder-Hall 2010).  
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Nussbaum (1995) suggests that the lack of clarity over defining the concept of sexual 
objectification in radical feminist theory leads to an over-expansive critique that risks vilifying 
sex. MacKinnon (1987; 1989) and Dworkin (1974; 1987) are the target of Nussbaum’s discussion. 
Nussbaum’s basic definition of objectification is ‘to see and/or treat a person as an object’ (1995: 
251). Given this, she begins to theorise the concept through considering how we treat objects – 
from the ballpoint pen to the Monet painting. From this, Nussbaum suggests that objectification 
should not be understood through necessary and sufficient conditions, but the looser notion of a 
cluster concept. A cluster concept provides a number of features that do not necessarily imply one 
another and thus can be separately occasioned. Nussbaum proposes that objectification is 
constituted of any of the following seven features: ‘instrumentality, denial of autonomy, 
fungibility, violability, denial of subjectivity, inertness, ownership’ (ibid: 257). In disaggregating 
these features, Nussbaum suggests the possibility of benign objectification. It is this claim ‘that 
sexual objectification is not necessarily harmful’ that disputes the radical feminist use of the 
concept.  
 
According to Nussbaum it is only instrumentality that is “always morally problematic” (1995: 
289), but because this is only one feature of the concept and the features are extricable from each 
other, there are many cases of objectification that are not morally objectionable and in fact can be 
positive. Alongside the consideration of our treatment of objects, Nussbaum also uses literary 
examples to demonstrate the possibility of benign objectification. Nussbaum provides an excerpt 
from D.H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover, claiming that it both represents a case of sexual 
objectification and is an example of a positive sexual interaction. The features of a relationship 
that Nussbaum identifies as making the objectification positive are “symmetry, mutuality and 
intimacy” (Marino 2008: 345). 
 
Stock (2015) disputes that there is serious disagreement between Nussbaum (1995) and 
MacKinnon (1989), claiming that the difference in aims and methodologies between these 
perceived rivals undermines the basis of disagreement. Stock identifies that MacKinnon’s use of 
the concept of sexual objectification is ‘constitutively tied to gender roles’, whereas Nussbaum’s 
is not (Stock 2015: 193). In radical feminist theory, gender is theorised as the enforced role of 
sexual subject and object; the pervasive sexual violence against women and girls is explained 
through the sexual objectification involved in the construction of femininity and masculinity. The 
status as a sexual object is imposed on women and girls by men in specific acts and it is imposed 
through the structural framing in the social construction of gender. Nussbaum recognises the 
social hierarchy that leads to increased negative sexual objectification of women, but in her 
expanded definition of the concept, sexual objectification does not constitute gender. According 
to Stock, Nussbaum is concerned with the concept of sexual objectification as it is employed in 
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ordinary usage –  the success of this exploration concerns whether the definition is able to 
encompass all possible contexts of use. This differs markedly from MacKinnon (and more broadly 
radical feminist theory), in which the concept of sexual objectification is deployed to explain 
activity perceived as morally problematic. The success of this explanatory use is whether it 
provides “effective moral criticism” (Stock 2015: 195). 
 
As my aim is to employ the concept of sexual objectification to explain the mind of the rapist in 
support of radical feminism, my use is as an explanation of morally problematic behaviour. I 
agree with Stock (2015) that there is no need to search for a singular definition of sexual 
objectification and there does seem a relevant distinction in the aim of Nussbaum (1995) and 
MacKinnon (1989). However, it also seems relevant to consider how Nussbaum offers her 
account partly as a critique of MacKinnon (1987; 1989) and Dworkin (1974; 1987), and how the 
claim of positive objectification is consistent with broader criticisms of radical feminism as anti-
sex. To explain rape through the process of sexual objectification, the concept needs to be 
delineated in a way that distinguishes it from the mental process involved in sexual activity more 
broadly. If people want to apply the term more loosely in ordinary usage this is fine, but it is 
important to distinguish this from the radical feminist use, in order for the concept to have 
explanatory power.  
 
I propose that the central defining feature of sexual objectification, as used in a radical feminist 
explanation, is the denial of subjectivity. In Nussbaum’s (1995) cluster concept, the denial of 
subjectivity is stated as one of the features that can be part of benign objectification. In arguing 
against the conception of sex as inherently objectifying, I argue that it is a disembodied and 
autonomous conception of the subject that leads to the false claim of sex as objectifying. This 
draws together criticism of Kant (1780) and Nussbaum (1995). If it is different conceptions of the 
subject that leads to variations in the normative understanding of sexual objectification, the 
difference between Nussbaum and radical feminism is more substantive than a difference in aim 
and method. 
 
Nussbaum (1995) unites Kant with the radical feminist accounts of sexual objectification 
provided by MacKinnon and Dworkin. This alignment is not unique to Nussbaum but found 
throughout philosophical discussions of sexual objectification. Herman (2002) makes the explicit 
claim that there is overlap in Kant’s views on sex and the theories of sexual objectification 
provided by MacKinnon and Dworkin. Kant (1780) theorised sex as posing a moral problem in 
being inherently objectifying. The problem with sex for Kant was that “sexual interest in another 
is not interested in the other as a person. Insofar as one is moved by sexual appetite, it is the sex 
(the eroticised body, the genitalia) of the other that is the object of interest” (Herman 2002: 60). 
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Kant considers that taking the body as the object of interest “blocks regard for the body as a body 
of the person” (ibid). Kant resolves the moral problem of objectification in sex through the 
institution of marriage. Kant proposes that sex is made morally permissible through the equal 
rights granted over one another in the marital union. According to Kant, objectification is no 
longer morally harmful as in marriage your rights of ownership over the other means you ‘win 
yourself back’ ([1780] 1963: 167). 
 
The problem of sex for Kant (1780) brings out the dualism between body and mind and thus his 
disembodied conception of the subject. If the moral problem arises because the object of interest 
is the eroticised body and not the person, then the subject is not thereby the eroticised body. The 
sexual desire becomes degrading to the person on the premise that the person is not their body, 
and thus the desire is not directed at them as a person. The disembodied subject that places the 
body as property is a conceptualisation of subjectivity in which it is reserved for particular 
subjects, allowing others to be defined as property – black people in slavery and women in 
marriage. In contradiction to Kant’s claim of marriage granting reciprocal rights, marriage at the 
time of Kant’s writing involved the explicit ownership of women by men: passed from the 
property of their father to the property of their husband. Despite Kant’s gender-neutral account, 
the reality of this conceptualisation of subjects and bodies is that men possess women’s bodies. 
For Kant, sexual objectification is an inevitable fact of being rational minds ‘stuck inside’ desiring 
bodies. If we accept the alignment of the radical feminist critique of sexual objectification with 
Kant’s account, then it implies that the problem of objectification is based on the notion that as 
subjects we are not our bodies, hence the harm is in being reduced to our bodies.  
 
The way in which Kant (1780) theorises sexual objectification as morally problematic is one of 
the ways that Kant is drawn together with radical feminism. Through Nussbaum’s (1995) 
theorising of benign objectification, she thereby distinguishes her account from Kant and radical 
feminism. In fact, this proposal of benign objectification can provide an alignment between 
Nussbaum and Kant – and a distinction from radical feminism – in the claim that sex is inherently 
objectifying. For Kant this is morally problematic and can only be resolved through marriage, 
while for Nussbaum this is not necessarily morally problematic. But according to both accounts, 
sex is objectifying. I propose that when the subject is understood as embodied and intersubjective, 
sex should not be seen as objectifying. Nussbaum suggests that the denial of subjectivity can be 
part of benign/wonderful sexual objectification, and yet she defines a denial of subjectivity as 
treating “the object as something whose experiences and feelings (if any) need not be taken into 
account” (1995: 257). I will use Beauvoir (1949) to consider the centrality of recognition of 
subjectivity to sexual interaction. 
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In direct opposition to Kant’s (1780) proposed solution to the objectification of sex through 
marriage, Beauvoir considers that institutionalising the sexual relation through marriage “is 
obscene in principle in so far as it transforms into rights and duties those mutual relations which 
should be founded on a spontaneous urge; it gives an instrumental and therefore degrading 
character to the two bodies” ([1949] 1997: 463). The property rights conceptualisation of bodies 
fails to account for the feeling of sexual interaction; as embodied subjects in sexual desire we feel 
drawn to another. As an embodied subject this involves recognising the other’s subjectivity 
through their embodiment. The transformation of the feeling of embodied subjects – ‘the 
spontaneous urge’ – into rights and duties is degrading in reducing bodies to objects. Beauvoir 
states that sexuality “should be the expression of a whole being” (ibid: 252). The person is their 
eroticised body; in a context of mutual sexual desire, each is regarded as a sexual subject. The 
sexual subject has desires and the possibility of pleasure.  
 
Furthermore, the intersubjectivity of sexual desire fuses recognition of the other’s subjectivity 
with one’s own desire. The sexual desire for the other is inextricable from the other’s desire for 
you. It is an intersubjective moment in which feeling desired is bound with desiring the other. If 
the partner was to suddenly appear revolted, this would interfere with the other’s desire. In 
recognising the other’s desire for you (as a constitutive part of your desire for them), you must 
recognise them as an embodied subject with sexual desires and the possibility for sexual pleasure. 
This is to suggest that part of sexual desire is the recognition of the other’s sexual subjectivity. 
The claim of the positive denial of subjectivity seems to reduce sex to a mechanical bodily 
function, ignoring the role of intersubjectivity in sexual interaction. For sexual desire and pleasure 
to be mutual and reciprocal it must be based on recognising the subjective states of the other.  If 
a partner expresses pleasure, pain, discomfort or disengagement, the other partner will need to 
respond to this if the act is going to be satisfying to both partners. Subjectivity is recognised 
through the ability to feel what the other feels through interpreting their spoken and unspoken 
communication of their subjective experience. Mutually satisfying sex has to be responsive to the 
communication of the other’s subjective state. Instead of casting sex as objectifying, sexual desire 
should be understood as involving the recognition of the other as a sexual subject. 
 
Once subjects are understood to be embodied, sexuality is an expression of our subjectivity; the 
intersubjectivity of sexual desire then reveals the felt bond between embodied subjects. I propose 
that this is an emotional bond, not found in the specifics of a romantic attachment but through the 
ability to interpret the communication of the other’s subjective states. Responding to the 
communication of the other’s subjective states requires taking the role of the other. It is through 
sexual relations that we “discover that we are intimately and inextricably related to each other” 
(Bergoffen 2012: 42). The intersubjectivity of sexual desire allows that this recognition of 
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interdependence does not necessarily pose the other as a threat. In Beauvoir’s account, the “erotic 
is the moment in which I recognise myself in the other without reducing the other to my double 
or dissolving myself in their otherness” (Bergoffen 1997: 120). The role of recognising 
subjectivity in Beauvoir’s account of sex means that instead of theorising sex as inherently 
objectifying, Beauvoir theorises ‘erotic generosity’: “the delight the lovers give and take in mutual 
recognition of their freedom is what lends strength and dignity to physical passion; under these 
circumstances nothing they do is degrading, since nothing is a matter of submission, everything 
is a matter of willing generosity” (Beauvoir [1949] 1997: 463). The recognition of sexual 
subjectivity involves the desire for the other to feel pleasure for their own sake. The ‘giving’ 
nature of mutually satisfying sexual interaction is premised on ‘taking into account the 
experiences and feelings of the other’ – the recognition of subjectivity.  
 
It is Nussbaum’s (1995) failure to properly theorise intersubjectivity and embodiment that leads 
to this Kantian conception of sex as inherently objectifying. Firstly, Nussbaum’s method of 
theorising through analogy to objects implies a disembodied subject. If objectification can be 
understood through analogy to treatment of objects, it seems objectification involves the treatment 
of the body as an object. Nussbaum recognises that two of the cluster features – denial of 
autonomy and denial of subjectivity – are not ‘modes of treatment we would discuss in the case 
of mere things’ (1995: 258). Nussbaum does not conclude from this consideration that the analogy 
to the treatment of objects is problematic, in that it is as bodies that we are subjects and hence our 
bodies are not analogous to objects even when objectified. This presents a failure to theorise 
embodiment. Secondly, the possibility of a positive denial of subjectivity suggests that subjects 
are independent from each other, as opposed to emotionally bound. This isolated subject is 
furthered through centralising the feature of autonomy, which can be contrasted to a concept of 
subjects as interdependent – intersubjective. The rational subject that is distinct from the body 
relegates emotions to the body. With this, the interdependence of embodiment is lost. The failure 
to theorise an intersubjective and embodied subject can be seen to underlie the claim that sex itself 
is objectifying.   
 
Cahill (2010) rejects the concept of sexual objectification and suggests an alternative concept of 
derivatization. She claims that objectification as a concept is overly burdened with enlightenment 
theorising; “in remaining loyal to certain tenets of modern thought, such as privileging of 
autonomy and rationality in subjectivity, they fail to recognise sufficiently the role the body plays 
in subjectivity” (Cahill 2010: 30). It is proposed that this leads to a vilification of the body and of 
sexuality. Cahill ties critiques of objectification to enlightenment theorising and hence rejects the 
concept itself. Instead, I propose that the radical feminist critique of sexual objectification is not 
bound with a rational autonomous (disembodied) subject. This involves rejecting the association 
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between Kant (1780) and radical feminism. According to Cahill, theorising rape through sexual 
objectification fails “to name the particularity of rape and sexual violence as distinct from other 
sexual experiences” because in order to be “sexual one must be seen as a thing-for-sex” (2010: 
137). Although she theorises an embodied and intersubjective subject, the proposition of the 
inherent objectification of sex displays a misunderstanding of the implication of this conception 
of the subject for the meaning of sex.  
 
In rejecting the association between Kant (1780) and radical feminism, sex should not be seen as 
inherently objectifying. If subjects are understood as embodied and intersubjective, then sexual 
interaction is based on the recognition of sexual subjectivity. Beauvoir’s (1949) account of erotic 
generosity indicates that theorising an embodied and intersubjective subject places recognition of 
subjectivity as central to sexual interaction. Defining sexual objectification as the denial of 
subjectivity means that sexual objectification is necessarily harmful. This does not vilify sexual 
interaction that is based on the recognition of subjectivity. This critique of sexual objectification 
does not thereby prescribe forms of sexual interaction, beyond the stated need to recognise the 
subjectivity of the other during the interaction. This allows us to critically consider consensual 
sex that fails to provide women with sexual pleasure, as exemplified by the orgasm gap discussed 
in Chapter Two. This does not conflate sex and rape but recognises that in a society that denies 
women’s subjectivity, the ideal of erotic generosity is not only absent in the act of rape. This 
coheres with Alcoff’s (2018) discussion that the harm of sexual violation should be understood 
as a harm to her sexual subjectivity. Being able to direct our sexual desires and seek pleasure from 
interaction with another is central to our capacity to ‘make a self’ (Alcoff 2018: 112). This 
presents an account that necessitates normative judgments on sex without providing an account 
that is moralistic or proscriptive. I will further consider this through the vignettes of rape and 
Beauvoir’s (1953) discussion of Marquis de Sade. 
 
2.2 Distorted and Normalised  
 
The vignettes provide instances in which men choose to have sex with someone who is 
unconscious. As discussed in the first section of this chapter, the theoretical pertinency of the 
vignettes is in part the way in which these depictions are disturbing. The penetration of an 
unconscious body involves eroticising a body in the absence of subjectivity. In theorising the 
mind of the rapist it is necessary to capture the perversity of this form of desire without 
pathologising the rapist; we must simultaneously be able to consider that the act is disturbing and 
normalised. The need to capture what is disturbing about the depiction in the vignettes provides 
evidence against the accounts of sexual interaction as inherently objectifying. If we see each other 
as objects during sexual interaction (sex is inherently objectifying), then there is nothing perverse 
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about the sexual desire for someone who is unconscious. Beauvoir’s (1953) discussion of Sade 
helps us to theorise this perversity without slipping into pathology.  
 
In The Second Sex Beauvoir (1949) provides an account of the position of woman as sexually 
objectified. In Beauvoir’s (1953) account of Sade she provides the counterpart to this in theorising 
the objectifier, expressed in the sexuality of Sade (Bergoffen 1997). According to Beauvoir, the 
value of Sade’s testimony “is that it disturbs us. He obliges us to call into question once again the 
essential problem which, under many faces, haunts these times: the true relationship of man to 
man” (Beauvoir [1953] 2012: 95). The form of sexual subjectivity found in Sade’s fiction and 
real life “is perverse insofar as it misses the fundamental way in which the erotic expresses the 
ambiguity of our condition as consciousness, as flesh, as subject, and as other” (Bergoffen 1997: 
119). Sexual objectification is disturbing insofar as it distorts the foundation of our 
interdependence as embodied and intersubjective subjects.  
 
If we take intersubjectivity and embodiment to be foundational to subjects, this reveals that the 
recognition of subjectivity cannot be avoided. This clarifies that the definition of sexual 
objectification as a denial of subjectivity in fact involves the recognition of subjectivity. It is not 
a cognitive error when he denies her subjectivity, it is not that he mistakes her for an object. If it 
was possible to make this category mistake or to entirely switch off from recognising another’s 
subjectivity this would mean we could disconnect subjectivity from bodies. This would result in 
the vignettes and Sade’s testimony not disturbing us. It is disturbing because it represents a 
distortion. His denial of her subjectivity involves the recognition of her subjectivity. 
 
Furthermore, this recognition of subjectivity is central to the experience of dominance. A position 
of dominance is not achieved through treating an object as an object. The feeling of dominance is 
only achieved through knowing it is a subject to whom you deny subjectivity. In reference to 
Sade, Beauvoir states that “the libertine “would have much to complain of if he acted upon an 
inert object that felt nothing”. This is why the contortions and cries of the victim are necessary 
for the happiness of the torturer” ([1953] 2012: 60 – 61). In considering the unconscious victim, 
this can be easily overlooked. Although much more like an inert object, I propose that his 
knowledge of her subjectivity is still central to his enjoyment of the act. Knowing she is a subject, 
momentarily unable to resist, gives him a feeling of dominance. Furthermore, the loss of 
consciousness is not permanent and he knows this; he begins when she is unconscious but he 
knows that she could (and does) regain consciousness at any point during his penetration. The 
fact that she may open her eyes provides a thrill to the act. This thrill is that she may open her 
eyes and close them again (as in vignette two); he thus gains ultimate dominance from her 
complete submission. She may open her eyes and participate in the act he has started (as in 
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vignette three); this provides him with ultimate dominance in that he gains her complete 
compliance. Her eyes may open and close as she slips between states of consciousness (as in 
vignette one and four); he gains complete dominance from his continuation of an act, knowing 
she becomes aware but is unable to resist. 
 
The opening of her eyes does not make him leap back in sudden realisation of her subjectivity, 
just as the cries of Sade’s victims do not make him suddenly stop, realising he causes pain. 
Drawing on her own experience of being sexually abused as a child, Alcoff explains “while the 
child gags and whimpers (even screams and cries), the adult sighs and moans…one can detect the 
sexual enjoyment experienced by the other…pleasure here is corporeally perceived as a product 
of one’s own pain and torment” (2000: 54). The phenomenology of being raped can confirm that 
the rapist is fully aware of the subjectivity of the victim and it is this that gives him enjoyment. 
Her subjectivity is not overlooked, it is gripped and twisted in order for him to gain his position 
of dominance. Beauvoir elucidates this recognition of subjectivity contained within the denial of 
subjectivity and how this centres on the ambiguity of existence: “an evasion of his consciousness 
in his flesh, an apprehension of the other as consciousness through the flesh” ([1953] 2012: 60). 
He apprehends the other as a subject through the use of her body, thus the use of her body is not 
in the absence of recognising her as a subject. In recognising her as a subject and denying her 
subjectivity, he gains a position of dominance. 
 
The way in which ‘he evades his consciousness in his flesh’ outlines how this distortion of 
consciousness is not a pathology. Despite being a distortion of the foundation of subjects, it is 
central to existentialism that the freedom of man – in being responsible for his own self-creation 
– is experienced as anguish. The anguish of freedom explains man’s tendency to flee from the 
ambiguity of existence. It is through denying the self as both subject and object in the world, or 
through denying the relation to the other, that we can evade responsibility for ourselves. Although 
it is a foundational distortion, it is a distortion explained by the constitution of free subjects. The 
process of sexual objectification as an evasion of responsibility will be further outlined in the final 
section of this chapter.  
 
The mind of the rapist involves a distortion regarding the foundation of what it means to be a 
subject, but this distortion is in fact normalised through the social construction of gender; what it 
means to be a subject in patriarchy. The commonality of subjectivity is evident despite the 
differences in sexed bodies. But the distortion of consciousness is facilitated through the structure 
of patriarchy in the social construction of women as sexual objects. Much of the social 
construction of gender centres on the exaggerated differentiation of bodies: hair length, body hair 
removal, make-up, clothing etc. Radical feminism and Beauvoir (1949) elucidate how the 
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presentation of her embodiment based on the social construction of gender facilitates the denial 
of her subjectivity through differentiating her from him. As Beauvoir states: “the ideal of feminine 
beauty is variable, but certain demands remain constant; for one thing, since woman is destined 
to be possessed, her body must present the inert and passive qualities of an object” ([1949] 1997: 
189). The social construction of her as a sexual object normalises what is ultimately a distortion 
of consciousness in denying her subjectivity. 
 
The role of the social construction of gender, and hence how this distortion of subjectivity is 
normalised through the structure of patriarchy, can be seen from a further detail from my own 
experience – vignette one. Her28 fake nails were complimented before she lost consciousness, and 
when she fully regained consciousness and was no longer being used for sex, she asked ‘where 
are my pants?’ The aggressive rebuke was: ‘they are knickers’. Unaware of feminist critiques of 
gender, this telling-off stuck with me. When I later came to understand the function of gender in 
the objectification of women, I could understand the importance that my underwear was not a 
gender-neutral garment, but a symbol of femininity that created my cunt into an extension of his 
own aggrandised subjectivity. He corrects her gender-neutral terminology because it is central to 
his experience of domination that she is feminised. The construction of her embodiment must be 
differentiated from his as she is denied subjectivity precisely through this socially constructed 
differentiation. 
 
This section has established that sexual objectification should be defined as a denial of 
subjectivity. Through conceiving of subjects as embodied and intersubjective, this defines sexual 
objectification as necessarily harmful without vilifying sex itself. Through this conceptualisation 
of the subject we can establish that the vignettes are disturbing in representing a distortion of 
consciousness. This clarifies that the denial of subjectivity in sexual objectification involves the 
recognition of subjectivity. The normalisation of this foundational distortion of consciousness is 
found in the social construction of gender. I will now further establish this denial of subjectivity 
as a negation of moral emotions.  
 
Section Three: Imposed definitions and Moral Emotions  
 
This section will establish the compatibility of symbolic interactionism and the radical feminist 
account of sexual objectification. The subject of symbolic interactionism can be brought together 
 
28 Whenever I write about my own experience of rape I continuously shift between first person and third 
person pronouns. I have not removed this shifting from “I” to “her” as this reflects the deep sense in which 
rape is an attack on the individual girl/woman as an attack on the category. The humiliation and degradation 
was suffered by me as an individual but I was interchangeable as a feminised object that could be degraded 
and humiliated for the men’s enjoyment. I was she. 
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with the subject of existentialism to draw out the meaning of intersubjectivity to subject 
production. Theorising the role of the definition of self and other in our self-conception begins to 
suggest how sexual objectification can constitute the structure of patriarchy as well as being a 
process in the mind of the rapist. An intersubjective subject relies on taking the role of the other, 
which centralises moral emotions. The symbolic interactionist concept of ‘the looking-glass self’ 
(Cooley 1902) can be brought together with the existential concept of ‘the look’ (Sartre 1943) to 
demonstrate that our self-conception is comprised of how we are seen by others. Seeing the self 
as seen by another produces moral emotions that constrain harmful action because of a negative 
self-reflection. This intersubjective understanding of self thereby produces a moral realm. Sexual 
objectification as a way of seeing involves interrupting the reflexivity of this process, such that 
he can violate her in the absence of guilt and shame. The absence of moral emotions in the act of 
rape will be considered through Scully’s (1990) study of convicted rapists and the vignettes of 
rape. This negation of moral emotions is ultimately an evasion of responsibility for himself. The 
negation of moral emotions does not mean he does not know/recognise that she is a subject: it is 
instead that the reflexive sense of himself is suspended such that he does not feel ashamed for 
violation.  
 
3.1 The Imposition of a Definition  
 
MacKinnon’s definition of sexual objectification – “having a social meaning imposed on your 
being that defines you as to be sexually used” (1989: 140) – implies an account of a subject that 
is produced through interaction. The harm of sexual objectification is that, in imposing a social 
definition onto women, this interferes with their ability to be recognised in social interaction 
through presenting themselves. The imposition of sexual objectification is thereby a central harm 
to women’s standing as subjects. Considering how this definition coheres with the subject of 
symbolic interactionism brings out that the radical feminist critique of sexual objectification is 
underpinned by an interactionist subject. In The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959) 
Goffman provides a subject that presents a self in interaction through the management of an 
impression. This impression is managed “by influencing the definition of the situation which the 
others come to formulate” (Goffman [1959] 1969: 15). Goffman uses the metaphor of a theatre 
to elucidate this dramaturgical concept of self: the theatrical performance has a ‘frontstage’ and a 
‘backstage’; in order to pull off a performance it is necessary to conceal certain elements. The 
performance of identity is the same; there is a choice of which aspects of ourselves to perform in 
a certain context. The curation of a self for social interaction places identity in the presentation of 
self. This makes identity a negotiation between subjects, just as the actors of a play must work in 
concert to achieve the performance. 
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This subject produced through interaction can be seen to underlie the radical feminist 
understanding of sexual objectification. The harm of having a definition imposed is that this 
undermines the possibility of presenting the self in order to enter into the negotiation of identity. 
Women are unable to influence the definition that others come to formulate, and hence unable to 
manage the impression of themselves because the social definition is imposed. If self-presenting 
subjects co-construct themselves through negotiating their identity and managing impressions, 
sexual objectification as an imposition of a definition undermines the intersubjective foundation 
of self-production. Drawing out how MacKinnon’s (1989) definition of sexual objectification 
implies an interactionist subject, is reinforced through Jutten’s (2016) support for MacKinnon’s 
account of objectification. Jutten considers MacKinnon’s (1989) account of sexual objectification 
as necessarily harmful, in contrast to Nussbaum’s (1995) cluster concept that places the harm of 
sexual objectification in ‘instrumentalisation’. Jutten supports MacKinnon’s account through 
focusing on the harm of sexual objectification to women’s ability to self-present. Jutten draws on 
Nagel (1998) and Velleman (2001) to propose that presenting a self is central to social 
interaction.29 In rejection of Nussbaum’s (1995) account of objectification Jutten (2016) suggests 
that instrumentalisation may occur as part of this imposition of a social definition, but the problem 
with identifying the harm of objectification as instrumentalisation, is that this locates 
objectification only on the level of interpersonal relationships and misses that it is also a social 
process. An imposition of a social definition that undermines the presentation of self can be 
understood both on the level of individuals and as a social process. The definition is imposed 
through rape and sexual harassment, but it is also imposed through the cultural representation of 
women – for instance Jutten (2016) considers the ‘no more page three’ campaign. It is an 
interactionist subject that enables theorising sexual objectification as a social process and a 
process on the level of the individual. 
 
Existential criminology has noted the overlaps between the theoretical perspectives of 
existentialism and symbolic interactionism. In particular, Hardie-Bick and Hadfield have drawn 
together Goffman’s dramaturgical concept of self with Sartre’s account of bad faith. Hardie-Bick 
and Hadfield propose that both accounts present ‘personal identity as constructed through 
 
29The aspects of these papers that Jutten (2016) uses, highlight the interactionist subject underlying radical 
feminism. However, these sources are not suitable for developing this defence of radical feminism as 
Nagel’s (1998) article in fact proposes a public/private distinction in order to criticise women speaking out 
about sexual violence perpetrated by men in positions of power, making it evidently not compatible with 
radical feminism. Velleman’s (2001) account, meanwhile, places the body as inherently shameful and 
makes the claim that the male body is most shameful because of the possibility of involuntary erections. 
This is also incompatible with radical feminism in missing the role of the social construction of gender in 
relation to shame and bodies. 
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performativity’ (2011: 15).30 In previous chapters I have discussed the choice in consciousness 
and the implied freedom and responsibility found in an existential account of subjectivity. This 
freedom is found in ‘creating a self’ (Vintges 1992; Pilardi 1999). Arp’s overview of the 
existential subject brings forth this compatibility with Goffman (and more broadly the subject of 
symbolic interactionism), as she states that existentialism “sees humans as beings who create and 
define themselves in interaction with others and the circumstances they find themselves in” (Arp 
2001: 2). Beauvoir’s (1949) embodied and intersubjective subject, expressed through the concept 
of erotic generosity, presents subjects that are interconnected – they are able to willingly give 
pleasure to another because of the ability to take the role of the other. Taking the role of the other 
is central to the symbolic interactionist concept of a subject produced through interaction. Given 
this overlap, I propose the radical feminist account of sexual objectification can be understood 
through the combined subject of symbolic interactionism and existentialism.  
 
The creation of subjects through interaction and the consequent role of definitions of self and 
other brings forth how the radical feminist account of sexual objectification is not only structural 
but also implies a process in the mind of the individual. Sexual objectification is a definition 
supplied through the social construction of gender; the structure of patriarchy. As we create and 
present ourselves through interaction, definitions are utilised by the individual. The feminised 
construction of her, discussed in the last section, provides an example of how the social definition 
(in the construction of gender) is imposed in the act of rape. The denial of her subjectivity through 
rape imposes a definition onto her in the instance, but this definition is found in the structure. The 
next chapter will focus on this connection between the subject and the structure in considering 
the narrative construction of identity. First, this section focuses on the subject in considering role-
taking and moral emotions on this conception of a self that is presented through interaction.  
 
3.2 Moral Emotions  
 
Goffman suggests that it is as a performer that there is a “capacity for deeply felt shame” 
(Goffman [1959] 1969: 246). The management of impressions is to avoid emotions of shame and 
embarrassment. This brings out that the negotiation of identity in the presentation of self depends 
on the ability to take the role of the other. Shame considers the self from the perspective of the 
other; we can only be ashamed of ourselves through internalising the other’s perspective on 
ourself. It is this reflexivity of moral emotions that produces a moral realm for intersubjective 
 
30 Hardie-Bick and Hadfield (2011) draw attention to the fact that Goffman uses Sartre’s examples of bad 
faith to illustrate the performed subject. Goffman also in fact uses a long quote from Beauvoir to illustrate 
the front and back stage of performing a self: the example is of women ‘play-acting’ at accepting their 
status of ‘other’ when they are with men and then being able to relax when they are with women (Goffman 
[1959] 1969: 115 quotes Beauvoir [1949] 1997: 557). 
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subjects, as in considering how our behaviour will be assessed by another our action is 
constrained. In arguing for the humanism of existentialism it was noted that the moral realm arises 
from centralising consciousness. This section develops this suggestion in considering the role of 
moral emotions in intersubjective subjects. I will now introduce Scully’s (1990) use of symbolic 
interactionism in her account of rape, before again drawing this together with existentialism.  
 
Scully (1990) conducted in-depth interview research with convicted rapists and with another 
group of men convicted of non-sexual offences for comparison. Through this research she found 
strong support for what she terms the feminist/sociocultural explanation of rape – that rape is not 
a pathology but is learnt behaviour from the patriarchal structure. Scully’s research aimed to fill 
a gap in feminist scholarship through gaining access to men’s perspectives, thus theorising the 
individual within the structural explanation.31 To provide this account of the individual, Scully 
draws on Cooley’s (1902) concept of ‘the looking-glass self’. Scully thus proposes that 
‘theoretically taking the role of others produces a ‘looking-glass self’ with reflexive emotions 
such as guilt, shame and embarrassment which mediate self-control’ (1990: 98 – 99). The looking-
glass self provides a subject who “imagines themselves as others must see them, and this 
construction of what others must see is fundamentally like an image reflected back in a mirror” 
(Schaffer 2005: 54). According to this theory, a self-concept is comprised of “three principal 
elements: the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgment 
of that appearance, and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification” (Cooley 1902: 
l84). The emotions of shame and embarrassment mediate action, as a negative reflection on the 
self from the perspective of the other motivates avoiding such action. Our self-conception is 
derived from our estimation of how others see us; taking the role of the other controls conduct 
through moral emotions. 
 
If we couple Beauvoir’s (1949; 1953) account of subjectivity with Sartre’s (1943) concept of ‘the 
look’ it becomes consistent with the concept of ‘the looking-glass self’ outlined above. Through 
the example of someone being caught peeping through a keyhole, Sartre suggests that the feeling 
of shame at being seen produces a concept of self: “I see myself because somebody sees me” 
([1943] 1989: 259). The look manifests the other’s subjectivity and through this, the person who 
is looked at is able to grasp themselves as a subject that can be judged. As Sartre claims, this 
 
31 Given Scully’s (1990) aim to theorise the individual within a socio-cultural explanation of rape and the 
robust methodology of her research, it is surprising that Gadd and Jefferson (2007) do not discuss Scully’s 
research or theoretical conjectures in the development of their psychosocial account of rape. Scully’s 
research is considerably stronger than the primary data used in Gadd and Jefferson’s development of their 
first case study and the theoretical proposal of symbolic interactionism provides a more compelling account 
of the subject within a structural explanation of rape. 
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shame of the self “is the recognition of the fact that I am indeed that object which the other is 
looking at and judging” (ibid: 261).  
 
Sartre (1943) presents a conflictual account of subjects and thus the look is seen as a form of 
objectification, in that through the look each is made into an object for the other. In contrast, the 
positive intersubjectivity involved in the erotic relation of Beauvoir’s (1949; 1953) account 
distinguishes Beauvoir’s subject from the Hegelian ‘fight to death’ endorsed by Sartre (Bergoffen 
1997). Morris (1999) points to Sartre’s account of the look to suggest that there are positive forms 
of objectification. Instead, I propose that if we replace Sartre’s conflictual account with 
Beauvoir’s positive account of intersubjectivity, the look is the recognition of subjectivity in the 
other, which grounds our own position of subjectivity. In recognising the other’s subjectivity I 
grasp myself as a subject. The self is produced through an internalisation of the other’s perception 
of you. This intersubjective foundation of subjectivity creates a moral realm, as acts that would 
incur judgment from others involve the feeling of shame. As the moral impetus of shame relies 
on a recognition of subjectivity, we can now consider that sexual objectification as a denial of 
subjectivity contrasts this looking-glass self/the look with ‘the gaze’. 
 
The gaze of sexual objectification refuses the self-reflection of the looking-glass self/the look. 
Beauvoir states that as prey “she will then be helpless under his gaze” ([1949] 1997: 346). She 
will be helpless because the denial of subjectivity subverts the feedback mechanism that 
constrains his action. Patriarchal subjectivity that develops through objectifying women 
undermines the moral basis of action as “the intimate presence of the other radically escapes this 
experience; therefore it does not concern me, and cannot dictate any duty to me” (Beauvoir [1953] 
2012: 90). Duty is dictated through seeing the self reflected back through the eyes of another, thus 
the denial of her subjectivity frees him from the judgment produced through the intersubjective 
foundation of subjects. As discussed in the last section, sexual objectification as a denial of 
subjectivity involves a recognition of subjectivity, because firstly it is not in fact possible to fail 
to recognise subjectivity, and secondly because this recognition of subjectivity is central to the 
feeling of dominance. The disruption of intersubjectivity that produces the moral realm is in terms 
of the reflection back on himself. The looking-glass self and the look produce feelings of shame 
when the self is reflected back through the eyes of the other. The gaze of sexual objectification 
removes this reflection on the self and hence removes the moral emotions that constrain action. It 
is in this way that he ‘evades his consciousness’. 
 
The looking-glass self, the look and the gaze all provide perceptual analogies. Sexual 
objectification has variously been theorised as a way of seeing. Langton states that 
“objectification is a stance, a way of looking at the world, and a social practice” (2009: 332). 
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Stock (2018) also considers sexual objectification as quasi-perceptual in her proposal of 
objectification as a form of mind-insensitive ‘seeing-as’. The way we see each other is how we 
define each other. This definition as the recognition of subjectivity produces moral action through 
reflecting the self back through taking the role of the other on oneself. Sexual objectification as a 
way of seeing involves denying her subjectivity. The absence of role-taking leads to an absence 
of moral emotions that constrain action. The perceptual analogy grasps that definitions are not 
purely propositional; they are felt and provide an overarching framework for how we interact with 
the world. This captures the existential perspective discussed in Chapter Three of a ‘world-
design’. If his world-design involves the denial of her subjectivity, he is freed from the 
responsibility implied through intersubjectivity.  
 
Sexual objectification as a way of seeing denies subjectivity, and this involves a  negation of 
moral emotions. The absence of moral emotions explains the possibility of sexual violence, as 
without the self-reflection supplied through recognising subjectivity he is free to violate her 
without guilt or shame – emotions that act to constrain harmful action. In Scully’s (1990) study 
she divides the convicted rapists into men who admit the offence and men who deny the act was 
rape. Scully found that “admitters and deniers were similar in one very important respect. The 
majority did not experience guilt or shame during or immediately following their rapes, nor did 
they report feeling empathy for their victims at that time. Instead of the emotions that might have 
constrained their sexually violent behaviour, these men indicate that they felt nothing or they felt 
satisfied” (1990: 135). The social construction of gender facilitates rape through providing a 
definition of women that disengages the emotional reflection on oneself that makes it shameful to 
violate another. Scully states “Since actions directed at meaningless objects do not evoke feelings, 
emotions fail to constrain their sexually violent behaviour. Hierarchical gender relations and the 
corresponding values that devalue women and diminish them to exploitable objects or property 
are the factors that render feeling rules inoperative and empower men to rape” (ibid: 166).  
 
Vignette one and four provide examples of group-rape. This form of rape is distinctive in 
providing a public and shared construction of identity. The subjectivity of women/girls is denied 
within the construction of a group identity as masculine. Participating in the construction of her 
as a sexual object bonds the men together as representative of the dominant subject. In these cases, 
the absence of shame and guilt is attested to by the shared participation. Franklin found that the 
mood of men engaged in group-rape is “typically described as celebratory, with participants 
laughing and cheering each other on” (2013: 38). The celebratory act is one of pride not of shame. 
This pride develops from the collective sense of identity as masculine. The negation of moral 
emotions in not feeling ashamed is not simply an absence of self-assessment: rather, the social 
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construction of gender allows the act of violation to be affirming of his sense of self, hence 
eliciting the emotion of pride.  
 
Vignette one presents a case that has been planned. The intentions would have been discussed by 
the group and it seemed that procuring teenage girls was a regular activity for these men. The 
repetition of the act and the necessary prior discussion between the men to orchestrate the abuse 
is indicative of an absence of shame and guilt. In vignette four, the rapists publicly communicate 
their sex with an unconscious woman through a note on the fraternity notice board. The possibility 
of bragging publicly about sex with someone who is unconscious reveals that sexual 
objectification provides an identity that is proudly displayed. As Sanday states “their statements 
and actions during the days after the event seemed to indicate that they considered the 
event…something to be proud of” (1990: 7). The rape does not evoke shame and guilt in the 
rapists, but evokes pride in his dominant sexuality and thus masculine identity. The possibility of 
such pride must be understood in the context of the patriarchal structure. 
 
In vignette two the victim is raped again by the perpetrator two weeks later. The initial act of rape 
was not followed by remorse, but a thirst for continuing the sexual violation of a teenage girl. If 
raping led to a sense of guilt, the act would not be repeated to avoid this feeling of self-judgment. 
If sexual violation is a consistent behavioural pattern for these men, it must be understood as 
consistent with their sense of self, their way of being in the world. They do not suffer self-
judgment of guilt and shame, but instead they feel invigorated in their dominance of sexually 
objectifying women/girls. This is supported through –  and made possible by – the cultural 
framing, but it must ultimately be understood as his choice in self-construction. He is not 
compelled into the position of the oppressor, he chooses to rape. The vulnerable offender 
theorised by Gadd and Jefferson (2007) fails to grasp this way of being. Placing the rapist as 
vulnerable makes the act reactive, as opposed to recognising the chosen mode of being by men 
who rape – Jim from Gadd and Jefferson’s case study is also a repeat offender. 
 
In vignette three Alcoff (2018) explains that she continued in a relationship with the person for a 
short time before ending the relationship, as she could not trust him after he had had sex with her 
while she was unconscious. Considering that Alcoff came to consciousness during the act and did 
not pretend to remain unconscious, the perpetrator would have known that she knew he started 
having sex with her whilst she was unconscious. In continuing the relationship and not 
acknowledging the event, the perpetrator does not appear to feel guilt or shame about the incident. 
It is possible to continue as normal in the relationship, because as he sees her as a sexual object, 
he can appropriate her body at the moment of its loss of consciousness. Unable to resist, she can 
be entirely possessed as part of his positive self-construction. 
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The recognition of subjectivity can be understood as the functioning of moral emotions; the denial 
of subjectivity in rape and other acts of sexual objectification can be understood as the negation 
of moral emotions.  In Chapter Two I proposed that the loss of common humanity in sexual 
objectification allows him to evade responsibility for himself. It can now be understood that this 
evasion of responsibility is achieved through a negation of moral emotions. The negative self-
judgment of shame becomes refracted through denying her subjectivity. The identification with 
the social construction of masculinity then allows him to achieve a positive sense of self from 
violation. He can be proud of rape; rape can be self-affirming. This negation of moral emotions 
is because instead of negotiating an identity through which the self is reflected back to the self, 
the definition of her is imposed, making her unable to cast judgment on his actions as he defines 
her outside of subjectivity.  
 
Bergoffen (2018) considers that the recent ‘Me Too’ movement can be seen to respond to 
patriarchal violence through reversing the shame and subsequent silencing of victims, instead 
shaming the perpetrators. The political power of the testimony of sexual violence is precisely 
because this occurs in a context in which shame is directed against the victim. Speaking out about 
sexual violence is radical in that she refuses to be shamed and calls for the perpetrator of the abuse 
to be shamed. Reversing the shame requires refusing the social construction of gender that places 
her as sexual object and him as sexual subject. In fully accepting her as a subject, her testimony 
of sexual violence should be believed, and this should place shame on him for his violation. This 
is not a call to release the inner essence of humanity from any cultural interpretation, instead it is 
a basic call for refusing a social construction that denies her subjectivity. For women to be 
recognised as subjects, eliciting moral emotions through the look/the looking-glass self, we must 




Theorising rape through vignettes of rape from the perspective of the victim centralises the voice 
of the victim and the reality of rape. It provides a method that mirrors the rise of radical feminism 
in terms of women sharing experiences with each other, and the more recent online collation of 
women’s testimonies of sexual violence. It presents a phenomenological method that is able to 
capture the generality of the act through abstracting the specifics and focusing on the moment that 
is repeated. The method of phenomenology is furthered by the inclusion of my own experience: 
this places the rape victim as capable of providing insights into the subject of rape. The subject 
must be theorised as fundamentally intersubjective and embodied, which means that sexual 
interaction is not inherently objectifying. This allows us to consider why sex with someone who 
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is unconscious is disturbing, as it violates the foundation of consciousness. This distortion of 
consciousness is normalised through the social construction of gender. The relevance of this in 
the moment of rape has been evidenced through an anecdote from my own experience. This 
indicates the advantage of the phenomenological perspective of theorising as a victim of rape. 
The radical feminist claim that sexual objectification imposes a definition and the intersubjective 
and embodied subject of Beauvoir’s (1949; 1953) existentialism dovetails with the subject of 
symbolic interactionism. This presents an account of the subject as presenting a self, based on the 
ability to take the role of the other. The looking-glass self and the look can be brought together to 
explain objectification as a way of seeing that involves the negation of moral emotions. Moral 
emotions involve internalising the other’s perspective on you; this constrains action to avoid a 
negative self-reflection. Sexual objectification involves an evasion of responsibility for himself 
through interrupting this process of reflection on the self. The vignettes indicate an absence of 
shame and guilt, whilst further demonstrating the presence of pride in men who rape, as they are 
able to affirm a positive masculine identity from the act of rape. 
 
Sexual objectification can be defined as a denial of subjectivity based on the recognition of 
subjectivity. As a process in the mind of the rapist this involves the negation of moral emotions, 
allowing him to violate another without negative self-reflection. The social construction of gender 
allows him to affirm his sense of self from rape, such that he can gain a feeling of pride from 
sexual violation. The next chapter will continue this theorisation of the subject of rape, proposing 
that alongside the negation of moral emotions, men who rape must produce rationalisations to 
make the act of rape consistent with their sense of self. This elucidates the connection between 
the subject and the structure, as the narrative construction of identity draws on the narratives 
provided by the culture. In terms of the subject of rape, this involves the definition of women as 



















This chapter presents rationalisations as the final component of the process of sexual 
objectification in the mind of the rapist. This continues the joint theorisation of the subject of 
existentialism and symbolic interactionism introduced in the last chapter. This chapter brings 
forth how this account of the subject combines with the radical feminist structural explanation of 
rape, inserting the individual into the structural account. The first section of the chapter proposes 
the process of sexual objectification is initiated by his desire for dominance. I will then consider 
how, according to the account of the subject introduced in the last chapter, identity can be 
understood as a narrative construction of self. The positive sense of self gained from the act of 
rape means that the rapist provides an account of the act as justified. I propose the concept of 
rationalisations to capture this process that precedes the act itself and involves simultaneous 
knowledge and denial of his responsibility in raping her. This account presents the choice of rape 
in providing a conscious process. The second section introduces how the process of 
rationalisations provides an explicit connection to the structure. The act of rape is justified through 
endorsing the social construction of gender that defines women as sexual objects. This cultural 
definition is used by men to evade responsibility for violation. I will further consider that the 
demonisation of the rapist is utilised in rationalisations for rape through differentiating the rapist 
from the normal man. This account suggests that these cultural narratives are utilised by the rapist; 
he learns the language through which he can see his action as justified. This account does not 
reduce the subject to the structure, but provides an explicit connection between the subject and 
the structure. The final section of the chapter will defend the explanation of rape through 
dominance instead of vulnerability, and defend presenting sexual objectification as a general 
theory of rape. 
 
Section One: Rationalisations as Narrative Self 
 
This section will begin by establishing that sexual objectification as a process in the mind of the 
rapist is rooted in a desire for dominance. I will establish this through considering Langton’s 
(2009) account of the possibility of sexual objectification arising from sexual desire. I will then 
introduce how the subject of symbolic interactionism and the subject of existentialism presents a 
narrative construction of self. This provides the concept of rationalisations as the final explanatory 
component of my account of sexual objectification. This draws out the simultaneous knowledge 
and denial involved in the linguistic neutralisation of violation, suggesting that rape requires an 
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active mental process and hence the  involvement of consciousness. I will finally discuss how the 
account of rationalisations provides a strong concept of the subject, retaining the rapist’s 
responsibility for his action.  
 
1.1 Desire for Dominance 
 
Although radical feminism has under-theorised the individual, the implication of the theory of 
rape is that this is a knowing strategy of dominance. I will expand on this implication by positing 
the desire for dominance at the root of the process of sexual objectification. The way of seeing 
that denies her subjectivity is driven by his desire for dominance. Langton (2009) supports the 
radical feminist imposition account of sexual objectification by considering desire-driven belief. 
This discussion is useful in identifying the components of sexual objectification as a mental 
process. However, Langton places the desire as sexual desire, thereby failing to situate sexual 
objectification as part of identity construction. In Langton’s discussion of sexual objectification, 
she considers the general absence of theorising desire-driven belief in discussions of 
objectification within analytic philosophy. Langton notes that in other areas of analytic 
philosophy, such as the epistemology of colour and value, desire-driven belief is theorised in 
terms of the mind’s propensity to ‘spread itself’ onto external objects (2009: 246). In considering 
philosophical accounts of motivated belief, Langton considers phenomenological gilding, wishful 
thinking and pseudo-empathy as possible ways of understanding the influence of desire on belief 
in sexual objectification. This influence of desire on belief can be understood as a form of 
projection, as the internal sentiment of desire influences your perception of the external reality.  
 
Langton posits sexual desire as initiating sexually objectifying beliefs, stating that “more sinister 
desires might be equally relevant, or more relevant for example, explicit desires to maintain or 
exercise power, to dominate or humiliate, to cause pain; but I shall not be attending much to 
these….I am hoping the omission can be viewed as a dialectical strength: presumably if sexual 
objectification can be generated by more ordinary sexual desires, without help of sinister desires 
to exert power or humiliate, it could all the more readily be generated with their help” (Langton 
2009: 248). Implicit in this proposal is the separation of sexual objectification and power. Instead, 
I propose that when subjectivity is understood as intersubjective and embodied, sexual 
objectification must be theorised as a position of power and hence as emerging from the desire 
for dominance. In defining her as a sexual object he defines himself as a dominant subject, 
meaning that sexual objectification cannot be detached from power. 
 
In the last chapter I have centralised an account of sexual interaction as embodied and 
intersubjective, such that it reveals the interdependent embodied nature of our subjectivity. When 
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Langton (2009) endorses Nagel’s (1991) conception of sexual desire as involving a desire for a 
matching desire in the other, she does not take this further to theorise the inherent intersubjectivity 
of sexual desire. I propose that this indicates that sexual desire on its own necessarily involves 
recognition of the other’s subjectivity, thereby it cannot be sexual desire that drives the imposition 
of sexual objectification. Understanding the desire as a desire for dominance can explain how the 
intersubjectivity of sexual desire is inverted into seeing her as an object. The dominance of gender 
is sexualised, as gender equates to sexual object and subject positions, but this does not mean that 
we should conflate sexual desire and a desire for dominance, in which the dominance is 
sexualised.  
 
The men in the vignettes choose sexual gratification in the absence of mutual desire or interaction. 
Their choice to have sex with an inert and unresponsive body presents a stark example of using 
the body of another. Sexual pleasure in the absence of interaction can be achieved by 
masturbation, and thus the men’s choice to have sex with someone who is unconscious cannot be 
explained by the desire for sexual satisfaction in the absence of active interaction. It is the act of 
turning a subject into an object that means the unconscious body of the victim was eroticised by 
these men. In the absence of a desire for dominance, the men would not actively procure victims 
(as in vignette one), or see the opportunity for sex when the victim lost consciousness (in the other 
vignettes). Locating the mental process of sexual objectification as arising from his desire for 
dominance implicates both the structure and the subject within the explanation. The structure 
because the position of dominance is made available through the social construction of gender 
under patriarchy. The subject because in proposing the role of desire, the subject chooses to 
position himself as dominant.  
 
The way of seeing her must be understood through how this allows him to construct a sense of 
himself. ‘Sexual Solipsism’, the title of Langton’s collection of her essays and of one of the essays 
within the collection, develops from Beauvoir’s (1949) account of the objectification of women 
making her a mystery (2009: 314). Despite this central reference to Beauvoir, Langton 
predominantly uses Kant in her theorisation. This is reflected in her attempt to bring the 
theorisation of projection together with theorising autonomy (Langton 2009: 241 – 261). Turning 
to Kant and the privileging of the independence of autonomy misses the implication of what 
should be drawn from the notion of sexual solipsism. If identity is intersubjective and thus 
produced through interaction, objectification violates this foundation of subjectivity and is 
thereby necessarily a relation of power. The imposition in which he defines her as an object is a 
form of solipsism in the way in which he evades responsibility for himself, allowing him to violate 
her in the absence of self-judgment. In casting himself as a singular subject he constructs a 
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position of dominance, which is necessarily rooted in a desire for dominance. I will now establish 
that the beliefs produced through this desire are rationalisations for his action. 
 
1.2 Rationalisations  
 
The last chapter explored how the men in the vignettes did not experience guilt or shame from 
having sex with an unconscious female; they did not experience moral emotions that would be 
expected given the harm of violation. What this absence of moral emotions reveals is that the act 
of rape did not damage their sense of self. In order to preserve a positive identity, these men must 
have provided an account of their behaviour that made it appear justifiable, and hence consistent 
with their sense of self. In providing reasons for our action we consider the self from the 
perspective of the other, thus taking ourselves as a social object (Mead 1934). In stark contrast to 
individualist philosophies of the subject that present the problem of other minds (see Avramides 
2020), this symbolic interactionist account of the subject suggests our very self-conception arises 
from imagining how we are perceived by others (Cooley 1902; Mead 1934; Goffman 1959). This 
presents the subject as being constituted through internal conversation; a narrative construction 
of self. Lippens and Crewe consider the overlap between Mead and Sartre in their “focus on the 
dialogical self and its internal deliberations and conversation” (2009: 6). According to an 
existential account, the subject’s freedom is found precisely in this capacity to self-reflect; 
imagining different possibilities for action and seeing the self in these possibilities provides a 
transcendence of the immediate that constitutes agency (May 1983). This capacity for self-
reflection is the capacity to stand back from ourselves (Hardie-Bick and Hadfield 2011). This 
internal dialogue is then externalised through performing/presenting a self. This self-reflective 
and self-presenting subject is found in existentialism and in symbolic interactionism.  
 
Given this conception of the subject, I propose that the desire for dominance produces beliefs that 
make his act of sexual violation appear justified. Rather than analysing motives as an inward 
drive, Mills suggested that motives are justifications we provide for “present future or past 
programs or acts” (1940: 907). Scott and Lyman propose that an account “is a linguistic device 
employed whenever an action is subjected to valuative inquiry” (1968: 47). They suggest accounts 
can be divided into excuses and justifications and are part of ‘impression management’ (Goffman 
1959). If it is anticipated that the action would be condemned by others, the attempt to maintain 
a positive identity requires that the action is made justifiable to avoid the expected condemnation. 
Scully applied this symbolic interactionist framework in her study of convicted rapists, finding 
that from the perspective of the rapist “almost no act was rape and no man was a rapist” through 
the utilisation of linguistic devices (1990: 97). Pryor (1996) also applied this understanding of the 
narrative work involved in maintaining a positive sense of self in his study of convicted child 
 119 
molesters. Pryor finds that the men in his study construct exceptions to the rules and boundaries 
that would forbid the behaviour they commit. This is possible because the rules and boundaries 
are definitions that can be modified. Hudson’s (2005) study of convicted rapists applies 
Goffman’s dramaturgical concept of self to consider the negotiation of identity in men labelled 
as rapists. Hudson finds that various ‘distancing techniques’ were used “to preserve a more 
acceptable identity both in the eyes of others and to enhance their own sense of self-worth” (2005: 
66). I propose that the justifications found in the narratives of convicted rapists (referred to as 
accounts/definitions/vocabularies/linguistic devices/distancing techniques), are best captured by 
the term ‘rationalisation’. A rationalisation is defined as “the action of attempting to explain or 
justify behaviour or an attitude with logical reasons, even if these are not appropriate” [my italics] 
(OUP 2020). 
 
Rationalisations should not be understood as subsequent to the action but as necessary to produce 
the action. Mills states that “anticipations of acceptable justifications will control conduct” (1940: 
907). Schaffer (2005) considers that the moral emotions of pride and shame provide anticipatory 
responses to our actions and thus precede the action. The fact that “disclaimers are delivered in 
conversation prior to the potentially offending remarks clearly indicates that the speaker has gone 
through a conscious process of recursively playing out scenarios based on each possible course 
of action” (Schaffer 2005: 55). Although most often a reason for an action will be extracted from 
a person after they have acted – and studies of convicted rapists reveal the rationalisations for 
rape subsequent to the act and the conviction – this mechanism should in fact be seen as prior to 
the action. This focuses my account of rationalisations on justifications rather than excuses. 
Excuses accept that the act was wrong whilst denying responsibility for the act, whereas 
justifications accept responsibility for the act but deny that it was wrong (Scott and Lyman 1968). 
Excuses for rape – such that he was drunk or emotionally unstable and hence the harmful action 
should not be taken as a true indication of himself – seem appropriate once he has been accused, 
but not prior to the accusation.  
 
To turn to the vignettes, there is necessarily a moment of reflection prior to the act when he must 
rationalise that sexually satiating himself on her body is justifiable given his overall conception 
of self. These vignettes clearly bring out this moment of contemplation, given that in all of the 
cases the sexual act begins when the victim is unconscious. The very act of undressing the victim 
is indicative of having time to think about one’s action. As discussed in the last chapter, the 
vignettes vary in terms of the act being planned or opportunistic. The men in vignette one were 
actively seeking adolescent girls for the act, giving these men the most explicit temporal gap 
between contemplating the action and acting. In vignette two, as the victim had lost consciousness 
after voluntarily consuming alcohol, we can suggest that the act itself was not planned prior to 
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the encounter. However, when he finds her unconscious on the bed there is still a necessary 
temporal gap between the thought that he could sexually satiate himself on her body and following 
through with this. In vignette three, it is unclear whether the perpetrator gave the drugs 
anticipating the loss of consciousness, but irrespective of whether he had this foresight when he 
gave his girlfriend the drugs, there is again a necessary moment in which he must see the 
opportunity of having sex with her whilst she is unconscious and then follows through with the 
act. As the group-rape in vignette four occurs in the context of a fraternity party, it could be 
suggested that there is not necessarily the moment of reflection. The men could claim they ‘got 
carried away’, encouraged by the group dynamics, as once started by one member of the group 
the others could claim to have been ‘drawn in without thinking’. However, firstly this act was 
consistent with the behaviour of the fraternity and how they spoke of and treated women (Sanday 
1990); the act cannot then be framed as ‘out of character’, a moment lacking self-reflection. 
Secondly, the proud declaration of the act on the notice board in the morning again suggests that 
this act is claimed by the perpetrators. For an act to be unreflective it would seem odd to then 
claim the act so clearly after the event. Given this, I suggest that in all of the vignettes the rapist 
was able to reflect before committing to the act. In this reflection he justified the act as consistent 
with his sense of self. 
 
In this moment of reflection – which could last for weeks, hours or minutes – the rapist must 
present himself with reasons that justify the act of rape. The rationalisation for the behaviour is 
the moment of choice in the action. Action is preceded by rationalisation, and therefore the mind 
of the rapist in the moment of rape is explained by his ability to provide reasons that define the 
act as justified. The explanation of sexual objectification does not make him simply compelled to 
violate her, as the necessary contemplation means first he must construct a series of reasons that 
make the act justified. In Alcoff’s (2018) account of sexual subjectivity she considers how the 
rapist and the rape victim imagine their sex lives before and after the rape. This act of imagining 
oneself as a sexual being brings out this conscious process of self-construction. To say that the 
men in these vignettes sexually objectified the victim is to say that they negated moral emotions 
and rationalised their violation of her. It is this that can explain the pleasure of the act and the 
absence of self-deprecation at harming another person. As I have proposed in the last chapter that 
sexual objectification should be understood as the denial of subjectivity, the negation of moral 
emotions is part of the felt definition that refuses her subjectivity. Rationalisations provide a 
narrative construction to support this denial of her subjectivity. The rapist evades responsibility 
for himself by emotionally and narratively suppressing the feedback mechanism on the self that 
is implied by the intersubjectivity of embodied beings. The gaze of sexual objectification means 
he does not feel guilt and shame instigated through the looking-glass self/the look, and he can 
construct his violation as justified through rationalisations. 
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Locating rationalisations as constitutive of the narrative construction of self is what distinguishes 
their propositional nature from other propositional beliefs; they are beliefs about his identity. The 
belief that the chair is an object has no bearing on his sense of himself, whereas the belief that his 
sexually objectifying action is justified is intrinsically linked to his construction of subjectivity. 
Sexual objectification as a way of seeing is not simply about a severance of feeling, it is further 
about narratively producing oneself as dominant. Through this conscious self-construction as 
dominant he is entitled to the sexual use of her body; the act makes sense within his construction 
of identity. The limitation on freedom implied by the Freudian account of the unconscious is 
contrasted with the agency imputed to the subject that produces himself through narrative 
construction (Jones 1980). Theorising rape through this account of the subject is supported by the 
phenomenology of being raped. Both Brison (2002) and Alcoff (2018) theorise from their own 
experience of sexual violence, and they also provide accounts of the subject as fundamentally 
intersubjective and embodied with a focus on narrative identity. Brison (2002) reaches this 
position on the subject through the rupture to narrative identity experienced when victimised by 
rape, and how the self is healed through sharing narratives. Alcoff (2018) locates the harm of 
sexual violation as a harm to our self-making capacities. Taking these theoretical insights from 
women who have been raped can confirm that the act of rape is part of his production of 
subjectivity. Producing his identity through rape means he can narratively construct his act as 
consistent with his sense of self. This is the role of rationalisations in rape. The desire for 
dominance produces the way of seeing that negates moral emotions and rationalises the sexual 
violation as consistent with a positive sense of self. 
 
1.3 A Humanist Position 
 
The account of rationalisations presents a humanist account. By this I mean it puts forward a 
strong concept of the subject theorised through choice, agency and responsibility. As I have 
argued in Chapter Two, this humanist perspective is necessary for providing normative theorising. 
Scully states that “motivations to rape are not irrational, subconscious and uncontrollable, but 
rather, overt and deliberate” (1990: 137). This can be accounted for if the subject is understood 
as consciously constructed. Rationalisations encapsulate the consciousness involved in the 
process of sexual objectification. The rationalisation of an act that is harmful to another anticipates 
the way in which this negatively reflects on the self and thus provides reasons that neutralise this 
negative self-reflection. He evades responsibility for his action through constructing the act as 
justified. Scott and Lyman reference Sykes and Matza’s (1957) ‘techniques of neutralisation’ as 
examples of justifications, because to “justify an act is to assert its positive value in the face of a 
claim to the contrary” (Scott and Lyman 1968: 51). The theory of techniques of neutralisation 
 122 
disrupted criminological explanations that placed offenders as existing outside of the social and 
moral norms by suggesting that offenders adhered to the morals of the social group whilst using 
mental techniques to make their violation consistent (Sykes and Matza 1957).32 The neutralisation 
involves recognising the act as a violation; the justification is premised on the anticipation of a 
negative response.  The neutralising function of rationalisations in reference to sexual violation 
thereby presents an important awareness of his action.  
 
The consciousness of the process of sexual objectification can be seen from the mental agility 
required in the simultaneous acknowledgement and denial. As discussed in Chapter Four, sexual 
objectification as the denial of subjectivity entails the recognition of subjectivity. The recognition 
of subjectivity is necessary to gain the feeling of dominance, as treating an object as an object 
does not achieve a position of dominance. The way of seeing involved in sexual objectification is 
therefore to recognise her subjectivity as he denies it. A substantive mental process is required 
because of the way sexual objectification violates the foundation of subjects as intersubjective 
and embodied. The distortion of consciousness is in his knowledge that she is a subject and the 
moral import of this, whilst refusing the negative self-reflection entailed by his violation of her. 
The neutralising function involved in rationalisations for rape recognises the act as a violation, 
whilst distancing himself from the negative implication of violating another. Passive absorption 
of the structure or determinism through the structure would not invoke the conscious process of 
neutralising the act through presenting justifications that salvage a positive identity. 
‘Rationalisation’ encapsulates this simultaneous awareness and denial –  ‘attempting to explain 
or justify behaviour or an attitude with logical reasons, even if these are not appropriate’ – the 
fact that the reasons supplied may not be appropriate suggests a level of fabrication.  
 
In Scully’s study of convicted rapists, when the men were asked how the victim would have felt, 
the most frequent response was ‘humiliated and degraded’ (1990: 135). This indicates that he 
knows full well the impact of his action on the other; this effect is what provides the thrill of 
dominance. The slight linguistic shift used to retain this awareness whilst not defining himself 
through the discrediting identity of the rapist is a conscious process, thus he cannot be 
conceptualised as a passive subject. Similarly, in Pryor’s study of convicted child molesters, some 
of the men were unable ‘to disentangle the thrill of transgression from the sexual excitement’ 
(1996: 159). If the thrill of sexual violence is in the transgression, then he is not unaware of the 
boundary that he crosses when he sexually violates her. Jutten makes a similar point that sexual 
harassment involves a ‘tacit sense of appropriateness’ allowing for a “faux thrill of transgression” 
(2016: 44). The rationalisation to present himself positively is the conscious process to disavow 
 
32 For an overview of how this presented a break with traditional criminological theorising see Matza 1964. 
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the implication of his transgression. The awareness implied by the process of neutralisation can 
be supported by a case in Beneke’s (1982) data on men talking about rape. Burt comes to a 
realisation and consequent redefinition of a sexual interaction he had, as in fact being an act of 
rape against a woman (Beneke 1982: 37 – 42). This realisation is reached through his engagement 
with feminist consciousness-raising and thus his act was not at any point externally defined as 
rape forcing the redefinition. Burt recalls that his determination to have sex with her and his 
expectation and entitlement meant that he did not accept her protestations against sex. The fact 
that this man is able to realise he raped her indicates prior knowledge that was neutralised by his 
rationalisations for his action.  
 
The structure does not trick the rapist into thinking the action is harmless or that she is in fact a 
sexual object. Instead, he uses the structural framing to negate the shame and self-judgment of 
violating another. The rapist uses his capacity for self-reflection to contort his knowledge and 
denial of her subjectivity, and his knowledge and denial of his responsibility in harming her. If 
the self is narratively produced and projected forth after a process of self-reflection, the mind of 
the rapist must be theorised through a substantive mental process. Rationalising harmful action 
contains both knowledge that the action is harmful as well as neutralising this harm. The retention 
of his positive sense of self through the sexual violation of another requires an account of the 
subject that is conscious in his self-construction. 
 
Social psychology accounts of implicit bias have recently gained popularity in the explanation of 
oppression (Greenwald et al. 1995; Cikara et al. 2011; Gawronski et al. 2020). The oppressive 
culture is seen to lead to automatic associations leading to biased judgments. As discussed in 
Chapter Three, the psychosocial explanation of rape explains this act of dominance as a product 
of the unconscious (Gadd and Jefferson 2007). The accounts of sexual objectification provided 
by Papadaki (2010) and Stock (2018) both propose that the connection to the structure of 
patriarchy means objectification may not be intentional. Papadaki (2010) suggests that the 
stereotypes about women, promulgated through the patriarchal society, can mean that men believe 
women to be this way and hence they have no intention to objectify them – it is simply a 
consequence of the society they have grown up in. Papadaki considers that if a man is brought up 
believing that the correct attitude is that sometimes violence needs to be used against women, his 
violence can result not from an intention to objectify but from the intention of ‘teaching her a 
lesson’ (2010: 35). This account presents the patriarchal structure as exonerating his 
responsibility. Stock (2018), drawing on social psychology accounts of implicit bias, provides an 
account of objectification as mind-insensitive seeing-as. Stock proposes that the sexually 
objectifying images that saturate the culture set up a habit of attention and thought. Stock then 
 124 
argues, that according to this account, sexual objectification “looks relatively passive, 
spontaneous, and non-deliberate”, reducing responsibility for objectifying behaviour (2018: 308).  
 
Theorising the subject through the process of rationalisation rejects explanations of the rapist 
through implicit, unconscious or unintentional processes. The identity performed through rape is 
a conscious self-construction. The definitions he provides of self, other and the situation – in order 
to proudly construct himself through violating another – comprise his conscious choice. This 
account retains full responsibility for his choice to rape. Rape is driven by individual men’s desire 
for dominance. Contrastingly, in Papadaki’s (2010) account it seems the men in the vignettes may 
also not be responsible for their actions. Their choice to have sex with unconscious females is 
consistent with the patriarchal structure that devalues women and girls to sexual commodities to 
be used and exploited by men, so how were they to know any different? If Papadaki was correct 
and much objectification is an unintentional consequence of absorbing the structure, it becomes 
difficult to explain why it is not all men who rape women. Rather than understanding this way of 
seeing to be a habit and thus implicit, I propose that we should understand this way of seeing to 
be the way in which our perception of the world is framed by how we see ourselves. Moral 
emotions are not negated simply through exposure to objectifying portrayals; it is necessary to 
endorse these objectifying portrayals in the pursuit of a dominant sense of self. This means that 
the way of seeing is not passively absorbed, it is consciously endorsed. This can be understood 
through theorising the role of rationalisations within sexual objectification.  
 
The conscious process involved in rape and the control he has over himself can also be derived 
from the phenomenology of being raped. The offender in Brison’s (2002) case attempted to 
present an ‘insanity defence’. From Brison’s perspective this is simply not credible given her first 
person experience of the moment. Brison states: “I was the only one who knew how he behaved 
by the side of the road, in the ravine, what he’d said, how he’d moved, how he was aware of what 
he was doing. He knew it was wrong and that he had to cover his tracks” (2002: 108). The 
knowledge that the act is wrong and the attempt to avoid responsibility for his act indicates that 
the structure of patriarchy does not fool men into believing that violation is righteous. Instead, the 
structure of patriarchy provides men with the means to knowingly violate whilst removing their 
responsibility for this violation. Using the phenomenology of being raped to theorise the rapist 
asserts the importance of theorising his consciousness in the act of rape. This active conscious 
process in the act of sexual objectification can be understood through analysing sexual 
objectification as involving rationalisations. This account of rape presents a subject that has 




Section Two: Masculinity and the Demonised Rapist  
 
This section explains how the account of rationalisations connects the individual to the structure. 
The primary rationalisation for rape is the definition of women as sexual objects, thus the social 
construction of gender presents the language of justification for rape. The demonisation of the 
rapist provides a further rationalisation for rape through differentiating the rapist from the normal 
man, allowing men who rape to disidentify with the label of the rapist. This account provides a 
connection between the individual and the structure without reducing the subject to the structure. 
The context of embodiment and socially constructed meaning delimits possible forms of identity 
without determining a singular way of constructing the self. Learning the language to rape uses 
the structural framing instead of being determined by the structure. This account is distinct from 
anti-humanist accounts of post-structuralism, and presents a stronger concept of subjectivity than 
the psychosocial investment in discourse. It is also consistent with some post-structural accounts 
in terms of narrative production of subjects. 
 
2.1 Masculinity  
 
Connecting the proposal of rationalisations facilitating rape with the radical feminist explanation 
of rape is to suggest that the social construction of gender provides a cultural narrative that 
presents the language of justification for rape. The rationalisations for rape are grounded in the 
cultural definition of women as sexual objects and men as sexual subjects: the structure of 
patriarchy. As rape enacts the bifurcation into sexual object and subject positions, the rapist does 
not have to struggle and scramble to make the act of rape appear justified, he simply has to adopt 
the language of the structure that presents her as a sexual object. His act of rape makes sense 
within patriarchy. This is the radical feminist claim that his act is not an aberration but a 
confirmation of the social structure. The way in which it confirms the social construction of 
gender is the way in which he can provide rationalisations for his rape that are comprehensible. 
Sexual objectification is imposed onto women through the social construction of gender, and this 
imposition of a definition is utilised by individuals in the act of violation.  
 
All of the justifications presented by the convicted rapists in Scully’s (1990) research are 
variations on the same theme. Defining her as a sexual object and himself as a dominant sexual 
subject, this rationalises raping her by placing it as consistent with the cultural definition of men 
and women. The sexual objectification of women, which underlies the structure of patriarchy, 
presents him with a language in which he can construct the victim as deserving or willing. A man 
convicted of group-rape makes the act justified as “usually the girl had a bad reputation, or we 
knew it was what she liked” (Scully 1990: 156).  Another group-rapist stated: “I felt she was a 
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dirty slut and anything we did was justified. Gave me a sense of status” (ibid: 134). The cultural 
definition of her as a sexual object is manifested through the array of derogatory sexual terms 
applied to women: whore, slag, slut. These terms rely on the virgin/whore dichotomy, dividing 
women into good and bad. The rapist can place the victim on the whore (bad) side of this equation 
in order to make his act justified. A quote from a convicted rapist in Bonnycastle’s study clarifies 
the role of the social construction of gender in rationalising rape: “Raping a man is trying to turn 
him into a woman. Raping a woman is because she is a woman” (2012: 167). This quote brings 
out the distinction between sex and gender; a man can be turned into a woman through rape 
because ‘woman’ is a socially constructed position of subjugation. The rape of women confirms 
the socially constructed meaning of her embodiment under patriarchy.33 The structure of 
patriarchy produces the definition of women as sexual objects, which provides men with the 
ability to rationalise the act of rape through adopting this cultural definition.  
 
In vignette one, the men can rationalise their rape through considering that only a whore would 
accept an invitation from an unknown man so she is deserving; or that she would know sex was 
implicit in the invitation and thus she is in fact willing. In the vignettes in which she loses 
consciousness after voluntarily consuming drugs or alcohol, the men can rationalise that this level 
of intoxication is indicative that she is a whore and is therefore willing or deserving. In vignette 
three, he can use the relationship as a pretext for being entitled to the sexual use of her body; as 
his girlfriend she is his sexual object. In vignette four, the victim was known as having a reputation 
sexually and in terms of taking drugs (Sanday 1990: 43), so the men can rationalise that she would 
be ‘up for it’ anyway; it does not matter that she is not currently conscious. The general feature 
of the vignettes in which the victim is unconscious requires rationalisations that do not draw on 
any interactional ambiguity, so at first it may seem more difficult to rationalise this form of rape. 
But when we consider the deep construction of women as sexual objects, her intoxication that led 
to her loss of consciousness is in fact a perfect tool in the framing of her as deserving of violation 
and/or willing to be violated. Not only does her loss of consciousness literally make her into an 
object, but the prior level of intoxication or risky behaviour casts her as the type of female who 
can justifiably be sexually violated. 
 
 
33 This quote also indicates how a radical feminist explanation can be used to explain men’s sexual violence 
against boys and men. Through the act of rape the victim is feminised; by treating a woman as a woman he 
gains dominance, but by treating a man as a woman he also gains dominance. Given the social construction 
of gender, masculine dominance can be enacted on the bodies of boys and men – the raped male is 
feminised. Explaining the intricacies of how this account can be applied to the rape of boys and men is 
beyond the scope of the thesis, but this is to hint that the explanation of radical feminism can also be applied 
to explain men’s sexual violence against boys and men. 
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The act is justified through the social construction of gender and this allows him to evade 
responsibility for himself and shift the responsibility onto women and girls. In Hudson’s study of 
convicted rapists her findings corroborated Scully’s (1990) as “men attempted to justify their 
behaviour by presenting the victim as culpable, regardless of their own actions” (2005: 62). In 
Chapter Two I provided a quote from Beauvoir (1949) in which she presents an anecdote of two 
girls from a brothel presented as ‘perverted and debauched’ while the men who sexually used 
them remain ‘respectable and honoured’. In constructing her as a sexual object, this provides a 
rationalisation for his sexual violation such that he evades responsibility for himself. This 
rationalisation does not only alleviate his responsibility, it shifts the responsibility onto the victim. 
Girls who are prostituted are constructed as debauched. This rationalisation allows men to remain 
respectable whilst sexually using them. The extent of the problem with Gadd and Jefferson’s 
(2007) attribution of vulnerability to the rapist in contrast to women’s sexual power is now 
evident. Gadd and Jefferson repeat the rationalisations of the rapist. Constructing her as a sexual 
object involves making her responsible for being violated, which is often achieved through an 
alleged overpowering sexuality.  
 
The role of a narrative construction is not only in this overarching construction of her as a sexual 
object (temptress/whore/slag/slut). It can also be seen through the need to narratively construct 
her as feminised during the act of rape. To again return to the anecdote from vignette one 
discussed in the last chapter, he polices her language, reprimanding her that they are knickers 
because his act is justified through this linguistic construction of her as feminised. The social 
construction of gender is what makes his act justified, so to retain a positive sense of self he must 
consciously construct her as feminised throughout the act of rape. As a sexual object she is 
deserving or willing, making her responsible for her own violation. To maintain this inversion of 
responsibility he must consciously and continuously narratively construct her as feminised, as a 
sexual object. Rationalising rape through the narrative construction of identity drawn from the 
social construction of gender maintains the negation of moral emotions. He does not feel guilt or 
shame because, as she is a sexual object, he is freed from responsibility for his violation; the act 
is justified given the cultural definition of her. 
 
The individual act of dominance gains its meaning from placing him in the collective 
categorisation of men over women. The rationalisations for rape based on the definition of her as 
a sexual object therefore provide an integral connection to the structure in drawing on this 
collective definition. Vignette one and four are examples of group-rape; the collective 
construction of identity is evidenced through the collective action of violation in these examples. 
This brings out the role of the audience of other men in his rationalisations for rape. In group-rape 
the collective of men see each other in the same role that they themselves play. Given this, their 
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justification for rape does not have to take place with an internalised perspective of the other, as 
they enact rape in a group and thus the act is accepted by the social group they are part of. Group-
rape has consistently been found to be enacted as a form of recreational fun and male bonding 
(Sanday 1990; Scully 1990; Lees 1996; Franklin 2004; Franklin 2013). The men can rationalise 
their behaviour by defining her as a sexual object, and this definition is affirmed by the male 
audience in pursuit of masculine dominance. Men who perpetrate sexual violence alone, as in 
vignette two and three, have internalised this male audience in pursuit of masculine dominance, 
because the act gains its meaning from the construction of a collective identity. When men rape 
alone they are still constructing this collective identity as masculine through the violation of 
women/girls. It is still a process of bonding with the brothers, even if the brothers are only in 
one’s head, or as an audience in the retelling of the sexual exploits. This collective identity relates 
to the presence of pride discussed in the last chapter; rape can be affirming of his sense of self as 
masculine. Rationalising his sexual objectification involves a proud construction of a masculine 
self.  
 
The fact that the rationalisations of defining her as a sexual object are given to a female 
interviewer (such as Scully 1990) reflects that this male audience is accepted as the standard. 
Women’s perspective is erased from the culture to the extent that it is expected that women will 
also acknowledge this justification for rape. The truth of this is seen in the general disbelief of 
rape victims. Through casting her as a sexual object, both the rapist and the society refuse the 
definition of rape as she is recast as deserving or willing. As discussed in the last chapter, many 
people who heard of the incident in vignette four did not define the act as rape. As Sanday states, 
the perpetrators believe “the sexual behaviour is not rape. On many campuses the opinion is 
shared by a significant proportion of the campus community” (1990: 4). It is precisely because 
rape is consistent with the cultural framing of patriarchy that the perpetrator and onlookers can 
redefine the act as not rape. In Langton’s (2009) consideration of wishful thinking as the 
mechanism of sexual objectification, she suggests this could also function in people’s disbelief of 
rape victims. The desire that produces incredulity towards women’s rape claims could be the 
desire that the world is a safe place. This is echoed in Franklin’s consideration that “Confronted 
with an instance of random injustice, people deflect anxiety about the possibility of such an event 
happening to them (or a loved one) by pointing to something that the victim did to bring it upon 
herself. …. the victim-blaming also echoes the loudly proclaimed rationalisations of the assailants 
themselves: “She wanted it.” “She’s a slut.” “She didn’t get hurt” ” (Franklin 2014: 60). 
 
Rationalisations provide an explicit connection between the individual and the structure, because 
to provide a reason for an action, the reason must be expected to be accepted by the social group. 
Although prior to the act he only has to justify his action to himself, this justification is taking the 
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perspective of another on himself, so providing a justification is anticipating the response of 
another and presenting a reason that would be accepted by another. What would be an accepted 
reason for an action is embedded within the culture (Scott and Lyman 1968; Scully 1990). It is 
not the case that anything can be used as a reason, therefore reasons for action gain meaning/are 
comprehensible within the parameters of the social group. This relates to the intersubjectivity of 
language itself, hence Mead’s (1934) proposal that the self cannot be conceived as prior to the 
social group. It is useful to think of this using the model of the studies of convicted rapists and 
then apply this backwards to how he justified the action to himself prior to committing the act. 
When engaged in an interview, the convicted rapist is not going to present something as a reason 
that would evidently not be accepted as a reason for the action. Instead, he presents reasons that 
he anticipates will be acknowledged as valid justifications for the behaviour. For instance, stating 
‘I had a headache so I raped her’ is not comprehensible as a reason, such that this would not be 
given as a justification for the action. As his rationalisation preceding rape considers himself from 
the perspective of another – in the same way as an extracted justification – the rationalisation is 
given meaning within the context of the social group; it must be seen to be accepted by others as 
a reason for the action. Defining her as a sexual object justifies his sexual violation because the 
social construction of gender under patriarchy affirms this definition of her. 
 
2.2 The Demonised Rapist  
 
Alongside the social construction of gender that endorses rape as the ultimate manifestation of 
her sexual object status and his status as a dominant sexual subject, there is the seemingly 
contradictory social construction of ‘the rapist’ as the most demonised figure. Not only does rape 
stand as the second most serious crime just below murder in terms of legal categorisation, the 
media construction of the rapist portrays him as a monster – the personification of evil (Pryor 
1996; Hudson 2005). The label of the rapist is thoroughly stigmatising; to be accused of rape is 
to have your identity discredited (Hudson 2005). Within prison culture the rapist stands as the 
social outcast; the crime amongst other crimes that cannot be accepted, thus providing a group 
identity to the other inmates (Hardie-Bick 2018). In the media and in the social imagination the 
rapist remains the ‘other’, mentally deranged and defined against the normal man. This can then 
function in the rationalisation for rape, as men who rape define themselves through the cultural 
narrative of masculinity and thus adhere to the norm are not the social construction of the rapist. 
The demonisation of the rapist can be seen as a further rationalisation for rape, through framing 
his own action in distinction from the imagined construction of rape.  
 
Studies of convicted rapists record the narratives of rapists once they have been accused and 
convicted, and hence labelled as a rapist. Even given this external label, the convicted rapists 
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distinguish their act from other acts of rape to salvage their identity under the pressure of this 
stigmatised label. Men who raped women could distinguish themselves from the child sex abusers 
(Bonnycastle 2012: 256), and within child sexual offences the age of the victim provided a sliding 
scale of who was the real monster rapist (Hudson 2005: 67; 70). Further rationalisations that draw 
on the social construction of the rapist could distinguish an act given levels of violence or relation 
to the victim (Pryor 1996: 179; Hudson 2005: 70). These rationalisations enabled convicted 
rapists to adhere to the morality of the social group through themselves vilifying the rapist and 
thus constructing themselves as importantly distinct from this more extreme (read ‘real’) form of 
rape.  
 
None of the men in the vignettes were arrested or convicted of rape. In vignette four the men were 
accused of rape but this was dealt with through the university rather than the criminal courts 
(Sanday 1990: 77 – 85). Theorising these men in the moment of rape means theorising them 
outside of being externally labelled a rapist. My contention is that none of these men would self-
define as a rapist. They are able to justify their sexual violation through defining her as a sexual 
object, and they are able to avoid a self-definition of rapist through the construction of the 
demonised rapist who sits outside of the social norm. The fact that the loss of consciousness 
means no physical force or violence is necessary to ensure compliance can be used by these men 
to define their act outside of the parameters of rape. These men can imagine rape as a violent 
brutal act. In these instances she lies there without resistance; he is not thereby forced to tightly 
pin her down leaving bruises on her body. In his mind he can then construct rape as leaving marks 
on her body – as physically beating her – providing confidence that rape is not the act he himself 
is committing.  
 
The men in vignette four publicly declare the rape through a note claiming an ‘unconscious riff’. 
Having sex with an unconscious person is to admit to rape, and yet using the term ‘riff’ indicates 
how slight the linguistic shift is in order to positively identify himself through the act of violation 
without identifying himself as a rapist. The term riff meaning ‘techniques of getting sex from a 
woman’ is indicative of language conveying men’s entitlement to the sexual use of women’s 
bodies; it presents sex as a conquest rather than a participatory activity between two sexual 
subjects. Just as whore/slut/slag achieve a denial of responsibility for violating her, terms such as 
‘riff’ evade responsibility through inscribing socially constructed positions of gender based on 
her sexual objectification, whilst avoiding the implication of rape in this treatment of women. 
 
What at first appears to be a contradictory cultural narrative – the social construction of gender 
endorses rape as the ultimate manifestation of masculinity, yet also socially constructs the rapist 
as the most demonised figure – can in fact be seen to co-constitutively facilitate rape. These two 
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strands of culture work together to provide the rationalisations for rape: sexual violence is justified 
by her definition as a sexual object but no sexual act committed by a normal man will be rape, 
because the rapist is an evil ‘otherworldly’ figure. If rape was culturally understood through the 
lens of radical feminism, in defining himself through masculinity when he rapes he would also 
have to accept the self-definition of the rapist. The social construction of the demonised rapist 
allows rape to be redefined as sex; the form of sex he chooses is justified by her status as a sexual 
object. The rapist cannot be understood outside of the structure because he is able to rationalise 
his action through drawing on these cultural narratives supplied by the structure of patriarchy. 
The vilification of the rapist allows his justified sexual use of her to be defined as ‘not rape’. 
Through these intertwined rationalisations, developed from the social constructions that constitute 
the structure, the rapist can define himself as part of the moral community that hates rapists: his 
act is not really rape and he is justified in his action because she is a sexual object.  
 
How the strands of the structure are used in his rationalisations for rape reveals the 
intersubjectivity of identity construction. The rapist is justified in sexual violation because he 
defines himself against her; he defines himself as the dominant masculine subject in opposition 
to her subjugated status as a sexual object. According to the rapist, the act is not rape because he 
defines himself against the imagined image of the vilified rapist; defining himself against the real 
rapist undermines this label being applied to him. As noted by Hardie-Bick, self-narration can 
“lead to the derogation of others and serve to legitimize brutal forms of violence and social 
exclusion” (2018: 586). The sexual objectification of women and the demonisation of the rapist 
provide two examples of this exclusionary construction of identity. Once the demonisation of the 
rapist is understood as functioning in rationalisations for rape, it is important that we humanise 
the rapist. Theorising his subjectivity – in opposition to denying his position as a subject by 
demonising him –  in fact removes one element of his rationalisation for rape. The definitions of 
sexual object, sexual subject and the demonised rapist are cultural narratives that facilitate rape 
through allowing the rapist to rationalise his action.  
 
2.3 The Individual and the Structure  
 
The cultural narrative presented by the gender binary is utilised by the rapist to present his action 
as justified. His use of the cultural definition of sexual subject and object does not require that the 
structure determined him. Rooting the process of sexual objectification in the desire for 
dominance means that he chooses to identify himself through dominant masculinity. Through this 
choice he ‘masters the vocabulary’ (Scully 1990: 98) provided by the structure that justifies his 
act of violation. The structure frames the available choice of identity without determining one 
single subject position. Beauvoir’s (1949) situated subject recognises the constraints of the 
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structure but refuses to thereby relinquish human choice and agency. The process of 
learning/mastering the language that justifies rape retains his choice and agency in this narrative 
construction of self. The existentialist/symbolic interactionist self that is 
presented/created/performed through interaction locates choice and consciousness within subject 
production. Our material embodiment and the socially constructed meaning given to this within 
the structure limits the available possibilities without dictating a single path of identity. The 
possibility of gaining dominance through sexual violence is presented by the structure. The 
individual’s embodiment opens up this opportunity, but the actualisation of this is dependent on 
his individual desire for dominance. The structure is not totalising or monolithic; patriarchy 
through the social construction of gender provides the dominant cultural narrative, yet the 
possibility of challenging and critiquing this structure indicates that the structure does not remove 
conscious thought. Subjects are not exact replicas of the structure; any system of oppression is 
surrounded by counter narratives and resistance. There is not a single script.  
 
The men in the vignettes live in the context of patriarchy. The social construction of gender 
presents them with the possibility of dominant self-construction based on sexually objectifying 
women/girls. These men desire dominance and thus consciously construct themselves through 
masculinity. This way of seeing negates moral emotions and provides rationalisations for rape. 
When they make her unconscious or find her unconscious they can eroticise her body, as she now 
explicitly manifests her sexual object status. In the absence of her consciousness he truly has her 
as an object. To go ahead and use her sexually is to enact his collective position as dominant. He 
is not moved by the suffering he causes and he does not self-identify as a rapist, because in 
adopting the position of dominance presented by the culture he is freed from the negative self-
reflection involved in the violation of a subject; he can see himself as justified in his action. My 
proposal for why these particular men choose to rape is that these individual men desire 
dominance. Men who do not desire dominance will not construct themselves through the language 
of patriarchy. These men will not sexually violate women as the thought would invoke shame and 
self-judgment. Not all men are rapists, but rape is pervasive within patriarchy because of the 
facilitating environment which presents the possibility of a position of dominance and the 
language through which he can rationalise sexual violations. 
 
The synthesis of radical feminism, Beauvoir’s (1949; 1953) existential humanism and symbolic 
interactionism succeeds in theorising both structure and agency. The strength of bringing these 
perspectives together can be seen from the way in which rejections of radical feminism are rooted 
in the under-theorised individual, whilst criticisms of existentialism and symbolic interactionism 
centre around an over-focus on the individual. I have conceded that the individual is currently 
under-theorised on the radical feminist explanation, whilst evidencing how the perspective does 
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not preclude theorising agency. Longmore presents the most common criticism of symbolic 
interactionism as “examining the trees so closely that they fail to show us what the forest looks 
like …fail to connect the individual with their location in the social structure” (1998: 55). This is 
very similar to criticisms of existentialism in which early Sartre (1943) is not distinguished from 
Beauvoir (1949). Beauvoir agrees in the ultimate freedom of humans not being determined by 
nature, whilst recognising that the unequal power distributed through humanly created situations 
can impede freedom. For those in a situation of oppression the choice that constitutes human 
freedom is constrained. This criticism of individualism is equally misplaced in relation to 
symbolic interactionism, as if “the individual and society are two sides of the same coin; no 
individual exists apart from society, and there can be no self apart from others” (Longmore 1998: 
45), thus the analysis of the individual is thereby necessarily an analysis of the social context 
through which the individual gains meaning. As Musolf states “Structure and social justice was a 
foundational concern to the founders of symbolic interactionism” (2016: 9). The advantage 
therefore of bringing together the structural theory of radical feminism with the theories of the 
subject provided by Beauvoir’s existentialism and symbolic interactionism, is to dispel the 
tendency to view theories of the subject and theories of structure as necessarily in tension. 
Beauvoir’s existentialism can be seen to underlie radical feminism, whilst the radical feminist 
definition of sexual objectification can be seen to imply an interactionist subject, and numerous 
overlaps can be found between symbolic interactionism and existentialism. Seeing these theories 
within each other helps to overcome the perceived incompatibility of accounts of the individual 
and accounts of social structure, revealing the strength of the synthesis.  
Another advantage of bringing these theories together is that the different theories provide varying 
emphasis and focus on the concepts of objectification and subjectivity. Sexual objectification is 
the key concept of radical feminism, but this has not been adequately theorised on the level of the 
individual. Beauvoir (1949) also centralises the concept of objectification to account for women’s 
oppression, but further provides an account of the individual evading responsibility for the self 
through this process of objectification. Objectification is not a central concept of symbolic 
interactionism but can be seen as implied through the role of the recognition of subjectivity; if 
subjectivity is premised on recognition of subjectivity in others, it seems plausible to suggest that 
oppression is explained by objectification. In defining objectification as the denial of subjectivity, 
I have suggested that the radical feminist critique of sexual objectification is underpinned by the 
central importance of recognition of subjectivity. Subjectivity is a core concept of both 
existentialism and symbolic interactionism, providing an account of subjectivity as embodied and 
intersubjective. The explicit and implicit theorisation of these concepts across the three theories 
allows the combined approach to bring out the connection between objectification and 
subjectivity.  
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The concept of ‘situation’ is central to both Beauvoir’s (1949) existentialism and symbolic 
interactionism, however, the uses of this concept are distinct. I will briefly consider the distinction 
and again how this evidences a different emphasis of each theory rather than an incompatibility. 
We can begin to understand the distinction in how this concept is used by the existential phrase 
‘situated subject’ and the symbolic interactionist phrase ‘definition of the situation’. For Beauvoir 
the subject is situated by the body, by social institutions, and by history (Kruks 1990). This 
provides a sharp contrast with early Sartre (1943) as “woman does not merely fail to bring her 
situation into being by her own project. She is, rather, its product” (Kruks 1987: 115). As woman’s 
situation impedes on her freedom “situation becomes, in de Beauvoir’s analysis, above all 
externally constituted (though subjectively experienced)” (ibid: 116), it is also this shift away 
from Sartre’s conception that allows situation to encompass the general condition of social 
groups. The emphasis for Beauvoir in her use of the concept of ‘situation’ is embodiment and how 
social interpretation of this embodiment can act as an impediment on the subject’s freedom. For 
Goffman, impression management is “achieved largely by influencing the definition of the 
situation which the others come to formulate, and he can influence this definition by expressing 
himself” ([1959] 1969: 15). The ‘situation’ is not thereby externally constituted but arises from 
the intersubjective moment of self-production. A definition of the situation is projected in the 
“presence of others” (ibid: 23). Part of the definition of the situation is a conception of the self. 
The emphasis for symbolic interactionism in the use of the concept of ‘situation’ is 
intersubjectivity. Situation does not denote a general condition but denotes the specific moment 
of subject production through the interpretations and meanings that are given in the instance. 
Bringing these uses of ‘situation’ together suggests that: the difference in how a subject is situated 
will impact on their ability to define the situation. This is to suggest a compatibility between these 
different uses of the concept. The advantage of the synthesis is to bring embodiment and 
intersubjectivity into equal focus.  
Theorising a subject that is narratively constructed connects to the structure as these narratives 
are drawn from and make sense within the structural framing of patriarchy. Retaining an account 
of agency within the structural analysis distinguishes the account of rationalisations from anti-
humanist theorising. The agent is not reduced to discourse as there is choice and agency in the 
identity he adopts, as the use of linguistic devices to rationalise his violation are instigated through 
his desire for dominance. Gadd and Jefferson (2007) aim to theorise the subject, however the 
reliance on the unconscious undermines the concept of choice within identity construction. The 
proposal of an unconscious investment in discursive positions does not thereby implicate the 
agency of the rapist within the explanation. In contrast, my proposal that the rapist masters a 
vocabulary to rationalise his rape means that the rapist retains agency within the structural 
explanation. Furthermore, the investment in discursive positions implies that discursive positions 
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are readymade holes for subjects to slot into, which does not impute adequate agency to the 
subject. In contrast, the learning of a language to rationalise his actions presents a stronger account 
of the subject interacting with the structure. This can be seen from the inclusion of sexual 
objectification and the demonisation of the rapist in rationalisations for rape. The intersubjective 
construction of identity is multifaceted; instead of drawing down a readymade position from the 
discourse, the rapist must learn a range of linguistic devices to neutralise his action. The 
simultaneous knowledge and denial involved in rationalisation requires an active mental process, 
thus I propose these narratives are learnt as opposed to invested in. 
 
Throughout this thesis I have contrasted my account with post-structural theorising, in the anti-
humanism of queer theory (Butler 1999) and Gadd and Jefferson’s (2007) attempt to find 
women’s agency in the multiplicity of discursive positions. However, the account of a narrative 
identity is in fact compatible with post-structural accounts that retain a concept of the subject and 
maintain the power dynamic of the rape scenario rather than dispersing power between subjects. 
My account of the rapist, using the cultural narratives of patriarchy to produce a dominant 
subjectivity through negating moral emotions and rationalising his action, is consistent with the 
post-structural accounts of rape provided by Brison (2002) and Alcoff (2018). As discussed 
earlier, both of these accounts utilise the authors’ own experience of rape to centralise the need to 
theorise the subject as intersubjective and embodied. Brison states that the ‘self is created and 
sustained by others’ (2002: 62), with this relational concept of self explaining the damage of 
violence and the need to ‘remake the self in connection with others’ after the trauma of sexual 
violence (ibid: xi).   
 
Alcoff (2018) uses Foucault’s later texts (such as Foucault 1984) in which the subject is returned 
to theory, applying his concept of ‘fashioning a self’ to explain the specific harm of sexual 
violence as a harm to the practice of self-making. Alcoff’s account firmly combines construction 
through discourse with the phenomenology of embodiment, presenting identity as a narrative self. 
Foucault’s later theorising overlaps significantly with Beauvoir’s (see Vintges 1992). In Brison’s 
(2020) review of Alcoff (2018) she contends that Alcoff’s account can bridge the ‘sex wars’ 
through drawing on Foucault whilst providing an account that is compatible with radical 
feminism. I suggest that Alcoff’s (2018) account is compatible with the explanation I have 
provided of the mind of the rapist and thus I agree with Brison (2020). Gavey (2005) combines 
the approaches of radical feminism and post-structuralism in her suggestion that normative 
heterosexual sex provides the cultural scaffolding for rape. Gavey states: “Within the sharply 
gendered binary dynamic of heterosexual sex (masculine – feminine, active – passive, dominant 
– submissive, desiring – desired) lie the building blocks that both enable rape and provide the 
perfect alibi for many rapes – it was just sex” (2005: 232). This is consistent with my theory that 
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the sexual objectification contained in the social construction of gender provides rationalisations 
to rape. Considering the compatibility between my account and various post-structural theories 
clarifies that my argument is positioned against anti-humanist versions of post-structuralism, 
whilst also objecting to the use of post-structuralism to locate women’s power in their sexual 
objectification. In the next section I will also object to the way in which the post-structural 
conception of power can be used to insert vulnerability into the explanation of dominance. 
 
Section Three:  Rape and Power 
 
The theory of rape that I have provided places dominance as explanatory and unifies the category 
of rape, suggesting that the rapist can be explained by the process of sexual objectification as a 
negation of moral emotions and the utilisation of rationalisations for rape. This section will 
consider potential objections against the causal root of dominance and the presentation of a 
unified theory of rape. In addressing the possible question of why these men desire dominance, I 
will consider the problematic implication of Bonnycastle’s (2012) assertion that vulnerability 
underlies the desire for dominance, in explaining rape through race and class oppression. 
Bonnycastle’s account will be rejected by pointing to men in positions of power who commit 
rape, and considering the relevance of context for the situated subject. I will then consider how 
the claims made by rapists of being vulnerable or powerless can be seen as rationalisations for 
rape. This presents my account as a counter-explanation to the explanations provided by both 
Bonnycastle (2012) and Gadd and Jefferson (2007). I will defend my explanation of a unified 
theory of rape by disputing the coherence of categories of rape and clarifying that the mental 
process suggested is distinct from a typology of a person. A unified account of rape is most 
consistent with women’s experience of sexual violence and the emergence of radical feminism 
through women sharing these experiences of being sexually objectified.   
 
3.1 Beneath the Desire for Dominance 
 
Radical feminism theorises dominance as explanatory. This is repeated in my account of rape, as 
I have rooted the process of sexual objectification in his desire for dominance. One could object 
that this fails to explain why some men rape. It could be argued that in order to understand why 
particular men rape, it is necessary to understand why these men desire dominance. In ending the 
explanation at the desire for dominance it is implied that some men desire dominance simply 
because this position of power is available to men. This theory does not question men’s relation 
to power and thus could be seen as homogenising all men as powerful. The abstraction of the 
vignettes prevents theorising beneath his desire for dominance in not knowing the men’s 
biographies, intersectional identities or inner feelings prior to the decision to rape. The theory I 
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have provided of sexual objectification as the process in the mind of the rapist does not posit any 
internal or external conditions that produce the desire for dominance instigating the process that 
ultimately leads to rape. 
 
Foucault’s account that ‘power is everywhere’ and that all subjects are inevitably immersed in 
power relations ([1976] 1998: 93) is often used to object to the radical feminist analysis of rape 
being explained by men’s power. This distinct conceptualisation of power suggests that “there is 
no binary and all-encompassing opposition” (ibid: 94). Theorising patriarchy as ‘men over 
women’ is therefore seen to oversimplify complex relations of power. Given this, accounts that 
draw on this aspect of post-structuralism often complicate the analysis of dominance by placing 
vulnerability as causally relevant in the explanation of dominance. This is seen in Gadd and 
Jefferson’s (2007) psychosocial account of rape discussed in Chapter Three. Gadd and Jefferson 
(2007) suggest that men who rape invest in the discursive position of dominance because of inner 
feelings of vulnerability. The radical feminist account of dominance is seen to only account for 
men’s structural position of power without accounting for the subject’s experienced relation to 
power. Gadd and Jefferson would be likely to suggest that their account provides a more in-depth 
explanation than my account that ends with the desire for dominance, because the psychosocial 
explanation is able to differentiate the men who desire dominance through their experience of 
vulnerability. 
 
Bonnycastle (2012) also draws on post-structuralism in her study of men convicted of stranger 
rape, which results in her suggestion that feelings of powerlessness motivated the performance of 
dominance in rape. According to Bonnycastle, ‘power is an effect but not a cause of rape’ (2012: 
230), as the men in her study frame their enactment of dominance as being rooted in feelings of 
powerlessness. Bonnycastle notes the structural disadvantage of the men in her study as they were 
disproportionately poor and racialised. This is taken to provide a material basis for their feelings 
of being powerless. In Scully’s (1990) study of convicted rapists she dismisses the 
overrepresentation of working class and black men in her study, taking it as reflective of the bias 
of the criminal justice system, rather than a variable in explaining the perpetration of rape.34 
According to Bonnycastle (2012) this misses the potential explanatory relevance of men’s 
disenfranchisement in their subsequent desire to enact dominance. Bonnycastle would object to 
the end point of my theorising being the desire for dominance as this overlooks the potential prior 
feeling of powerlessness motivating a desire for dominance.  
 
34 Scully’s study is more easily able to attribute the bias of her sample to the criminal justice system itself, 
given that she provides a comparison group of men convicted of non-sexual offences. The comparison 
group of men present a similar skew in terms of class and race positions to the group of men convicted of 
rape (Scully 1990: 65). 
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3.2 Rejecting the Vulnerable Rapist  
 
I reject this increasing tendency to theorise the vulnerable rapist, taking the radical feminist 
position of dominance to provide a more theoretically coherent and empirically grounded analysis 
of rape. Bonnycastle (2012) validates the men’s feeling of powerlessness through recognising 
their situated position as socio-economically disadvantaged or racially marginalised. Through 
recognising the intersection of their identities, Bonnycastle disputes theorising these men as 
holding a position of power prior to the act of rape, therefore suggesting that the act of rape is a 
response to their disenfranchisement due to their race or class position. The locating of 
vulnerability within the material reality of class and race oppression is most evident from 
Bonnycastle’s suggestion for reducing rape: “this study suggests that there is a need to improve 
the material, social, and cultural opportunities of marginalized male citizens…… [to] decrease 
their resort to violence” (2012: 284). If it is structural disadvantage that explains rape, then sexual 
violence becomes a problem of working class and black men.  
 
This is another form of ‘othering’ the rapist that has always been found alongside 
psychopathological explanations of rape. The men in Bonnycastle’s (2012) study of convicted 
stranger rapists may have this structural disadvantage, but to place this as explanatory is to ignore 
the many men who rape while holding complete positions of power (through their race and class 
positions as well as their sex). These positions of power make them far less likely to be convicted 
of rape. The use of post-structuralism and intersectionality to ‘correct’ the mistakes of second-
wave theorising of men over women can be seen to have a completely retrogressive result, as 
Bonnycastle explains rape by pinning it on working class and black men. It is disappointing that 
this analysis – which places rape outside of the actions of the white middle/upper class man – is 
revived in academic theorising whilst being packaged as modernising feminist theory. This 
explanation of rape continues class and race oppression through the constructed sexual threat of 
men in these communities. As noted in the first chapter, Davis (1981) rightly objects to 
Brownmiller’s (1975) supposition of black men being more likely to commit rape because of a 
position of subordinated masculinity. Bonnycastle’s (2012) use of intersectionality to reaffirm 
this racialised construction of rape indicates the problem of using post-structural accounts of 
power to look for vulnerability beneath dominance. 
 
I reinstate Scully’s (1990) reading of the disproportionate number of structurally disadvantaged 
men in studies of convicted rapists being reflective of the bias of the criminal justice system in 
who is reported, charged and convicted. This is imperative to recognise when theorising rape, 
given both the tiny minority of cases that are processed by the criminal justice system, and the 
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role of the construction of black men’s sexuality as a threat to white womanhood in the oppression 
of black people. I will later contest Bonnycastle’s (2012) localised theorising of the category of 
stranger rape, but for now we can focus on this as a type of rape to consider an example to refute 
stranger rape being explained by structural disadvantage. Dominique Strauss-Kahn violently 
raped a hotel maid (Brenner 2013). Dominique Strauss-Kahn is a white upper class male. At the 
time of the rape he was the director of the International Monetary Fund and presidential nominee 
for the Socialist Party in France. He epitomises a position of power in the most total sense. It is 
not possible to locate any material disadvantage that could possibly support any claim of desiring 
dominance through rape because of feeling powerless. Dominique Strauss-Kahn avoided criminal 
prosecution precisely because of his position of wealth and power (ibid).35 The ‘Me Too’ 
movement has provided ample examples of men in positions of power perpetrating sexual 
violence. The outpouring of testimony from victims who have been abused by men in positions 
of power makes an explanation of rape based on structural disadvantage untenable. The powerful 
men who have been exposed as perpetrators of sexual violence did not desire dominance as a 
response to powerlessness. Given this, it is not consistent to then explain structurally 
disadvantaged men as desiring power for this reason. If a disenfranchised man can desire 
dominance over women, alongside a man of immense structural privilege desiring dominance 
over women, the desire for dominance is explanatory and should not be read as being causally 
influenced by powerlessness. The radical feminist explanation that explains sex class oppression 
through the construction of gender is precisely to explain how the rich man, the poor man, the 
white man, the black man all perpetrate sexual violence, as they all occupy a potential position of 
power in adopting a self-construction as masculine.  
 
The attempt to use intersectional identities to dispute the radical feminist analysis of ‘men over 
women’ relates to the arguments of essentialism that I have refuted in Chapter Two by pointing 
to the situated subject of Beauvoir (1949). Understanding that subjects are always situated we can 
appreciate intersections of oppression without thereby invoking race/class oppression to explain 
gender oppression. Just as men do not essentially hold a position of power – it is the situation of 
patriarchy that results in this – it is also the case that men do not always hold a position of power, 
as they will be also situated by class and race, such that in other contexts the rapist may occupy 
the position of the oppressed. But in the moment of rape the rapist holds a position of dominance. 
The situation in which he enacts dominance cannot be determined by him being situated as 
oppressed in other contexts. The embodiment of the men in the vignettes allowed them the 
 
35 The victim of this case, Nafissatou Diallo, was a black woman. A proper use of intersectionality should 
consider how his position as a white wealthy man and her position as a black working class woman leads 
to a lack of criminal prosecution; instead of drawing fallacious conclusions about ‘the rapist’ on the basis 
of convicted populations. 
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possibility of dominant self-construction in opposition to women/girls, irrespective of their race 
and class positions. He utilises the structural framing of patriarchy to situate himself in the 
position of the oppressor, hence it is his desire for dominance that is explanatory. Vulnerability is 
not relevant to theorising rape because in the moment of rape he imposes a definition of the 
situation that utilises his embodiment, which provides the position of masculine dominance. 
Radical feminism provides an explanation of acts of violence and thus there is no implication that 
all men hold power at all times. The aim of this thesis is to consider the rapist in the moment of 
rape; this is a moment in which he enacts dominance. Choosing to be in the position of the 
oppressor at that moment is a free choice. 
 
Instead of taking claims of vulnerability and powerlessness made by convicted rapists to reflect 
dominance being underwritten by vulnerability, I suggest that these claims can be understood as 
rationalisations for rape. It is important to consider that in studies of convicted rapists the men 
being interviewed are negotiating an identity that has been stigmatised through the label of rape. 
If these men can present themselves through a lens of suffering and impotence, this alleviates the 
responsibility of having committed rape. Scott and Lyman include ‘sad tales’ as a category of 
accounts: “The sad tale is a selected (often distorted) arrangement of facts that highlight an 
extremely dismal past and thus explain the individual’s present state” (1968: 52). In Chapter Three 
I provided an existential reinterpretation of men’s proclamations of vulnerability to demonstrate 
the role of sexual objectification in the perspective (world-design) of these men and how this 
encompassed the prior assumption of dominance. Having now explained rape through narrative 
construction, these claims of vulnerability can be understood as rationalisations for rape. In 
defining her as a sexual object he evades responsibility for his treatment of her by placing himself 
as vulnerable to her sexuality and thus compelled to rape. In rejection of the vulnerable rapist we 
can theorise the investment in narratively constructing a vulnerable self, as this functions to lessen 
his responsibility for violation. Gadd and Jefferson (2007) and Bonnycastle (2012) take the claims 
of convicted rapists as revelations of an inner vulnerable self, thus disputing the radical feminist 
analysis of dominance. If we instead consider the role of rationalisations in rape and the 
discredited identity of being a convicted rapist, I suggest these do not expose the vulnerable 
subject within, but demonstrate the rapists’ performance of identity. 
 
As discussed in Chapter Three, Foucault’s (1976) conceptualisation of power can be used to 
attribute women power when they are objectified. The fact that it is also then used to attribute 
vulnerability to men who rape indicates that this conceptualisation of power hinders the 
theorisation of rape by causing an inversion of the reality. As Harstock claims, through “insisting 
on metaphors of web and net, rather than structures of domination, we are led to conclude that 
merely each of us both dominates and is dominated. We are all responsible and in a sense no one 
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is responsible. Thus, the question of how to analyse  structures of domination is obscured” (1996: 
46). Similarly Deveux suggests that Foucault’s account of power “renders murky and less tangible 
numerous social relations, relations that feminists have argued constitute concrete oppression” 
(1996: 221). The way in which Foucault’s (1975b; 1976) farmhand is analysed as a victim of 
criminalising discourses (discussed in the previous chapter), whilst the girl he molests is seen as 
seductive (discussed in Chapter Two), reveals the inversion of the relation of binary power that 
results from the supposition of power being everywhere. This conceptualisation of power thereby 
reinforces patriarchal interpretations that men are not responsible for violating women and girls, 
whilst it is women and girls who are responsible for being violated. Finding power in positions of 
powerlessness and finding powerlessness in positions of power supports rationalisations for rape. 
 
3.3 Unifying Rape  
 
Gadd and Jefferson (2007) claim to focus on date rape in their discussion of rape, while 
Bonnycastle’s (2012) study is of stranger rapists. Bonnycastle (2012) finds this to be an advantage 
of her study as she contends a single theory of rape cannot offer an adequate explanation. The 
vignettes of rape that I have provided are unified through the victim being unconscious, but this 
is not to limit the explanation to this type of rape. I thereby propose that the account of sexual 
objectification as a process in the mind of the rapist is able to explain all ‘forms’ of rape. In line 
with post-modern criticisms of universalising grand narratives, it could be objected that the 
attempt to provide a single theory of rape ignores the complexity and multiplicity of the real 
world. This could be taken to implausibly suggest that all rapists are the same, ironing out the 
differences found in rape and rapists. To guard against this criticism I will argue against the 
categorisation of forms of rape and support the value of unifying rape as acts of sexual 
objectification.  
 
There is a fundamental issue in classification of rape, as different factors are taken as primary in 
common classifications, and thus the categories are not mutually exclusive. Acquaintance rape 
and stranger rape classify the act by the relation between the victim and perpetrator; gang rape 
classifies the act according to the number of perpetrators; date rape classifies the act through the 
context of the meeting. This inconsistency in classification means there are not sharp lines 
between these classifications; a gang rape may be a stranger rape, a date rape may be a stranger 
rape if this is the first time they have met. It does not then make sense to have an explanation of 
date rapists and an explanation of stranger rapists as if they are necessarily distinct. The choice in 
how to classify an act of rape can in fact bias the analysis. This is seen in Gadd and Jefferson’s 
(2007) incorrect classification of their main case study as a date rape. As discussed in Chapter 
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Three, this categorisation endorsed the defendant’s desire for a sexual relationship with the victim 
and aided the theorisation that this case was not rape. 
 
Furthermore, I suggest that the variance within rape should not lead to disparate theorising as if 
there are distinct types of rape that require distinct explanations. Radical feminism arose from 
women sharing their experiences. The experiences shared in consciousness-raising groups were 
varied, which is again repeated through the ‘Me Too’ movement. Yet when women share these 
experiences, it is the commonality that is seen in spite of the evident range of experiences: one 
woman was abused by her father, another by her husband, another by a stranger; one woman was 
beaten, one drugged, one pressured with words. The testimonies of women reveal the variance of 
rape, but it is the commonality that strikes us. This commonality is the act of sexual 
objectification. The relationship between the victim and perpetrator and the method used are 
ultimately contingencies that are underpinned by a particular way of treating women and girls. 
My suggestion is that this is explained by a particular way of seeing women and girls. This way 
of seeing is encompassed in the definition of self and other that involves negating moral emotions 
and utilising the structural framing to rationalise one’s actions. It is when we hold acts of sexual 
violence together that we avoid the problematic explanation presented by Bonnycastle (2012) that 
pins rape on the oppressed man. The structural explanation that explains rape through the social 
construction of gender rests on bringing rapes together. Theoretically differentiating forms of rape 
risks creating a hierarchy, repeating the rapists own rationalisations for rape. The husband who 
abuses his wife can distinguish himself from those who abuse strangers; the man who uses the 
tactic of coercion can distinguish himself from the man who uses violence. Different methods and 
different relationships should not overshadow the enactment of dominance, and thus I maintain 
rape should be theorised as a unified category in spite of the evident variance in individual cases 
of rape.  
 
Considering the mental process involved in the act of sexual objectification means this 
explanation can be applied to men in different contexts with different life experiences. Therefore 
it does not provide a homogenised account of all rapists as the same. Furthermore, the theoretical 
perspectives of existentialism and symbolic interactionism provide a perspective on the general 
production of subjectivity: what it means to be a situated subject defining self and other and 
narratively producing our subjectivity in interaction. Applying these theories to explain rape is to 
locate the rapist within the processes of identity construction; the mental process suggested is not 
differentiating him from all others. He may be a banker or a barman, he may have had a stable 
childhood or a life of trauma, but in the moment that he chooses to rape he desires dominance, 
negates moral emotions and provides himself with rationalisations to justify his act of rape. I 
propose that acts of sexual violence against women and girls can be unified as acts of sexual 
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objectification. To then consider what it means for him to sexually objectify is not to say all men 
who commit these acts are the same in total, but that they apply the same mental process in the 
act itself. The dismissal of radical feminism as totalising and universalising is often failing to 
consider the theoretical perspective arising from acts of violence against women. The acts do 
share a commonality and this allows that men who commit the acts also share a commonality in 
the mental process used to achieve the act. This explanatory unification need not imply any further 
similarity or homogeneity amongst these men. 
 
The phenomenology of being raped brings out both the unification of the multiplicity of acts of 
sexual violence and the need to reject the supposition of powerlessness as explanatory in the act 
of rape. From the perspective of the victim, theorising the rapist as vulnerable or powerless is an 
insulting inversion of the moment of rape. To acknowledge the reality of the victim’s account of 
rape I propose it is necessary to retain theorising the rapist through the dominance of the act. I am 
unconvinced by the rapists’ proclamations of vulnerability; from beneath him, it is his callous aim 
for power and dominance that is palpable. Many women experience multiple acts of sexual 
violence throughout their life. Kelly’s (1988) concept of a continuum of sexual violence reveals 
how the experience of these different acts connect together. The inclusion of my own experience 
of rape in vignette one does not stand alone in my past as a singular experience. Instead it sits 
amongst a range of other experiences on the continuum. The similarity that is experienced by the 
victim of sexually objectifying acts is suggestive of a similarity in the perpetrators. This similarity 
is the mental process of sexual objectification. When sexually harassed in public or when raped 
in the privacy of a home, she feels the weight of the imposition of sexual objectification. She feels 
the gaze that denies her subjectivity and thus frees him from self-judgment. She feels his 
entitlement to her body with no shame or guilt. The experience of being seen as a sexual object is 





Sexual objectification as a process in the mind of the rapist involves a desire for dominance, 
producing a way of seeing that negates moral emotions and provides rationalisations for rape. In 
defining her as a sexual object, he can construct his act of violation as justified in order to retain 
a positive sense of self. The process of rationalisation involves simultaneous knowledge and 
denial of her subjectivity and of his responsibility in violating her. The use of rationalisations to 
neutralise his act indicates his awareness in the act. This active mental process provides an 
account of the subject as conscious. The rapist chooses the position of dominance provided by the 
patriarchal framing. The rapist utilises the social construction of gender and the demonisation of 
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the rapist to provide a narrative construction of self that makes his act justified, hence avoiding 
the definition of the rapist. The reasons that justify his rape are given meaning by the structure of 
patriarchy. This account retains both an account of the subject and an account of the structure. 
This is achieved by combining the radical feminist explanation of structure with the subject of 
existentialism and symbolic interactionism. Explaining the mind of the rapist through the concept 
of sexual objectification is to suggest that he uses the structural framing to define himself as 
dominant and define her as a sexual object, which involves the negation of moral emotions and 
the presence of rationalisations to justify his act of violation. Rape is a product of the structure of 
patriarchy and the individual’s desire for dominance and consequent choice in self-construction. 
This explanation of rape presents his desire for dominance as explanatory, thus disputing the 
theoretical relevance of vulnerability. This explanation of sexual objectification as a process in 
the mind of the rapist is presented as a unified theory of rape. This encapsulates the unity in 
women’s experience of being sexually objectified in different ways and in varying contexts. 
Sexual objectification is a mental process and thus this account does not homogenise all rapists 


























It is critically important to theorise rape because it is a harmful act that is endemic throughout 
society. Radical feminism proposes that rape can be explained by the social construction of 
gender, centring on the sexual objectification of women. This presents a structural explanation of 
rape; rape is consistent with the structure of patriarchy. It is important to theorise the individual 
within this structural explanation of rape to avoid the charges of essentialism and determinism 
often levelled against radical feminism (Messerschmidt 1993; Brown 1995; Butler 1999; Cahill 
2001; Gadd and Jefferson 2007). Radical feminism has under-theorised the account of the 
individual, but the theory is compatible with an account of the subject as more than the structure. 
Theorising the rapist within a radical feminist explanation is premised on providing an account 
of subjectivity that avoids pathologising the rapist. Given that the structural framing is consistent 
with the widespread treatment of women in this way, sexual objectification should be understood 
as a social process and a process on the level of the individual. Within the structure of patriarchy 
she is sexually objectified. In the act of sexual violation he sexually objectifies her. Sexual 
objectification as a process in the mind of the rapist can be theorised through drawing together 
existentialism and symbolic interactionism. The narrative construction of identity presents choice 
in self-construction. The self is reflectively produced and performed in interaction. The structure 
that sexually objectifies women provides a narrative that enables a distortion of the recognition 
of subjectivity that is foundational to our subjectivity. This account humanises the demonised 
figure of the rapist without thereby presenting him as the victim.  
 
The account of the rapist that I have provided advocates interdisciplinary theorising, rejecting 
academic silos in order to enhance theoretical insights into human behaviour. This account of 
rape challenges current orthodoxies in feminist theory, philosophy, and criminology. The 
combined subject theorised from existentialism and symbolic interactionism can reinvigorate the 
radical feminist critique of sexual objectification. This challenges both the anti-humanist wave 
and the embrace of sexual objectification in current feminist theory (Butler 1999; Bernstein 2007). 
The combined use of radical feminism and existentialism provides a strong critique of the 
psychosocial account of rape (Gadd and Jefferson 2007), which has been widely accepted as a 
theory that advances criminology in theorising both the subject and the social context (see 
Gelsthorpe 2009). Theorising sexual objectification through Beauvoir’s (1949; 1953) account of 
the subject refutes the widespread philosophical position that sex itself is objectifying (Nussbaum 
1995; Cahill 2010). Once the radical feminist critique of sexual objectification is explicitly 
underpinned by an intersubjective and embodied subject it neither vilifies sex nor provides a 
restrictive or moralising account of sexual practices. The endemic levels of sexual violence 
against women and girls indicates the imperative need to provide normative theorising on sex. 
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This account of normativity can be derived from our constitution as subjects. In understanding 
subjects to be inherently intersubjective and embodied a moral realm is produced. Subjects see 
themselves reflected back through the other and this inhibits harmful action. Recognition of 
subjectivity is a requirement for moral action. This is encompassed in the interconnection between 
subjects but can be subverted by cultural constructions based on a denial of subjectivity. The 
cultural definition of women as sexual objects facilitates men’s lack of negative self-reflection in 
perpetrating sexual violence.  
 
The ‘Me Too’ movement has provided a recent public exposure of the level of men’s sexual 
violence against women across the world. The theory of radical feminism arose in the 1960s from 
women sharing experiences with each other and thus grappling with the ubiquity of sexual 
violence that women experience. Given this, it would seem that this current moment should take 
us back to radical feminist theorising. However, the perspective of radical feminism has been 
under siege for many decades, making it a marginalised perspective. Initial backlash against 
radical feminists branded them as extreme ‘man haters’, and radical feminist theories were then 
labelled as ‘anti-sex’, racist, and most recently, trans-exclusionary. The success of these 
aspersions means that to espouse a radical feminist theory or identify yourself as a radical feminist 
immediately leads to accusations that you hate men, morally condemn all sexual activity, and you 
are racist and transphobic. However, proper engagement with radical feminist theory actually 
provides a critical focus on men’s violence against women, centring the importance of women’s 
sexual pleasure. It becomes clear that radical feminism is in fact compatible with intersectionality, 
and can explain violence against trans people. The ‘Me Too’ movement and most recently the 
‘Everyone’s Invited’ platform, which has gathered thousands of testimonies of sexual violence 
suffered by girls, are testament to the way in which sexual violence against women and girls 
remains endemic. The theory of radical feminism cannot be dismissed, given that the reality that 
it set out to challenge in the 1960s is still our reality today.  
 
The current mainstream feminist positions do not offer girls a way of understanding this reality. 
The narrative is confused both in terms of the promotion of gender expression/identity and ‘sex-
positivity’ endorsing the sex industry. Whilst the theoretical position of queer theory rejects the 
subject and is hence anti-humanist (Butler 1999), the praxis encourages a politics of declaring 
oneself to be ‘non-binary’ (for instance), producing a vacuous form of identity politics. Glick 
suggests that this turns the second-wave slogan of ‘the personal is political’ into ‘the political 
need only be personal’, providing a movement that is “centred on who we are – how we dress or 
get off – that fails to engage with institutionalised systems of domination” (2000: 31). 
Retheorising the subject through a critique of sexual objectification can take us beyond this 
shallow performativity by critically interrogating the construction of gender that provides the 
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binary of sexual object and subject positions. Instead of reclaiming gender as essential identities 
we need to reject the cultural construction of gender that sexually objectifies girls and women.  
 
The claimed possibility of identifying oneself as non-binary – arising from the theoretical position 
that we cannot escape gender, hence advocating proliferation rather than abolition (Butler 1999) 
–  misses the intersubjectivity of the imposition of gender. The girls providing online testimony 
of sexual violence need to understand that they are being treated as sexual objects by boys and 
men because of being seen as female, which encompasses the social construction of femininity – 
sexual objectification. It is frankly irrelevant to define oneself as non-binary when you are seen 
and treated in the ways described on ‘Everyone’s Invited’. Furthermore, the declaration of a non-
binary identity reifies the binary itself, indicating how the post-structural call for proliferation 
reinforces instead of disrupts the structures of oppression. It is not possible to control how others 
see you and thus self-identification should not be advanced as the route to emancipation. Sexual 
objectification is a way of seeing that needs to be challenged through challenging the entitlement 
of boys and men to female bodies. This requires challenging the cultural construction of gender. 
This position is not reached when we teach that gender is an expression and an identity simply in 
terms of fashion and pronouns, and thus we can define ourselves as within or outside of the binary. 
 
At the same time, the sex-positive line of theorising that has culminated in feminism defending 
the sex industry as women’s choice and potentially liberating (Bell 1995; Nagel 1997; Egan et al. 
2006; Agustin 2007; Bernstein 2007; Bell 2009), means that girls are denied the theoretical 
understanding of their positioning as sexual objects being central to their oppression. The 
testimonies from girls on online platforms reveals how girls are continuously treated as sexual 
objects. When mainstream feminism then focuses on the choice and empowerment of the sex 
industry, this position of sexual object is simply confirmed, but reframed as women’s choice. The 
attempt to reclaim terms such as ‘slut’ and ‘whore’ (Hill 2016) is an attempt to reassert agency 
by accepting the patriarchy’s definitions of us. Fahs (2014) provides a critique of sex-positive 
feminism through considering ‘freedom from’ and ‘freedom to’. Whilst radical feminism 
represented a fight for freedom from all forms of sexual violence, sex-positive feminism fights 
for a freedom to express sexuality, including through the sex industry “often constructing 
pornography as positive, educational, and anti-repressive” (Fahs 2014: 273). The problem when 
‘freedom to’ is propounded in the absence of ‘freedom from’ is that this simply uses the language 
of choice to reframe oppression: “groups should not equate sexual empowerment with providing 
sexual access to others; rather, their sexual empowerment might derive from the freedom from 
such access to their bodies and (eroticized) labor” (ibid: 283). In a culture that teaches girls that 
to be woman is to be sexual object, presenting sexual objectification as a choice ignores the 
constraints under which female subjectivity develops. 
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This thesis has demonstrated that placing women’s power in the sexuality of their bodies is in no 
way new or subversive; as a form of sexual objectification, this has always been a key part of 
women’s oppression. Attributing women power through the sexuality of their bodies in fact 
provides rationalisations to rape them, and a conceptualisation through which to claim they have 
not been raped. What is needed is a strong critique of the imposition of sexual objectification. The 
girls narrating the treatment that they have suffered deserve a feminist framework that considers 
how the socially constructed meaning of their breasted embodiment encourages and facilitates 
such treatment. The rejection of radical feminism on many false grounds robs girls of a reading 
of their reality that not only resonates with the continued outpouring of testimony, but provides a 
firm ‘fuck you’ to the requirements of being a sexual object in order to be an acceptable woman. 
It is an infuriating reversal of the reality when “feminists who challenge objectification are seen 
as the ones who make women objects, not men. Feminists who fight the victimisation of women 
are seen as making women victims” (Jeffreys 1997: 80).  
 
The radical feminist critique of sexual objectification is directed at men who see and treat women 
as sexual objects and the culture that encourages this. In theorising sexual objectification as a 
process in the mind of the rapist I hope to have clarified that the critique is not directed at women. 
Sexual objectification as a process in the mind of the man involves a dominant construction of 
subjectivity that is grounded in his entitlement to the sexual use of women’s bodies. This provides 
no criticism of what women wear or what they do with their bodies, but it does provide a challenge 
to the idea that women’s empowerment is through the sexualisation of their bodies for a male 
viewer or user. Understanding this presentation of women’s power to be constitutive of their 
sexual objectification resists the presentation of the sex industry as liberating for women, without 
needing to deny the individual experience of some women who gain a sense of enjoyment from 
participating in these industries. The objectification of women as a social process is collective and 
thus the false premise of placing women’s power in the sexuality of their bodies is a collective 
meaning that is not undermined through finding an individual who gains a sense of power from 
the industry. The point is that the collective definition of this being women’s site of power 
provides rationalisations for men to rape women and hence it must be considered how the ‘sexual 
power’ of her body is premised on – and central to – his dominance. Theorising the rapist through 
experiences of victimisation indicates that the theory of radical feminism does not make women 
into victims; it speaks from the perspective of their victimisation. His act of rape victimised her; 
it is not her acknowledgement of being raped that makes her a victim. 
 
The confluence of a neoliberal culture of individual choice and consumerism, with queer theory’s 
totalising discourse in which we are trapped in gender, with an anti-normative stance that vilifies 
the critique of the sex trade, results in a theoretical and political position that simply lacks the 
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clarity and force of radical feminism. This thesis has rebuked Foucault’s (1976) anti-humanism 
and his account of power because Foucault’s influence over feminist theory underlies both the 
turn to gender as an essential self-identified identity and the embrace of the sex industry. Bringing 
back Beauvoir (1949; 1953) as the foundation for feminist theory can rectify the confusions 
arising from ‘playing’ with gender and equating sex-positivity with being positive about the sex 
industry. Radical feminism must be revitalised to provide a narrative that explains the reality of 
the testimonies that continue to flood the online world, and in order to provide girls with a 
genuinely radical future alternative, instead of symbolic politics of self-identification or attaching 
an empty neoliberal account of  ‘choice’ to forms of objectification. The way forward for 
feminism is to revive the radical feminist critique of the sex industry as a key aspect of patriarchal 
oppression in its positioning of women as sexual objects, without then turning to the state for the 
solution. It is possible to critique the sex industry as a feature of patriarchy without stigmatising 
the women who are (willingly or unwillingly) involved in the industry, and without thereby 
calling for increased criminal intervention. Carving out a space that reinstates the radical feminist 
critique of sexual objectification without then reverting to criminalisation will provide a stronger 
footing for the return of radical feminism.  
 
To theorise materiality alongside theorising social construction posits the reality of sexed bodies. 
This allows us to consider that the social construction of gender has been imposed onto this 
material reality. The differentiation between sexed bodies does not undermine the common 
humanity of subjects and thus does not determine a system of oppression. It is the imposition of 
the social construction of gender that creates a system of oppression. This system is maintained 
by subjects with choice and agency, as seen in the act of rape. Considering the categories of sex 
does not invoke biological essentialism, as the proposal is not that ‘men rape because they are 
biologically male’; it is that being biologically male within the structure of patriarchy provides a 
potential route to dominance, given the social construction of gender. Men who rape exploit this 
potentiality through choosing a dominant self-construction. The social construction that devalues 
women’s embodiment provides a language through which men can sexually use women without 
negative self-reflection. 
 
The moment of rape must be theorised and it cannot be reduced to discourse. It is when we 
theorise this moment of rape that we can theorise the rapist. Rape is not reducible to discourse 
either as a mere construction of criminalisation or as the discursive arbitration between competing 
accounts provided by the media and court trials. In the moment of rape, the victim experiences 
impotence against the rapist’s desire for dominance. Her words, her cries, her silent withdrawal, 
her confused participation are enacted within his definition of the situation. The definition of her 
as a sexual object is imposed and she is thus unable to assert her position of subjectivity and 
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negotiate an identity in interaction. The experience of being raped provides a moment that 
ruptures your sense of self. The moment shapes how you see the world and how you are able to 
interact with the world. Many victims find that the moment returns to them in the form of 
flashbacks. Given the tendency for victims to blame themselves (encouraged through the cultural 
interpretations of rape) they may reconsider the moment preceding the rape to analyse how they 
could have prevented it from happening. Rape is an act in the world directed by a subject. Rape 
is a reality. It is a reality that people like to deny either through blaming victims or demonising 
the rapist. The blame of victims can give a sense of safety that it won’t happen to you. The 
demonisation of rapists has a similar function, as it suggests that the rapist can be easily identified 
and thus avoided. The demonisation of the rapist has a further function: it leaves the structures of 
society unquestioned, thus alleviating any sense of collective responsibility for the creation of an 
environment that facilitates the systematic rape of women and girls. To move beyond widespread 
sexual violence we must grapple with the uncomfortable reality that men choose to rape and that 
the social construction of gender facilitates this choice.  
 
So yes, in the moment of rape he has power and she does not. In other instances he may be 
vulnerable, he may be oppressed, but this is not determining his choice to rape in that moment – 
the moment of dominance. Theorising power as absent and present in the act of rape does not 
need to theorise it is always absent and present. I chose to write a thesis on the rapist; I do not see 
myself as an eternal victim unable to gain agency. The denial of subjectivity in the act of rape 
was an attack on my subjectivity, but this did not mean an irredeemable removal of my position 
as a subject. Radical feminism has never been about lying down defeated, wallowing in our 
victimhood. We claim that we have been victimised to fight back against the structure that 
facilitates our victimisation and then blames us for it; to reverse the shame onto men who rape; 
to collectivise and support each other through the trauma; to raise awareness of the systematic 
treatment of women and girls in this way; to be there for the next generation, many of whom will 
experience what we have experienced. Theorising how one is oppressed is precisely to challenge 
the situation that causes this. There is no implication of denying women’s agency when we 
recognise that they are systematically raped. The critique of sexual objectification can be 
understood through an emphasis on women’s sexual pleasure and agency. A focus on women’s 
pleasure is not in tension with focusing on sexual violence, as one of the harms of sexual violence 
is the way in which it can stunt a victim’s ability to have fulfilling sexual relations. 
 
Reviving radical feminism can help to reject the racialised narratives of sexual violence that 
continue to be pushed by the media. In this way, intersectionality can in fact be deployed to argue 
for the need to revive not reject radical feminism. Despite the multiple revelations of sexual 
violence demonstrating that the perpetration of sexual violence is not specific to a particular racial 
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group, the reporting of these instances is not held together. This allows for white men to be 
explained through pathology/individual defects, whilst black and brown men are explained 
through a racialised narrative. The current focus on demonising and criminalising Asian people 
and the religion of Islam places Asian/Muslim men as the present threat to white girls. This is 
demonstrated by the UK reporting of child sexual exploitation. Cockbain and Tufail discuss how 
the term ‘grooming gangs’ “is itself a spurious media construct and one that has been heavily 
racialised from the very start” (2020: 5). This racialised narrative that presents sexual violence as 
a product of the ‘backward cultures’ of brown men simultaneously reinforces white supremacy 
and patriarchy. The importance of resisting these narratives can be seen from the far-Right’s use 
of these narratives to push a racist agenda under the false pretence of protecting women’s rights 
(Cockbain and Tufail 2020). If intersectionality is wrongly interpreted to mean we cannot speak 
of oppression against a class i.e. the perpetration of sexual violence by men against women and 
girls, we cannot then adequately refute the racist narratives that twist sexual violence into a racial 
threat. Focusing on the gendered dyad in explaining the rapist in the act of rape can contest sexual 
violence being falsely presented as the threat of black and brown men ‘taking’ white girls. 
Whereas I see queer theory and sex-(industry)positive feminism in opposition to radical 
feminism, I do not see intersectional feminism as being in tension with radical feminism. 
Therefore, to call for the revival of radical feminism is not to in any way dispute the value or 
presence of intersectional feminism. The reaction to rape, the representation of rape and rates of 
victimisation of rape cannot be theorised outside of intersectionality. My point is that when 
theorising the rapist in the act of rape, the most relevant factor is his performance of masculinity 
found across race and class positions.  
 
Given the prevalence of men in positions of power perpetrating rape, disenfranchisement should 
not be used as an explanation for rape. Given the widespread nature of rape it is not tenable to 
claim that all men who rape have suffered some personal tragedy, exceeding the level of tragedy 
that is a constituent part of every life. It is individual men from all walks of life and all social 
locations that choose to rape. The performance of masculinity through the act of rape is the choice 
of the rapist. Men who rape are not passive subjects who have blindly imbibed the structure of 
patriarchy, they have consciously chosen a position of dominance that is offered to them. The 
subject of rape cannot be understood outside of the structure of patriarchy because the definition 
of self and other that makes his act justified is derived from the culture. But equally the structure 
of patriarchy cannot be understood outside of the agency of subjects, because men who rape use 
the structural framing to enact the position of dominance that then perpetuates the structure. Rape 




Theorising sexual objectification as a process in the mind of the rapist achieves this concomitant 
recognition of the subject and the structure. The social construction of gender presents the sexual 
objectification of women as part of a positive masculine identity. Men who desire dominance can 
then choose to construct themselves through this social construction, providing a way of seeing 
that negates moral emotions and presents rationalisations to justify objectifying treatment. Rape 
is facilitated by the cultural framing of the sexual objectification of women but it is enacted 
consciously by men. Given how the recognition of subjectivity is foundational to being a subject, 
his denial of her subjectivity is an active distortion of consciousness. This account does not suffer 
from overprediction, as simply being a man in patriarchy is not sufficient to become a rapist. The 
desire for dominance and the active mental process of constructing oneself as dominant is a 
necessary component of becoming a rapist. This explains why not all men rape, whilst 
acknowledging how many men do rape. This account does not deny women agency as it is an 
account of men’s consciousness in enacting sexual objectification. Equally this account allows us 
to consider how women’s agency is constrained in the act of rape as when her subjectivity is 
denied he can proudly violate her, she becomes a mere prop in his self-aggrandisement. 
 
Given this theory of rape, what should we do? I have argued against reliance on the criminal 
justice system as a solution to the problem of sexual violence against women because the law has 
been involved in the construction of women as sexual objects. The low reporting and low 
conviction rates for rape are products of its collusion with the structural framing. But even if we 
had high reporting and conviction rates, we could never get on top of the problem, as the structural 
framing means more men would keep choosing dominance, even if many of them were being 
caught. Furthermore, the criminal justice system is central to class and race oppression. 
Advocating this system as the solution therefore advocates the disproportionate imprisonment of 
working class and black men, and fighting one form of oppression through perpetuating another 
cannot be accepted. I also do not agree with the framework of retribution, as rape is a serious 
social harm but so is imprisonment (Knopp 1994; Ilea 2018). The harm he causes is not removed 
through meting out harm to him. A vision of justice should alleviate harm instead of producing 
more harm (Canning and Tombs 2021). Furthermore, sexual violence can be seen as an 
institutionalised form of treatment in prisons with the use of strip searches (Davis 2003). In order 
to stand firmly against sexual violence it is not thereby consistent to support the prison system. 
An abolitionist perspective when theorising rape is important given the function of rape and the 
demonisation of the rapist in justifying the whole system of incarceration.  
 
Taking a non-retributive, non-adversarial approach can allow more focus on helping victims of 
rape. From my own experience the criminal justice approach stood in the way of seeking help. 
The fear of being forced to report or having the choice taken away because of safeguarding 
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children, can lead to further isolation. I propose we push for a system that recognises her harm 
without needing to prove what happened or seek individual retribution. Despite the tendency for 
radical feminist theory to be accompanied by calls for increased criminalisation, it must also be 
remembered that radical feminism founded rape crisis centres and refuges (Mackay 2015). 
Cockbain and Tufail note how the government funding for sexual violence support services is a 
fraction of the spending for investigations and inquiries, for example: “the total funding for rape 
crisis services across England and Wales was just £7.2 million in 2018/19, compared with 
Operation Stovewood’s [investigation into child sexual abuse in Rotherham] budget of £12 
million” (2020: 21). This conception of justice, which piles money into investigations and 
inquiries to establish the ‘facts’ of the case and then invests further in punitive measures of 
incarceration, leaves victims behind. 
 
The solution I propose from this theory of rape is radical social change. We need to change the 
context of subject production. We must refuse the presentation of women as sexual objects. This 
requires resisting the social construction of gender to ensure that the common humanity of women 
is accepted. This would remove the structural framing that provides men with rationalisations for 
rape. It is necessary to empower girls and women to not seek validation from men’s sexual 
attention, to see their bodies as a site for their own pleasure, power and strength. We need to 
believe women and make men feel ashamed for sexually objectifying treatment, bringing out the 
distortion of consciousness/the perversity of their acts, and thus rejecting the normalisation of this 
treatment of women and girls. We need to reverse the shame that is placed on her in order to place 
shame on him. The ‘Me Too’ movement provides some way towards this realignment of shame, 
but this is held back through the contradictions of the culture on the one hand condemning these 
men and then constructing men and women through a binary that rests on her sexual 
objectification.  
 
We must also not demonise the rapist. Instead, we must recognise that he is a subject who has 
chosen dominance in the facilitating culture of patriarchy. He is not an evil monster, but a subject 
who chose a position that is widely accepted by society. If we recognise the subjectivity of the 
rapist and recognise the role of masculinity in the act of rape, this takes away the rationalisation 
that allows men to rape without identifying themselves as a rapist. This is not a call to emancipate 
our ‘true’ selves or rid the world of all social construction. We make our own meaning and hence 
there is no true self, and we will always construct the world through interpretations and frames of 
reference. But, as fundamentally intersubjective and embodied subjects, subjectivity must be 
recognised. This requires refusing the positioning of women as sexual objects to sexually serve 
men, and it requires recognising the choice of the rapist to construct himself dominantly through 
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